



THE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS IN CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY CHOICE

**A Case Study on Megawati Soekarnoputri, the Fifth
President of the Republic of Indonesia and the
Multidimensional Crisis 1998 - 2004**

The dissertation is submitted to the Institute of Media and
Communication Science, the Faculty of Mathematic and Natural
Science, Technical University of Ilmenau Germany in partial fulfillment
of the requirement of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

By

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**ILMENAU GERMANY
2008**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been attached for the award of any other degree or diploma of the university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.

Yogyakarta, June 4th, 2008

A handwritten signature in dark ink, featuring a large, stylized loop at the beginning and a series of smaller, connected strokes that form the rest of the name.

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APPROVAL

This dissertation has been defended successfully in the front of the Commission of the Promotion, Institute of Media and Communication Science, The Faculty of Mathematic and Natural Science, the Technical University of Ilmenau, Germany, on Wednesday, June, 4th, 2008, at 09.00 in IBZ building, the campus of TUI, Germany.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Thanks to God, my Holy Father who gives and creates everything best for me, especially in a very valuable time of my academic life.

I would like to express my gratitude to all those who gave me the possibility to complete this dissertation.

I am grateful to the commission of the promotion in Technical University of Ilmenau, Germany, namely Prof. Dr. Alfred Kirpal, Prof. Dr. Andreas Will, and Prof. Dr. J Wolling for giving me the opportunity to share my dissertation in a greatest academic forum.

I want to be deeply indebted to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Martin Loeffelholz from the Technical University Ilmenau Germany who helped, encouraged and advised me in all the time of the dissertation processes, especially in many difficult situations. My heartfelt appreciation also goes to Prof Dr Klaus Dieter Altmeppen from the Catholic University of Eichstaett, Ingolstadt, Germany and Dedy Nur Hidayat, PhD from University of Indonesia for their willingness to be my reviewers in the middle of their business and a huge of activities.

My acknowledgement is also due to the State Secretariat and the Presidential Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia for giving me all the major and important data for this dissertation. Especially thank Drs. Garibaldi Sujatmiko, MA, who in 2003 – 2005 was the Head of the Bureau of the Press and Media, the State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia. And also, many thanks to the all staffs at the Headquarter of the Indonesian Police who also provided the important data.

My gratitude also goes to the following institutions and individuals, for the contribution, support, and encouragement, both physic and psychological, material and also spiritual:

1. Yayasan Slamet Rijadi, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
2. Technical University of Ilmenau, Germany
3. Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
4. The Faculty of Social and Political Science, Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University
5. Dr. Thomas Hanitzsch, Dr Liane Rothenberger, Ms. Fransisca Oehmer, Mr. Andreas Schwarz
6. My friends Lukas, Setio, Suryo, Andreas, Ndari, Anita, Agus, Ninik, Siyamto, Bambang KP, Bambang Wir, Nindito, and others.

Last but not least, I would like to special thank my mother, my lovely husband Henry “Bang Thoyib” Saragih and my family. Without their supports, I am not able to be me as right now, with all good academic attributes. Cause, a part of my success was stimulated by them and the rest parts are the result of my hard work.

Ilmenau, June, 4, 2008

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ABSTRACT

Crisis can happen any time and any where. Whether the crisis comes in or out, it depends on the effectiveness of the crisis communication strategy. Communication strategy becomes a very important key for crisis recovery. Based on the several researches, it was found that the strategy is selected on the basis of constructed reality about the crisis situation and other things related to the crisis. Based on my point of view, to select the strategy does not only refer to the situation of crisis but also any other factors. Referring to the system theory a strategy is selected on the basis of the structural characters of the organization and social system. On the other hand, based on the structuration theory, the strategy not only can be created in line with the character of the structure but also creates the structure. It means that the actor is active to create new action and new structure.

This dissertation explained the crisis communication strategy applied by the Presidents in responding to the multidimensional crisis that happened during 1998 – 2004 and the contextual factors in the strategy choice. Focus of this dissertation is the crisis communication strategy chosen by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth President of the Republic of Indonesia and the choices. The strategy is identified by exploring, analyzing and interpreting the content or text of the written speeches of the President. Interpretive approach and discourse analysis was applied. The context is also identified by analyzing and interpreting the text of news editorial from two Indonesian national newspapers. The structuration theory and a little part of system theory, for comparing purpose, are used as a basis of interpretation to link or to connect the text to the context.

The dissertation shows that the President tended to apply the defensive strategy. It is the strategy to defense ourselves in responding to the “publics accusation” by avoiding that we do a wrong or mistake, or contribute to the mistake. The dissertation also shows that this strategy can be connected by (1) the Public Relations practices which are more technical, mechanistic and applies one way relationship model, (2) the organizational structure which is structured, formal, and centralistic, and (3) the personal characters and attributes of the President which are more introvert and mindless.

In conclusion, the selected strategy or the action is influenced by the structural factors, both in an organization level and a larger system. The context of the choice is the structure. It was produced by the previous dominant people in the past. It constrains and also enables the current and next presidents in responding to the crisis. Unfortunately, in the case of Megawati Soekarnoputri, actor failed to break the chain of the interplay between a structure and an agency. Structure and the structure reproducing are more dominant. Based on the finding, I would like to say that it is not enough to understand the crisis situation to select the best strategy to respond to the crisis. It needs understanding the rules, resources and the structure in an environment and also the interplay between the structure and the strategy.

Keywords: crisis communication, strategy, defensive, accommodative, structure, agency.

CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION

Crisis can happen any time and any where. Organization and individual can face a crisis. If it happens, an organization and an individual stand on a critical or crucial time. Staying alive or collapse of an organization or individual depends on the way they manage the crisis. Applying a wrong way in crisis management will lead them to get collapse. Therefore, the way of crisis management, called strategy, would be planned carefully. Communication is inherent in crisis management. As stated by Benoit (Coombs 2001:321) communication is a part of the success of a crisis management effort. What an organization or a person says and does is critical for the success. Hence, it is important to think both crisis management strategy and crisis communication strategy. The two strategies can not be separated. A right communication strategy choice can be meant an effective crisis management strategy.

Crisis communication is one of the public relations fields. There are several researches about it. Almost is in context of business and corporation and the crisis related to business or profit organization. Based on the past researches, it has been found that there are some factors that influence the leader to apply certain strategy. It means that the strategy is selected by considering the several factors, which I identify as factors related to the crisis. I thought to find out of the contextual factors, it needs to use structuration theory. It offers the thesis that the organizational action, as well as the strategy of crisis communication, can be created not only because of the structure or system, as explained on system theory, but also of the individual's own free will. So, leader and his action can be seen not as a part of the structure, but as an agent who is capable to act by his own free will, creativity, and to create innovation.

By utilizing some concepts and propositions in those researches, the dissertation is purposed to analyze crisis communication strategy applied by public or political leaders in context of public or political organization. Multidimensional crisis that has happened in Indonesia comes to be a research case. This dissertation is intended to explain the strategy of crisis communication which is applied by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth President of Republic of Indonesia and the contextual factors could be connected to the strategy choice. The explanation is started by Chapter One that describes (1) the research background, derived into the explanation of crisis situation in Indonesia and its impact on the presidents' image. In this part is also explained factors might be the reasons of the failure of the government and

president to overcome the crisis faster. Those factors are their low sense of crisis and bad relations with the press and publics; (2) theoretical problem explains the important concepts of crisis communication strategy and the factors related to the strategy choice; and (3) research problem. It is followed by (4) the methodology; (5) research delimitation; and also (6) the description of the dissertation structure.

1.1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND

1.1.1. Indonesia during the crisis

It is not deniable that Indonesia has ever experienced crisis. Almost all of the Indonesian Presidents admitted that Indonesia was in crisis and in a very crucial and critical time for Indonesian survival. Different from other Asian countries, Indonesian government was assessed not quite successful in dealing with the crisis. Crisis was not resolved in a short time, but contrarily, crisis developed to be worse and very serious. Single crisis that was just a monetary crisis was becoming to be multidimensional crisis. It indicated that the Indonesia governments, and also the Presidents, have failed in dealing with that crisis. The incapability of this country to come out from crisis quickly has not only destroyed the image of Indonesia, but also image of Indonesian governments and the Presidents.

It is not easy to construct an image, so is to maintain and regain the already-destroyed-image. This is what Indonesia is dealing with currently. Incidences happened in successions, whose effect was on the establishment of an adverse nation image on its own point of view, moreover on that of other nations. Below are some economical, political, and social events occurred during 1998 - 2004 which have demolished the image of Indonesia. The successive events have taken place during the reign of four Presidents, these were Haji Muhammad Soeharto (HM Soeharto), Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (BJ Habibie), Kiai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid (KH Abdurrahman Wahid/ Gus Dur) and Megawati Soekarnoputri.

It is difficult to identify the real causes of Indonesian crisis that has been occurring since the middle of 1997. Economical problem that occurred in Philippine, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand was assumed as the triggered events for the Indonesian economical problem. Begun in 1997, Indonesia has experienced many incidences that deteriorated the national economy. A serial of incidences has been intertwined one to another with an unexpected huge incidence at its end that has brought destruction and loss with it. Started on the middle of 1997, the value of Indonesian currency (Rupiah/ Rp) declined toward US Dollar. The value of one US dollar that is equal with Rp 2.500,00 in time before 1997 changed into Rp 16.700,00 on June 17, 1998.

The rupiah devaluation against US dollar was followed by instability of rupiah value. It causes the degree of inflation hit into seven times more in 1998. Many international, national, regional and local-scale companies in Indonesia were bankrupt. It brought the problems of unemployment. Worker termination has increased the number of unemployment and people who have poor economical condition. The number of unemployment increased, from 4.1 million people in 1997 to 5.1 million people in 1998 (Julianery 2002: 39-42). This situation encouraged Indonesian people to enforce Soeharto to descend from his reign for he was considered to be unable to overcome the people's economic problems. The requirement was then followed by huge chaotic actions in 13-15 May 1998 in such ways as arsons, massacre, vandalism, plundering and even Chinese women rape. Media reported that there was a million of people dead, injured, raped and also billion rupiahs was lost (Kompas Cyber Media, 14 May 2002). This tragedy followed the tragedy of Trisakti 12 May 1998 that there were four students dead¹. The same incident occurred again in Semanggi on November 13th 1998². This incident caused 13 people were dead and 253 people got injured.

Those incidents insisted on Soeharto, overwhelmed by the poor image shaped by the people, resigned in May 21, 1998. However, the economic crisis was still continuing. Incapability of the government and the unsupportive political situation in that time have affected on the Indonesian's image on international publics. It is characterized by the decline of investors from overseas, the decreasing of tourism visitors, the threat of economic embargo from the international donors, the severance of contracts of international commercial collaborations either in private or public sectors, and the descend of share value in stock exchange. The decline of investment rate is started in 2001 that shown by the decreasing of accepted investment and the low of investment realization (Gianie 2002:94-97).

In the other aspect, in 1998, Indonesia has experienced the worst of national security during 32 years of HM Soeharto's reign. It is indicated by the travel warning or ban to Indonesia launched by several countries. The number of tourism visitors that was 5.185.243 people in 1997, decreased into 4.606.416 people in 1998 (Julianery 2002: 58). The national tourism investment fell into 18.6%. Indonesian tourism achievement is in worst position in the

¹ Related to the incident, two personnel of Indonesian National Police (POLRI) namely, Agus Tri Heryanto and Pariyo were brought to the court. On August 12th 1998, Agus received ten months imprisonment and Pariyo received 4 months because they were stated guilty not obey the institutional instruction and overused their authority in handling Trisakti demonstration. They were not stated as the actors of the students firing (Headquarter of Indonesian National Police 1999:253-264). This case is still on process till 2005 because assessed by some people that it was not clear yet. The real actors were not found.

² In this incident, the Minister of Security and Defense of the Republic of Indonesia admitted that there were 175 military personnel behaved too defensive and ignored the procedure, shoot and hit the students.

last ten years (Kristianto 2002:166-168). In the period of 1997-2001, as quoted from *The World Competitiveness Year Book IMD 2002*, Indonesia has experienced bad rating in the world competition, on the aspect of prospect and business climate. In 1997, Indonesia was in the level “38”, in 1998 it went down into the level “40” and in 2001 Indonesia was in the position “49”. It means that in four years (1998-2001) Indonesia was in fifth lowest rating in aspects of economic growth, political situation, business and infrastructure (Julianery 2002:68-70). The data show that Indonesian’s image was clearly not conducive for gaining high achievement in the world competitive economy and business.

The leadership of Soeharto was authorized onto BJ Habibie. Still with the same hope, the people required the economic improvement, by eradicating collusion, corruption and nepotism (CCN) that was indicated as a culture of Soeharto’s regime and thought as the resources of economic problems. During his rule, the echo of demand to judge Soeharto as the promulgator of collusion, corruption and nepotism and crisis roots were getting more intense. Even though Habibie took some breakthrough new policies, for example, press freedom, people still considered him as just the same figure as Soeharto, the part of New Order. During his term East Timor was exempted of Indonesia at August 30, 1999, which was the result of polling full of intimidating action, violence and human rights violation among East-Timoreste by Indonesian military. The separation of East Timor, one of the twenty seven provinces in Indonesia in that time, is believed as the biggest mistake and the main source of the fail of the BJ Habibie’s presidency (Sugiya, 2002:223).

In 1999 an election was held, which bore the figure of Gus Dur or Abdurrahman Wahid as the fourth President, substituting for BJ Habibie. The image of Abdurrahman Wahid as a nationalist, democrat and humanist lead to the birth of trust among people that the new president would bring a new bright hope to the future of the nation. However, during his rule, the crisis did not cease yet. Social crisis, such as conflicts in various dimensions were conceived to be purged. Frequency and intensity of crime, ethnic, religion and region conflict was increasing. The conflicts of -- such as religion or ethnicity -- related chaos -- have increased and taken place in many areas since 1997. Big ethnic unrests happened in 1999 in Kabupaten Sambas, West Kalimantan³, which was followed by the same unrest that happened in Poso, Central Sulawesi (1998-2002), in Maluku and North Maluku (January 1999- April 2002). This

³At least, there were 11 serious ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan since 1950 until 1999. Conflict occurred in Sambas (January-April 1999) involved ethnic Melayu -- Dayak -- Madura. In this conflict 68.000 Madura people have been evacuated, and 200 people were dead. Thousand of buildings were burned, public facilities were damaged and also economy and business life were inhibited (Tridianto 2002:321-334).

kind of conflicts continually followed the conflicts that occurred before, namely conflict in Kupang (November 30-December 2, 1998), Ketapang and Kupang in 1998 and Karawang, West Java in 1999. On February until April 2001 horizontal conflict also happened in Sampit, Central Kalimantan⁴. Most of the mass riots above occurred in the era of KH Abdurrahman Wahid's administration, but some of them are continuing, until the Megawati's administration. All the mass riots have caused hundred(s) people died and thousand(s) people were evacuated. Until April 5th 2002, recorded there were 1.247.449 Indonesian people lived as refugees in their own country (Sugiyana 2002:335-337). Those conflicts and riots contributed the difficulties of this country to resolve the crisis. The repeating conflicts, such as occurred in Poso and Maluku, indicated that the efforts of the governments to make peace among people from different ethnics were not quite successful. Table 1 below shows the total important crimes that are related to the ethnic, religion and race conflicts, based on the Indonesian National Police administration.

Table 1
Ethnic, Religion and Race Crimes⁵
2001-2003

Year	Crime Total	Crime Clearance	Percentage
2001	9	7	77.77%
2002	11	8	72.72%
2003	10	6	60%
Total	30	21	70%

Source: Indonesian National Police Today, Annual Report 1 July 2004

In the aspect of crime, such as robbery and plundering, raged over in every places of Indonesia, not only in frequency but also in intensity. More than 80 cases of robbery occurred during 1998-2002. Mass reactions to those robberies were manifested in various forms. Even, in some cases, the mass' reaction is killing the victim (Suwardiman 2002:346-366).

Beyond of the economic and social crisis, political crisis has taken place. It is indicated by the increasing number of political conflicts in the level of unit (actor, group) and the level of

⁴ In Sampit, the tragedy involved two ethnics, Dayak and Madura. Based on National Committee of Human Rights of Indonesia (Komnas HAM-Ind), the tragedy caused 352 people died and not less than 25 thousands Madura people evacuated. (Triardianto, 2002:321-334).

⁵ Types of crime were various. Only few of those crimes are categorized by Indonesian National Police as ethnic, religion and race crimes. The National Police of Republic of Indonesia has a certain criteria for categorizing the type of crimes.

system, internal or external, from local, regional to the national level. Chaniago (2001:137-148) stated that the sources of political crisis in Indonesia were the uncontrolled and ambitious power gaining in the level of political elites. Under Gus Dur's administration, conflicts between executive and legislative were put to the front. There were five cases in which Gus Dur and the parliament have different opinion about the issues, as follow; (1) the retirement of the head of Indonesian Police, (2) the effort to retire the President of Indonesian Bank, (3) the replacement of the three cabinet ministers, (4) the proposal of the candidate of head Indonesian Supreme Court, and (5) the revocation of Tap MPRS no XXV/MPRS/1966,⁶ (Santoso and Meming 2002:205-207). This legislative-executive conflict was predicted as one important factor of his failure to hold the power until the end of the presidential period.⁷

One of good "political will" of Gus Dur was his efforts to diminish the number of corruption, collusion and nepotism acts. The first step of those efforts was bringing HM Soeharto, the second president, to the trial in the case of corruption. But, it was not successful, neither did ones on other corrupt culprits. The trial in the same case on Tommy, Soeharto's youngest child, also failed, including the police failure to pursue his flight⁸. These failures were followed by the unsuccessful efforts of government and Indonesian attorney to bring many other corruptors into the court. Several commissions established by Gus Dur were also not successful to overcome the multidimensional crisis. Ironically, Gus Dur lost his position as president by parliament's impeachment because of corruption issue. About the number of corruption acts, it was difficult for Indonesia to decrease them. This situation was very bad for the image of Indonesia on international publics. From time to time, Indonesia always in bad rating in the list of very corrupted countries.

⁶ TAP MPRS no XXV/1966 explains about the prohibition of spreading of Marxism, Communism and Leninism.

⁷ Gus Dur has lost his position as president since he got impeachment from the Indonesian Parliament in case of corruption and budget deviation of Bulog and financial aid from Brunei. The case was popular by the label "Brunei and Buloggate". Bulog is the government institution which deals with the logistic management. Gus Dur was accused doing corruption and using the financial aid from Sultan Brunei for his personal purposes. He, finally, had to account for the case in the front of Indonesian Parliament, but his accountability was not accepted by the parliament. In the political discourse, the failure of Gus Dur to account for the budget was because of political interests than the corruption crime itself.

⁸ Tommy, the youngest child of HM Suharto was brought to the court in the *ruislag* between PT Goro Bathara Sakti and Bulog. In the court, Tommy was stated not guilty. This decision was assessed by publics as the worst time for law enforcement in the era of BJ Habibie's administration (Suryaningtyas, 2002:212-214). However, in later time, Tommy received imprisonment for his other cases, but, before he did his punishment, he escaped. The Indonesian national Police and the Indonesian attorney personnel have failed in pursuing him, even though after a period of time, the police successfully arrested him.

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR)⁹ and Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) as the highest Indonesian parliament held a session and inaugurated Megawati as the fifth president of Republic of Indonesia. The session was claimed to be very democratic. People thought that it could be an appropriate beginning for a crisis solution. On the other hand, there were problems not responded immediately by Megawati and her cabinet. The demand of radical Islamic groups to break up the relationship of Indonesia-USA, concerning with the terrorism action on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, was very intense (Danudjaja 2001:98). The circumstance was followed by issue of sweeping movement over white people in Indonesia. In Solo, 29 October 2001, sweeping had been done by hundreds of Laskar Jundullah, Kokam, Brigade Hisbullah and Laskar Hisbullah Sunan Bonang. Sweeping has been done in every hotel (Danudjaja, 2001:97-98). It caused many white foreign people leave or canceled their visit to Indonesia. Next, other countries attached the label for Indonesia as the network of terrorists. Bomb terror occurred for many times and in many places. There are 58 cases of bombing, and 12 unexploded bombs were found in between 1997-2002 (Suwardiman and Kristanto 2002:307-313). Until 2005 in the later government's administration era bomb terrors were still continuing.

In the meantime, the other events related to government were still ongoing. Human right violation done by state apparatuses in the cases of Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Maluku¹⁰; demonstration by publics to demand the change of the president and the government's policies; and the retirement and replacement of some cabinet minister are three of big political events during 1998-2002. More than 200 times publics' demonstration has occurred during 1997-2002. Almost of all were brought about by higher education's students. Generally, they demanded to government to resolve crisis and to change the presidents and some of cabinet members. They also expressed their disappointment and disagreement to the government's policies, acts and statements (Erianto and Kristianto, 2002: 224-264). Some of those demonstrations were being brutal and anarchistic. It made the social and political situation became worse.

⁹ With the president, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) has legislative power. It means that DPR has the authority to approve the bill. All members of DPR are the part of the members of MPR. MPR holds the highest people sovereignty. It has authority to draw up the constitution and state policy and appoint the president and the vice president.

¹⁰ There were many cases of human right violations during Indonesia in crisis. Referrings to the document written by Research and Development Unit of KOMPAS, during 1997-1999, military personnel were suspected kidnapping several activists, firing several students in Trisakti and Semanggi tragedies, doing violence in Aceh (1996-1999) and also in East Timor (1999) and killing Theys Hiyo Eluay, Head of Papua people board presidium (2001). In some cases, the Indonesian court decided there were no human rights violations, or categorized as very hard human right violations, such a case of the killing of four students of Trisakti. (Meming and Santoso 2002:303-306).

Table 2
Anarchism in Demonstration
2001-2003

Year	Crime Total	Crime Clearance	Percentage
2001	22	18	81.81%
2002	20	17	85%
2003	31	21	64.74%
Total	75	56	74.66%

Source: Indonesian National Police Today, Annual Report 1 July 2004

In another aspect, in this period of time, the changes of cabinet ministers have happened for many times in the short period of time; (1) in BJ Habibie's administration there were three changes of cabinet, (2) in time of KH Abdurrahman Wahid, it has happened fifteen times (Sugiyu, 2002:220-223). In general, the changes of cabinet ministers and the cabinets were done many times during 1998-2004. Only in a short time, the Presidential replacements have been done four times, the changes of the cabinets have been done six times, namely Kabinet Pembangunan VI (March 19th 1993-March 16th 1998), Kabinet Pembangunan VII (March 16th 1998 – May 21st 1998), Kabinet Reformasi Pembangunan (May 23rd 1998-October 29th 1999), Kabinet Persatuan Nasional (October 29th 1999 – August 10th 2000), Kabinet Persatuan Nasional II (August 26th 2000 – July 23rd 2001), Kabinet Gotong Royong (Agust 10th 2001) and Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu (October 24th 2004). This fast changing indicated that people did not find yet the leaders as their expectation. They need leader who is able to handle the crisis successfully.

Based on the explanation above, we can see how hard the crisis situation has to be faced by Indonesia and Indonesian people. Kompas editorial, one of the biggest Indonesian national newspapers described the crisis situation in Indonesia, as below:

“After the financial crisis happened on July 1997, in the same time, automatically our economy was totally damaged. Banks were closed down, conglomerates bankrupted, the unemployment was increasing, all of us were trapped again in the group of poor countries. This situation was worsened by the political crisis happened in the later time. After the resign of HM Soeharto from his presidency on May 1998, this country did not stop experiencing the political conflicts. [...] The difficulties were still added by the several conflicts that happened in the several areas, from Aceh to Papua. We are like facing something worst. We are really in the tears hill.” (Kompas, December 29th 2001).

Crisis, multidimensional crisis in Indonesia, which has described by Kompas above seems a very sorrowful drama, but it was very real if referring to the aforementioned description. Some people thought that until 2005, after eight years crisis has began, Indonesia was still in crisis. They said that the face of Indonesia has to be made up. Many areas and aspects of Indonesian life kept going on the unexpected road, especially since the roots or sources of the problem of crisis were not resolved yet. Ongoing crisis and its damages indicate that Indonesia, especially the governments have failed to prevent crisis occurrence and to overcome the crisis. Crisis which occurred in Indonesia was because of the low sense of crisis of the government and also all internal publics (Jacob Oetama, 2001:176). The national daily news, Media Indonesia, wrote on its editorial, "Government has lost of the sense of crisis. There is no fear to the fluctuation of rupiah values, there is no worrying about the decreased investment and real sectors that have not raised yet" (LP3ES, 2003:124). Sense of crisis is sensitivity of person or organization to the potential existence of crisis. The low of crisis sense was indicated by unwillingness and/ or incapability of the government to listen to, moreover to find, the developing issues, hopes and demands, opinions and criticism of the society, while in the discourse of the people, government can find the early signals of a potential issues to be a crisis. This negligence of crisis signals is often labeled as low sense of crisis. This failure in capturing crisis signals makes the crisis evolving bigger. The government's powerlessness in overcoming the reports on issues around the crisis, primarily via the Internet, is considered as the biggest mistake of the government. The Internet that is globalizing, that can be access by anyone and free from anyone's control, including the government, regardless its accuracy, has more or less impacts on the government's image in the public's view. After the fall of HM Soeharto, along with the press freedom that perceived by its actors as "allowing the reporting of anything", makes the government and its PR practices that implement one-way communication pattern, fails to manage the public discourse. In other way, Kompas, national daily news, in its editorial, stated that there were several factors that made Indonesian governments have a low sense of crisis; (1) there is a deep discrepancy of economical condition. Some parts of political elites in the government and its publics did not really feel and experience the economical problem; (2) the Indonesian political elites are not usual to behave democratically. They generally live in the engineered atmosphere and dirigisme, difficult to accept different opinion and interests; (3) Indonesian leaders are not cohesive. They generally moved on their own way, and their own interests (Oetama, 2001:176-177).

According to the Sudarsono's exploration (2003), the Indonesian multidimensional crisis is systemic, so has to be resolved by systematical efforts based on system thinking. Governments who play the key role to resolve the crisis have to think the crisis as a system, that is a product of interconnected and interacted dynamically events or actions which occurred in the certain period of time. Unfortunately, almost all of the Indonesian Presidents have failed to think systematically in resolving the crisis. It is indicated by HM Soeharto, the second of Indonesian President in the end of his administration, has no capability to learn (disability to learn). "He is trapped by 'the parable of boiled frog'," wrote Sudarsono in his books.

"Even though has realized that in the middle of the crisis situation, the President HM Soeharto was not identifying clearly sooner the structure and the system crisis behavior and also the resolution. Indonesian people are not carried to the comprehensive scenario...[...]. The solution of crisis is brought about by the President was describing in the very general main points and not giving the convinced direction." (Sudarsono, 2003:118)

On the other way, BJ Habibie, the third president, referring to Sudarsono's findings, has failed also to think systematically. He, moreover, did not realize that crisis has occurred, even though, finally he realized that Indonesia has to be faced very hard crisis situation. BJ Habibie did two things in dealing with the crisis, (1) fixes that fail, and (2) shifting the burden. It means that BJ Habibie's efforts to resolve the crisis leads to create new problem or make the problem becomes worse (Sudarsono 2003: 152). Gus Dur, the fourth president, have tried to identify the main sources of crisis and its resolution, but, referring to his speeches, Gus Dur was still difficult to identify these sources of crisis, the root of problem and the solutions. Gus Dur just said that there were so many hard tasks, not only for the government in overcoming the crisis, but also for establishing the national integration. One solution of Gus Dur, as done by the last two presidents, is shifting the burden. Governance restructuring is the manifestation of this shifting the burden (Sudarsono 2003:153-173). The fifth president, Megawati Soekarno Putri was also not explaining the variables of the causes of crisis, how they are affected to each other and the kind of crisis structure which can describe the anticipation toward the structure and crisis resolution (Sudarsono 2003: 197). The explanation above shows us that Indonesian governments did not only fail in issues management, but also in the whole of crisis management. The failure in crisis management made crisis going to be worse. It also means that the nation and also presidents' image were going worse.

1.1.2. The Relationship between Governments and Publics.

The relationship between an organization and its publics is dynamic. The relationship can change or be different in the different time. In crisis, positive relationship between an organization and its publics is very helpful to recover the crisis. The relationship, whether positive or negative, can be seen by analyzing (1) the image of an organization on the publics, (2) an organization's views about media, and (3) the position/the importance of public relations for an organization.

The following description is about the relationship between the Indonesian governments, especially the Indonesian presidents, and the publics. This kind of relationship might color the process of crisis recovery.

1.1.2.1. Image of the Presidents

This prolonged crisis¹¹ can be a predictor of inability of the government to resolve the multidimensional crisis. It made the government's reputation was not good on publics. The repeated president successions with such a relatively short intervals and short ruling period, particularly after the downfall of Soeharto, was the symbol of Indonesian people's quest for an appropriate president. It also indicates that people were not sure that presidents, with her or his staffs, can control the crisis. It is a symbol of people's hopelessness to build good image for this country.

The discourse of the government having no "Sense of Crisis" also symbolizes the government reputation and of this nation as well. The government itself, including the president, is considered to have failed in handling crisis communication, in order to save their personal or her/his regime and also of the country's image. For examples, people criticized Gus Dur not proportional with his statements about the Indonesian's internal problems that delivered in many international forums. He frequently made controversial statements, policies and acts. There were 20 controversial policies and statements made by Gus Dur during 1999-2000 (Kompas, 2001: 36-37). His attitudes caused his reputation declined on Indonesian people (Satrio, 2002:210). "Media Indonesia", Indonesian national daily newspaper, wrote in its editorial 20 April 2001 about Gus Dur's statements in international public forum. Media Indonesia assessed Gus Dur was spreading terrors in the middle of crisis time. This assessment

¹¹ Megawati, the former President of Republic Indonesia, in the certain forum (Tuesday, 4 Dec 2003), said that there were many people judged that Indonesia has still been in crisis, whereas actually Indonesia was getting out from the crisis and ready to enter to the better future (Kedaulatan Rakyat 5 December 2003). It means that based on President's point of view, Indonesia has resolved the multi-dimensional crisis.

was launched based on Gus Dur's statements that there would be a national rebellion by hundreds of Islam and Christian groups if DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/ Indonesian parliament) was pressuring him to resign as President. Gus Dur also said that there were a hundred thousands of his followers in Jakarta support the continuity of his presidency.¹² Those statements, based on Media Indonesia, could be interpreted as provocative statements that potential to damage the image of president and his government (LP3ES, 2003:109). In the other editorial, Media Indonesia also said that Gus Dur was talking too much in front of the international publics (LP3ES:2003:122). Not only Gus Dur, Megawati was also judged by public as the President that didn't have enough capability to be an effective public relations for herself and her country, especially in case of terrorism in Indonesia after World Trade Center Bombing, September 11, 2001 and Bali Bombing October 12, 2002 (Media Indonesia, 28 October 2002). Her incapability to communicate to the publics made Megawati was labeled as "Mrs. Silent"¹³.

Undeniably, economical crisis, political crisis, social crisis were finally followed by crisis of public confidence on government. The reputation of the governments during the crisis has never been in good level. Table 3, 4 and 5 show the governments' achievement in economy, politic and social aspects based on publics' assessment.

Table 3
Publics' assessment on
B J Habibie's performance
(in percent)

Government's Achievement	Respondents' attitude		
	Agree	Not agree	Don't know
Successfully establishing press freedom	69.0	27.2	3.8
Successfully improving economic growth	24.6	72.9	2.5
Successfully diminishing corruption, collusion, nepotism	10.7	87.1	2.2
Successfully establishing national security	17.7	80.4	1.9

(Source: Satrio, BE 2002: 208-211)

¹² This event happened when Gus Dur received memorandum action related to his scandal, Brunei and Buloggate. The two of accountability reports of Gus Dur were rejected by the Indonesian Parliament. Its consequence was Gus Dur had to reign from his position as president.

¹³ That Megawati was criticized by publics that she is always silent, even in the crucial time, was denied by Kwik Kian Gie, the president of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia's Board of Research and Development. Kwik explained that her silent is just publics' impression that was born because of her leadership style. Kwik also said that Megawati always speaks in the certain events, such as in annually official report forum, 16 August, the anniversary of PDIP. "She is not talking too much but most of all her speeches have a big value. Golden is silent but speak out on the right moment is diamond", Kwik was closing by the statement. (Kompas Cyber Media, 30 July 2002).

Polling was conducted by Kompas¹⁴ in the end of B J Habibie's administration, October 1999, showed that 70 percent of respondents assessed that he has been failed in improving the economic, national security and law enforcement. Habibie was assessed successful only in establishing press freedom. This assessment was not different too much from publics' assessment on KH Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri

Table 4
Publics' satisfaction of
KH Abdurrahman Wahid's performance
(in percent)

Government's Achievement	Respondents' attitudes			
	2000		2001	
	January	July	January	July
Successfully improving economic growth	50.3	25.7	19.7	10.3
Successfully improving politic and national security	41.8	30.7	21.7	13.4
Successfully establishing social welfare	41.4	30.1	30.0	18.9

(Source: Satrio, BE 2002: 208-211)

Table 4 demonstrated good reputation of KH Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), but only in the first three months of his administration. In this the early of his presidency, publics were very optimistic to the capability of Gus Dur to recover the economic crisis. But, the enthusiasm of publics decreased after one year of his reign. By parliament, as a representation of publics, Gus Dur lost his power and authority as president.

Table 5
Publics' satisfaction of the performance of
Megawati Soekarnoputri
(in percent)

Government's Achievement	Respondents' attitudes		
	Oct 2001	Jan 2002	April 2002
Successfully improving economic growth	43.0	21.9	31.3
Successfully improving politic and national safety	52.4	43.1	40.1
Successfully establishing social welfare	41.5	31.6	36.4

(Source: Satrio, BE 2002: 208-211)

¹⁴ Kompas is a national daily newspaper. The polling was performed by the Department of Research and Development of Kompas. The respondents were people who have telephone lines, their age were at least 17 years old. The respondents were selected by random systemic sampling method. The data collecting was done at 15-16 October 1999, January and July 2000, January, July and October 2001, and January and April 2002. Total respondents were 12.202 people in 13 big cities in Indonesia.

Publics' satisfaction of Megawati Soekarnoputri was not different from those of KH Abdurrahman Wahid. Shown at table five, publics' satisfaction was high only in early of her reign. Some demonstrations which demand Megawati and Hamzah Haz (vice president) to resign from his and her position claimed that this government has failed in improving the Indonesian prosperity. The public's negative assessment to Megawati performance after one year of her presidency was shown by some statements that were collected by Kompas at 16-19 July 2002 (Kompas Cyber Media, 22 July 2002), as below:

"[...] After one year of Megawati's presidency, I don't see the important progress. [...] National security problem is not resolved. [...]" (Wayan Putri, 46, tour leader).

"I am very disappointed to Megawati [...]. That is a proof that she did collusion, the same as Suharto did. How she can fight for promoting justice if she herself does not have wisdom to reflect her own experience [...]. I don't believe that Megawati will be able to communicate the truth..etc." (Sari, 31, NGO in Jakarta)

"Not in a longer time, we will enter the global competition, but Megawati seems do not do anything yet. Until now, her policies are not clear enough. It seems there are many hidden interests that drive her. I am worried that annually official report forum next month will be the arena for Indonesian parties to fight for themselves. In the meantime, Megawati can not do anything." (Joni, 31, private corporate staff in Jakarta)

"In the first time, I was very optimistic. I thought that Megawati would show us her best capabilities...But, this year we can see that Megawati is so weak." (Amelia, 40, consultant in Surabaya).

In the area of human rights enforcement, publics also judged that there was no significant improvement. The political transformation from authoritarian to democratic government coupled with personal commitment in high level government position did not necessarily bring about the improvement of human right practices. Juwana (2004:50-85) wrote in his article that during period of 1998-2003, the protection and promotion of the human rights in Indonesia remain far from being as expected. The down fall of Soeharto did not make Indonesia was free from human rights abuses. The government's commitments, improvement in legal framework and the growing of the number of institutions have minimally contributed to the protection and promotion of human rights. In addition, recent negative public perception on excessive practice of human right deteriorated further this cause. Just for example, the excessive practice of human rights in recent times has been challenged by publics. Their dissatisfaction of human right issues have been often directed towards human rights activists. There have been incidents where human rights activists and their offices were attacked

by certain people and organizations. Another example, under the Habibie and Wahid administration, freedom of the press was exercised as if there were no boundaries and laws. However, recently there have been lawsuits coming from the public challenging the freedom of the press. Of course, from the perspectives of human rights activists and journalists the many cases against the press have been seen as threat to the freedom of the press. The same applies to the freedom of speech. Demonstration held in the business areas in big cities have been complained by the public due to the inconveniences they have caused. Long traffic jam, road closed and public transportation are operated are instances of these inconveniences. On the other cases, the demonstration were being uncontrolled, that caused many cases of violence, destruction of public facilities and private ownership, and also human victims. This kind perception of publics to the human right practices done by governments has contributed to the unfavorable image of the presidents.

Beyond the crisis, unfortunately the images of the four presidents of the Republic of Indonesia were not going better. The four Indonesian presidents have failed to build good image, including in the area of human rights promotion and enforcement. Bad image of the presidents, in one hand, could be caused by their failure in crisis handling, and in other hand it was a part of the crisis itself. But, it was also possible that the failure in crisis handling was caused by the presidents' image.

1.1.2.2. Media in the Presidents' Point of View

Additionally bad image of the president is also constructed by media. It can be produced by the interaction between media and presidents. How the presidents look at the media represent relationship between them. Bad relationship can produce ineffectiveness of crisis resolution. The relationship between president and media persons describes below.

One characteristics of crisis is that the press coverage to the organization which in crisis is very high. It is because in crisis people have high intention to know whatever organization responses. In the other side, media have an important role to create public impression and opinion. The capability to create public opinion makes media have big contribution to crisis resolution. Media can be helpful for organization in crisis resolution, but also, they can make the crisis is getting worst. The good relation between organization and media which is established before the crisis will be very helpful for organization to build good cooperation in communicating the crisis, and in turn in creating positive image or positive public opinion. It is the reason why organization is very necessary to establish good relation and understanding with

media. Good relationship based on organization perspective is indicated by the willingness of the media to communicate the crisis accurately, balance and positively. And, based on media perspective is indicated by the willingness of organization to give needed information, transparent dialogues, honest and not intervene them in news creating. Unfortunately, in several cases of crisis in a few countries, media tended to worsen the crisis. The consequences of democracy and freedom of the press tended to give big opportunity to the press to publish information, including information which will worsen the situation of crisis.

In case of crisis experienced by the nation, the government must be able to cooperate with the press which have very important role in creating public discourse and public opinion. Unfortunately, referring to the Presidents of the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian mass media did not give positive contribution to crisis resolution, as their expectation. The Presidents saw that the image was exacerbated by Indonesian and even overseas press, which was considered, as only oriented on the exploration and exploitation of conflict and violence as the informational commodity.

The statements that are similar were also mentioned by the presidents itself. In the end of his presidency, Gus Dur frequently complained to the media because many his statements are constructed in the wrong way by press (Danudjaja 2002: 142, Tamin, 2003: 25, Dhani, 2004:6-7). Not only Gus Dur, Megawati also complained to media. She judged that Indonesian's mass media frequently constructed imbalanced and complicated information about the government's performance that makes the problem being worse (Tamin 2003:26, Dhani 2004:5-8). In the front of the members of PDIP, 21 January 2003, Megawati said as below:

“The main task of the press is showing the justice and fairness. For you who have the tools, please show that you can act fairly. We know that in the reform era, we have to be fair. But, now, please look the news reportage, imbalance. Is it or not? Not only imbalance but it is also complicated.” (Kompas, 22 January 2003).

Kwik Kian Gie in the press conference with the title “Litbang PDIP¹⁵ menjawab” that was held on 30 July 2002, also supported Megawati's complain, that mass media often constructed the imbalance news about Megawati and her cabinet (Kompas Cyber Media, 30 July 2002). This statement was repeated in forum at December 4, 2003. Megawati said that the several critics to

¹⁵ PDIP is abbreviation of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, the biggest one of the several political parties in Indonesia. Megawati is the president of PDIP. “Litbang” means “Penelitian dan Pengembangan” (Research and Development). It is one of many units in this party. “Litbang PDIP Menjawab” (Litbang PDIP Answering) is the title of this event.

her government are not objective. Many other parts of this country, based on her point of view, have been trying to speak ill of government (Kedaulatan Rakyat 5 December 2003). Bad relation between Megawati and press was also seen when Megawati as a leader of PDIP “exiled” journalists from a certain event held by this political party on Tuesday, Dec 2, 2003 by reasoning this event was an internal party meeting and that was closed for press (Media Indonesia, Dec 3, 2003).

Moreover, both Gus Dur and Megawati were frequently acting emotionally when face to face with the journalists and suspecting that there were certain parties behind the press that want to hamper their governance. Using Gus Dur concepts, there was character assassination through the mass media (Dhani 2004: 6-7). The relationship can be called distrustful and unsupportive relationship. It is not useful for the organization to bring them out from crisis.

How the relationship between the Presidents and the media people during the reform era? Tables below describe the statements of four presidents of the Republic of Indonesia in relation with the press. Those statements can be looked as the form of the relationship between the presidents and the press.

Table 6
The Statements of HM Soeharto in Relation with the Press¹⁶

No	Date/Events	President's statements
1	15 January 1998/ President's house Jl. Cendana	President reminded the press which began incite Indonesian people and made the situation getting worse, and constructed the many issues about him and made people were confused about the case of invasion of the stores.
2	9 February 1998/ Indonesian National Press day in the State Palace	President reminded the press to cultivate wisdom on Indonesian people in order to increasing the people's media awareness.
3	16 April 1998/Bina Graha	President worried about the mass media news which was not giving the currently real situation to the Indonesian people. According to this, government would lead the press.

Source: Juli Bestian Nainggolan, Thesis, 2004, “Pers dan Kekuasaan Presiden” page 79,80.

¹⁶ The statements were delivered by HM Soeharto under the situation in which many demonstrations demanded to the government to improve the economy condition and public prosperity. Publics saw that the President has failed to reform Indonesia, so they wanted to HM Suharto resign.

The three statements above were conveyed by HM Soeharto during the situation was very critical. It was the time of Indonesia entering the crisis situation. His statements show that the President blamed the press and feel dissatisfied with it. The second president, HM Soeharto, asked to the National Press to make self recheck and self control in news reporting. He wanted news reportage was not inspired by the overseas news reportage style. He wanted that the press were not exaggerated in constructing the news about economy and social gap, opinion conflict; and didn't make disturbance and construct the news which were purposed only to the increasing of the rate of selling. He always reminded to the press about the main task of National Press that are educating and motivating people to participate in the national development. HM Soeharto also clearly said that the national press needed to be reconstructed and he wanted to control it directly. According to the statements above, it is very clear that HM Soeharto saw that the media was not professional yet. In case of the critical situation the press did not do to make the situation better but in contrast, the press made the situation was worse.

However, during in his presidency before the time of crisis, it can be said that in Soeharto's presidency, the relation of the President and the press was not equal. There was domination done by president to the press but the press felt comfortable with this dependency and using it to demand the government fulfill their economy life (Nainggolan, 2004:80). It seems that the relationship between the government and the press was very "nice", comfortable for the two parties. But, this kind relationship was not good in the perspective of the press freedom and democracy.

Different from the prior Presidents, BJ Habibie, the later president showed the opposite approach to the media. Table 7 shows his statements about the Indonesian press.

Table 7
The Statements of BJ Habibie in Relation with the Press

No	Date/Event	President's statements
1	26 May 1998/ Bina Graha, meeting with the community leaders	President gave commitment to revoke Permenpen (Peraturan Menteri Penerangan/ The Regulation by the Minister of Public Information) No 1/1984 about SIUPP (Surat Ijin Usaha dan Penerbitan Pers/Legal Permit for Business and Press Publishing). President also opened the possibility to rehabilitate three printed media that have ever been closed down.
2	6 June 1998/Meeting with editors and journalists at Wisma Negara, Jakarta	President gave responses that press news have been good, but still needs to improve, especially in looking for the truth, not just sensation.
3	10 October 1998/ The Congress of PWI at 20 th at Semarang	President reaffirmed that government did not want to intervene to the news reportage. Government did not lead, give direction or call to the desk editor.
4	12 December 1998/ The Celebration of The 61 st LKBN Antara Anniversary, Jakarta	President asked to the press world to construct the information objectively, so, can be free from the certain group's propaganda.

Source: Juli Bestian Nainggolan, Thesis, 2004, "Pers dan Kekuasaan Presiden", p. 84

President BJ Habibie recognized very well about the existence of freedom of the press and tried to place the press as the institution which is free from the government intervention. It means that the media or press was not anymore under controlled by the government and other institution. Habibie saw that media must be independent and support the establishment of democracy in Indonesia.

The freedom of the press, by revoking the regulation about publishing permit, was continued by KH Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth President. Furthermore, in this time, the relationship between President and press was very closed and comfortable for journalists to gather information. Official mechanism and procedure for the media to access information from the government/ president were not so rigid and bureaucratic. Gus Dur said many times that the media or journalists were his best friends, as written below:

"...Because I love journalists, journalism world, I criticize or can be said that I ask you to improve yourself, then outside...Because, however, I was a journalist in the past, even though as a freelance journalist..." (Nainggolan, 2004:87)

In time of he criticized mass media, he always said that media was his best friend and he was a journalist in the past. Table 8 describes his statements.

Table 8
The Statements of KH Abdurrahman Wahid
in Relation with the Press

No	Date/Event	President's statement
1	17 February 2000 / The Day of the National Press, State Palace	President criticized the journalists about the reportage of East Timor, dismissal of several cabinet ministers. He admitted that he was a journalist and wanted the journalists were becoming independent and no need to come and ask to the president.
2	3 May 2000 / Meeting with South East Asian press leader , Jakarta	President hopes that the freedom of the press in Indonesia has to be maintained. He wanted the freedom of the press was done wisely. He also explained about the closing down of Information Department as a part of maturity building of society.
3	14 October 2000 / Dialogue with the <i>religious community</i> at Masjid Al Hidayah, Jakarta	President said that he was preferringred to give absolutely freedom of the press in democracy development. If the press was intervened, it will make big impact on the next future.
4	13 February 2001 / The State Palace at the event of the replacement of Head of TNI , Jakarta	President intended not to distribute the information to Republika* because of their low performance in their works. * national daily news
5	13 July 2001/ Mesjid At Taqwa, Cirebon	President assessed the press reconstructed his statement about the arrest of The Head of Indonesian National Police, General Bimantoro, in the wrong way.

Source: Juli Bestian Nainggolan, Thesis, 2004, "Pers dan Kekuasaan Presiden" , p. 87.

In early of his presidency, this close relationship has impacts on the press which is not critical for Gus Dur. But, in the early three months of his administration, press begin to be critical to the Gus Dur's policy, especially to the policy that has relation to the resign of several cabinet ministers, the economy and political condition which are not getting better, and his several inconsistent statements. These statements made the news are not conducive for his leadership. More over, in many occasions, he exactly criticized and blamed the journalists who frequently reconstructed his statement in the wrong way (Nainggolan 2004:84-87).

Not too much different from Gus Dur's assessment, Megawati also has similar impression for the Indonesian Press. There was not close relationship between the president and the press. This is shown by her statements as written in table 9. Based on her statements on many events and occasions, Megawati as the fifth Indonesian President saw that the Indonesian press was less responsible for holding their educational function. Furthermore, the press must improve their professionalism, in order to give positive contribution to the Indonesian recovering from the crisis situation.

Table 9
The Statements of Megawati Soekarnoputri
in relation with the Press

No	Date/Event	President's statement
1	Banjarmasin, February 8, 2002/ the Day of Indonesian Press	President hopes that the national press can play their role more than before to create a comfortable situation, enforce and facilitate the raising of the creative and constructive ideas. The national press should have an ability to develop and communicate knowledge, policy, strategy, plan, and program of Indonesian recovering in all dimensions.
2	Denpasar, February 9, 2003/ The anniversary of Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (PWI/ Association of Indonesian Journalists)	President hopes that the national press as the strength of the Indonesian struggles could have capability to provide the accurate and balanced information, and always give the attention to the appropriate norms and also give good contribution to create and establish the national values.
3	Palangkaraya, October 2, 2003	President said that in our society there were attitudes and behavior that tend to make fun of and blame ourselves, to create bad assessment for everything we have done and sometimes laugh at ourselves. In that occasion, President wanted to ask all Indonesian journalists to get attention for it. There was no any positive thing from doing like this.
4	Jakarta, February 10, 2004/ National Convention of Indonesian Mass Media, in the Celebration of The Day of Indonesian National Press.	President claimed that Indonesian press has the highest degree of freedom in Asia, even in all over the world. Of course, that freedom has to be followed by the responsibility, not only social and law, but also nationality and statesmanship responsibility. President asked to the Indonesian press to intensify the education function of mass media, equal with information and entertainment function.

Source: printed addresses of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth Indonesian President.

According to the four aforementioned tables, I can conclude that in general, in the early of the presidency, the presidents always tried to show that they would like to create good relation with the press, but, together with the time running, the relation between president and press tends to be worse. It is indicated by the uncomfortable feeling of the president about the performance of mass media. Most of all Presidents asked to media to improve their professionalism. Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati saw that media tended to ignore education function and emphasize more on the entertainment. In reporting the government performance, media was not accurate and imbalance. Even, these two presidents claimed that mass media press acted as someone else's tool to make their power unstable. This assessment was delivered by them in the end of their presidency. On the other hand, mass media feel right for their information construction. When doing their job, journalists represent the publics' interest, this is distributing information. "Whoever the person that stands for the publics' interest should be aware that no part of his/her activities is hidden from publics' interests." (Media Indonesia, Dec 4, 2003).

Media said that all complaints were only representation of the defensive reaction of the government to the critics.

Those statements were supported by Danudjaja, Tabah and Tamin. Those people have close relationship with the presidents. Tamin¹⁷ (2003:51) said that freedom of the press was understood by Indonesian press as free for, not free from. Free for doing and informing everything. It seems that Indonesian press in this time was just focusing on free for swearing, but not on free from government intervention, sensation, profit and market orientation, inaccuracy, copyright violation. Tabah¹⁸ (2002:105), the Indonesian police officer, criticized that the Indonesian press regulation (UU Pokok Pers No 40 tahun 1999) which mentions the function of the press is just to inform. It can be interpreted that the press is only oriented to disseminate “news”, but ignoring the other functions, such as to influence, to entertain and to educate which should be implemented together by press. In the conflict situation, Indonesian press just concerned on giving news, but not on educating people. It means that the news was oriented only to inform but not to educate. It lead the press was not eradicating the conflict but contributing the conflict. In the cases of mass riot, Tabah (2002:65-70) also views that press tended to focus on violence acts that are done by apparatuses, and ignoring the fact that mass did anarchism. It shows that press construct imbalance information that can lead to the bad public opinion to the state apparatus. Tabah claims that the freedom of the press in Indonesia is most free in all countries in the world. This condition brings about the increasing of the number of press publications. Unfortunately, the freedom of the press is not followed by the improvement of the journalist’s professionalism. This condition leads to the press create and disseminate inaccurate, ambiguous, individual privacy violation, imbalance and not respectful information to the publics (Tabah in Rastra, 2004:32-36). Danudjaja¹⁹ (2001:137-148) said that in the time when gaining the politic power was more important than the others such a social welfare, the truth of morality, justice, and kindness, Indonesian mass media frequently manipulate information for their own interests. This statement supported the other statements that mass media was largely judged to have exhilarated the crisis.

¹⁷ Indrawadi Tamin was working for President Megawati Soekarnoputri in 2000-2003. He was a deputy of protocol, press and mass media at Indonesian State Secretary. Before hold this position, he was a head of government public relations at Information Department, which was closed down by Gus Dur in 1999.

¹⁸ Anton Tabah is an Indonesian Police Officer. He speaks frequently as a representative of the Indonesian National Police. In 1999-2001, he was a private secretary of HM Soeharto, the second president of the Republic of Indonesia. When he gave his statement above (2002), he worked at Public Relations Division, The Headquarter of Indonesian National Police.

¹⁹ Danudjaja was a journalist for KOMPAS, Indonesian national daily news. Until now he is the Vice Director of Editorial of the megasite Lippo Star. Some scholars criticized that his opinion tends to be side by side with Gus Dur’s point of view.

Tabah, Tamin and Danujadja's statements can be reflected as the voices of the "inner circle people" of the Presidents. They have the similar statements about the press and the relation between the press and the presidents or the governments. They tended to see the Indonesian press was not professional in constructing the news about government's performance. Image media was not good on the presidents and the government.

Bad president's images on publics and on media could become an indication of bad interaction between the presidents or the governments and the publics, including the media. In turn, it will produce bad crisis overcome. How the organization positions its publics and media - dominates or gives equal participation in policy making processes - can affect on the result of this interaction. Organization which sees its publics and media are important and put it in equal level, can be realized by creating democratic organizational communication system and giving the equal opportunity to its publics to participate in the policy making, will produce positive outcome. To overcome the crisis positively, it needs to build and maintain good and supportive relationship between the government and the media, between the presidents and the media persons and also the publics.

1.1.2.3. The importance of Public Relations for the Governments

The relationship between the organization and its publics, can be seen not only by the relationship between the organization and the press, but also the relationship between organization and the general publics. How the organization posits the publics, dominates or gives equal participation in policy making processes, can be seen by how the policy of the organization about its public relations or organizational communication regulations. Organization which sees its publics are important will create the organizational communication system which is more democratic, giving the equal opportunity to its publics to participate in the policy making. It was manifested into the structure and the function of the public relation or communication system. How organization thinks about public relations can be an indicator for it.

For many practitioners, the terms public relations, communication or information management, organizational communication, business communication and public affairs are used interchangeably. In their point of views, the concept of public relations is usually understood as communication effort to gain economical profit and also just a part of more narrow functions of communication management. Even though, others, in contrast, see public relations as the broader term and apply communications term narrowly to techniques used to

produce information forms (Grunig 1992:4-5). For this research, in the context of government organization, using the term public relations is more appropriate than using the concept of communication management, especially in the cases of crisis and crisis management, although, in my point of view public relations can be integrated part of the management of presidential communication functions. However, the essential meaning of those terms is not quite different that is organizational communication activities, including internal and external communication.

The two conditions, low sense of crisis and bad relationship between government, in this research, focus on the president, and the publics could be as a result of the structure and function of public relations in the government or presidency institution. In contrast, the structure and function of public relations can be created by the two conditions. In the first condition, the structure and function of the public relations especially in crisis communication has affected the low sense of crisis of the government or president and bad relationship between the president and mass media. In the second condition, low sense of crisis and bad relationship between the government and mass media has determined the structure and function of public relations.

In Indonesia, the government Public Relations (GPR), by the law, constitutes the ideal manifestation of the aforementioned PR's roles and functions. Indonesian government PR is generated by HM Soeharto in order to promote two-way communication, to create open and candid dialog between the government and the publics, in order to increase the people's confidence on the future of Indonesia. This was reflected very clearly in HM Soeharto's speech, then as the President, in 1982 in the workshop of the PR of Local Government and Communication Elements of Indonesia:

"Openness becomes the basic attitude of the Government and hence must also flow in our communication's color and must be reflected in the Public-Relation's attitudes. [...] Public Relation's jobs must be not only prepared well when we deal with major tasks. Public Relations jobs must be performed well from time to time. [...] The informational and public-relation apparatus's jobs are to build the community's trust and to develop realistic optimism on the future and the development of social infra structure. [...] Therefore, give information that is good and correct, that is honest and transparent to the public, so that they can understand the common problems we deal with, so that they know which way we go through and so that they know what objectives we want to reach". (Dit. Pembinaan Humas Deppen RI/Bakohumas Pusat, 1987:1-3).

In the same meeting, the Vice President at that time, Adam Malik also stated:

"[...] informational and public relations jobs need to be fast and not only works to

neutralize the issues developed within the community, but nonetheless must be able to create within the community the circumstances that make impossible or at least reduce the occurrence of those issues. [...] Experience proves that the burgeoning of negative issues against the development, against the New Order Government is often because of the delayed information delivered to the community” (Dit. Pembinaan Humas Deppen RI/Bakohumas Pusat, 1987:4-5).

Adam Malik’s statement implies that the Public Relations has to perform issues management in an effort to know the public discourses on the government’s development policy. This means that the Indonesian Government PR is expected to be responsive toward the public opinion.

The May 1998 riot was not the beginning of the crisis. It is a crisis that has already in acute phase. The May 1998 riot that followed by various major events actually was a form of dissatisfaction and discontent of the people. In fact, the government PR failed to detect the dissatisfaction and discontent signals. The PR’s failure may be because of the non-conductive PR position in the organization structure. PR’s function is only disseminating information from the President to the people, not seeking and listening information from public to the President. Indonesian GPR, from the central to the local levels, was set up (only) to hold main duties, those are (1) to convey the government’s policies, and (2) to persuade the public opinion, attitude and behavior in order to support every government’s decisions. PR served the interest of government and its leader, the president. The communication model applied is one-way communication, and press agency oriented with its main duty to promote the president in the eyes of the people on an on-going basis. The role of PR supports the political system of authoritative Suharto with a centered government system. During 32 year of Soeharto’s reign, the system of public relations in Indonesia was developed merely as a tool of the president and his staff, which was referred in a term of “conveyor of the messages from president to the people”, or “government funnel”. As a result of the functions and roles, the GPR became unresponsive to the changes taking place in Indonesia after the downfall of Soeharto’s regime. On one side, the GPR was not used to convey public voices to the government in order to increase the people’s participation in the political processes in the government. (Perbawaningsih, 2002). On the other side, Indonesia has claimed itself since 1998 as a state which is upholding the democracy. It means that it requires its PR to be a facilitator for the people to communicate with the government. Theoretically, in the system of democracy it should give opportunities to the people’s freedom in conveying and expressing their opinion. The opportunity for the media to convey public voices also indicates the people’s

empowerment. In such system, the model of public relations no longer exists in one-way communication, but it should have an equal two-way communication instead. Therefore, public relations should have a high awareness and capability to articulate the needs and interests of the public, in this case from the people to the state or government. Indonesia still lacks the awareness and capability even in the reformation. It is probably the large barrier for the actualization of the relationship of people and government in Indonesia. The condition of Indonesian people who still do not understand and go deeply into the meaning of democracy in an exact manner is regarded as another factor exacerbating the impotence of government public relations in handling the crisis. In other words, I can say that the non-conducive position was exacerbated more by the situation at that time in which the people were not allowed to express their opinion freely. HM Soeharto's hegemony then was very extensive against the people so that the people themselves felt no need to declare their dissatisfaction, disappointment, and even misery. Soeharto was able to implant mindset among the people that misery, dissatisfaction and disappointment were something natural as the service of people to the country, to the motherland. Thus some term appeared such as nation servants, heroes without medals, and national social solidarity.

How does the application of public relations, especially in communication with publics including journalists or mass media persons, of the four presidents' administrations? Communication management in the New Order Era was highly under controlled by HM Soeharto, the second President of the Republic of Indonesia. He established the communication system and information channels, both within and outside of the president's organizational structure. He had many secret informants, and also the creative staffs who helped him in creating his good image on publics (Dhani 2004). HM Soeharto preferred to use face to face communication with publics, than dialogue to journalists, in order to disseminate his thought and government's policies to the publics, and then its dialogues were broadcasted by government television (Usman, 2004, Soemanto 2004). Even though the communication looked like two way communication, in fact, he applied one way communication, everything was controlled by him. Direct dialogue between HM Soeharto and the publics has been engineered as Soeharto's style in order to make him satisfied (Dhani 2004:123). In BJ Habibie's time, the absolute domination and power was disappeared. BJ Habibie who has western education preferred to establish free presidential communication with the low context culture²⁰.

²⁰ Usman did not explain the meaning of low context culture in his article. However, it can be defined as the open, outspoken and direct communication, transparent and using the simple words. What the people say is

He also applied human touch public relations (Usman, 2004). BJ Habibie gave the authority to speak as his spokespersons to several people, even though he had formal spokespersons. As his spokespersons, many of them for many times gave presidential information too early and too fast to the publics or press. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, one of his spokes persons, criticized the presidential communication management of BJ Habibie was “too much information and too many spokespersons”. In the situation of crisis, BJ Habibie did not have a settled communication management, moreover, in the certain case he failed to keep the formal communication and information out from publics’ intervention (Dhani 2004: 81-112). In the era of Gus Dur, the fourth president, the presidential communication management was very informal and spontaneous. In the early of his presidency, Gus Dur closed down Information Department in purpose to build the freedom of the press. He always established the direct and open dialogue with publics every Friday in the mosques. Unfortunately, the openness of this dialogue was misused by press. Gus Dur had also been trapped by his uncontrolled communication, within and outside of these countries. His statements became controversial. He cut off the role of state or president secretary but he promoted four presidential spokespersons (Usman 2004). Ratih Harjono, one of four Gus Dur’s spokesperson said, “Having four spokespersons, with one president who is very extrovert, is the weakness of Gus Dur. It made him lose his position”. People call this kind of communication situation as communication without management. Indrawadi Tamin, the Deputy of the press, media and protocol, President Secretary said, “There is no official guidance for the president’s secretary that can explain the task and strategy of presidential communication.” Miscommunication and unclear meaning of words and sentences which were shown on presidential communication was an indication that the official statements were not yet managed and packaged by an effective communication strategy (Dhani 2004:113-162). In the last administration, the fifth President, Megawati Soekarnoputri, presidential communication management had been changed for many times because of no settled national communication system. In the early of her presidency, Megawati applied open communication management, but it was changed in the rest of her presidency. The communication tended to be closed and very formal. She herself was more silent. She asked her ministers and her staffs as her informal spokespersons, for examples, the Minister of States Secretary, the Coordinator Minister, the Vice President, the

what the people think. It is not necessary to find the other meaning of the spoken word. It was different from Javanese communication style which is more comfortable with the carefully worded and calculated for the purpose conversations. Javanese people, and may be the Indonesian people in general preferring not to speak to the point. The meaning of the word has to find by the following questions.

functionary of political party, and also, the president's husband. There was no formal spokesperson (Dhani 2004:200). In the official communication mechanism and procedure, in the era of Megawati, it was more rigid than Habibie and Gus Dur. In this time, not all of journalists had pass card to enter and access information about president or government. The rules for journalists were established and implemented tightly, including prohibition of the method of doorstep interview.²¹

Referring to the explanation above, it can be concluded that after HM Soeharto administration, there was no structured-presidential communication management. The pattern of communication and information in the presidential institution was based on the characters and communication style of the president. BJ Habibie and Gus Dur who have democratic way in leadership tended to apply very open and two way communication management, with all consequences. Megawati who was not be very talkative created her communication with publics was more closed, formal and one way. All in all, there is no a presidential communication strategy which is effective for the crisis recovery.

It can also be concluded that the PR's structure and function in the government and presidential institution is different when the president is different. In the second president administration, in fact, the structure and function of government public relations was highly structured and formal. The communication between the organization and its publics tended to be one way communication. The function of PR staff is technician role which emphasized the tasks on the operational PR activities. In the third and fourth president administrations, one way communication was changed into two way communication models. The freedom of the press, open and free communication was applied, even though there was still not formal guidance and strategies for presidential communication yet. There was also no structure and system of presidential public relations. Megawati who was very popular with her silence led PR function was emphasized more on one way communication. All shows that the functioning and structuring of PR are very dependent on the individual characters of the presidents, their goals, current situations and also the structure of the organization. It can be said that on one hand, the personality of the actors, their recent interests, current environment's situation and the organizational structure determine the structure and function of its public relations but on the

²¹ That the journalists did not have permission to interview the president by doorstep interview, it invited many critics and comments. For some people, doorstep interview was unethical, but in other way, the other people said that the prohibition is just the way constructed by Megawati followers to avoid direct interview by journalists to Megawati. As we know, Megawati assessed that publics have no communication competency, particularly in the formal setting.

other hand, the structure and the function of PR constrained the individual, organizational and social actions.

However, I saw that almost in all presidents' administrations, public relations and organizational communication system and management were not established seriously. It indicated that the establishing of communication and relationship between organization and its publics was not to be an important concern for the government and the presidential institution. It can also be a representation of unequally president and public relationship. This relationship could influence the president in the process of the strategy selection. A wrong strategy can be affected to the unsuccessful crisis recovery.

1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM

Look at the crisis happened in Indonesia and its impact on Indonesian life, image and reputation, it is reasonable when crisis and image are two concepts that can not be apart. That Indonesian government has no highly crisis sense is one indicator that Indonesian government did not do crisis management. Ongoing crisis and difficult crisis resolution shows that Indonesian government has failed to handle crisis. The failure of crisis resolution, based on Indonesian experience, might be caused by the failure of the government and the president to resolve the basic problem of crisis in early of crisis stage. Furthermore, one important thing that also may give contribution to this ongoing crisis in this country is the government failure to communicate crisis. Crisis communication means how and what the organization communicate with its publics about crisis and in order to resolve the crisis. Theoretically, ineffective and improper communication by organization before, during and after crisis can create bad result in crisis resolution, not only crisis can develops to be worse, but also image, reputation and existence of organization can be lost.

Crisis is the situation which is indicated by three specific things (1) event that contains threats to image, reputation and or existence; (2) decision makers have a very short time to respond; and (3) the event is unexpected, unpredictable (Seeger 1998). The failure in crisis resolution can threat good image of management or organization. Actually, crisis can be anticipated and prevented by effective crisis management. Crisis management itself does not only mean management for crisis resolving, but every day life management of the organization. Crisis management becomes an inherent part of daily life of organizing of the organization. Crisis management therefore is one main task of the organization, especially of the sub unit of

organization that in charge to deal with the crisis. It is usually to be responsibility of public relations unit or department, or one of public relations' functions.

For many practitioners, the terms public relations, communication or information management, organizational communication, business communication and public affairs are used interchangeably. According to their point of views, the concept of public relations is usually understood as communication effort to gain economical profit and also just a part of more narrow functions of communication management. Even though, others, in contrast, see public relations as the broader term and apply communications term narrowly to techniques used to produce information forms (Grunig 1992:4-5). For this research, in the context of government organization, using the term public relations is more appropriate than using the concept of communication management, especially in the cases of crisis and crisis management, even though, based on my point of view public relations can be integrated part of the management of presidential communication functions. However, the essential meaning of public relations is not quite different from organizational communication activities, including internal and external communication. In addition public relations is not only responsible to communicate but also create and establish mutual relationship between organization and its publics in order to build and maintain good organizational image. In crisis, referring to Coombs and Holladay's (2001:321-340), the quality of relationship between organization and its publics and good organizational image can help the organization remains its reputation on crisis situation. It means that a good relationship between organization and its publics which has already existed²² can help organization to respond to the crisis better.

Image is very important in context of crisis. Good image helps organization in crisis handling. In crisis, when the situation is full of uncertainty about organization, good organizational image leads its publics to build and maintain the trust to the organization. Good image contributes to build and establishes effective crisis communication. It means that organization has to, not only manage the crisis but also communicate the crisis effectively. To communicate about crisis, organization needs strategies, both strategy of communication with the media, and strategy to construct or reconstruct the organization image. Inequitable communication strategy could affect on worse crisis situation. Unfortunately there were several organizational leaders did not think that communication in crisis needs strategy. Furthermore,

²² Coombs and Holladay (2001) called it "relationship history". Along with "crisis history", it builds performance history. Based on their research, good existed relationship and good crisis handling in the past made the organization understand the crisis situation better. Better understanding of the crisis, more effective organization's crisis response is.

they did not think that communication was a very important part of crisis management and crisis resolution.

There are several researches about crisis communication strategies. In general, the researches explored about the strategy of the crisis communication of the profit organization in responding to the public claimed about its product failures. Fisher, (1995: 143) adopted John F Mahon's research, wrote that there were alternative organizational responses to face negative issues or criticism from the other part, such a competitor. The alternatives responses are (1) resistance, organization take a counterattack directly to the issues or other opposite parts in order to self defense; (2) withdrawing from the controversies by doing capitulation or surrender; (3) terminating by ceasing the relationship; (4) cessation by dissolving the organization; or (5) bargaining, the efforts to compromise with the issues or opposite parties. Table 10 below is the some strategies of the organizations in responding crises.

Table 10
Strategies and Tactics of Crisis Responses

Strategies	Tactics	Examples (Case)
<i>Resistance</i>	<i>Persuade, propagandize, deny Responsibility</i>	<i>The Tobacco Industry</i>
<i>Bargaining</i>	<i>Offer inducement or threat</i>	<i>Physician withholding services to force reduction in malpractice insurance premiums</i>
<i>Capitulation</i>	<i>Concede, seek best solution, seek exoneration</i>	<i>Johnson and Johnson, and the Tylenol scare</i>
<i>Termination</i>	<i>Cease relationship</i>	<i>General Motors exit from South Africa</i>
<i>Cessation</i>	<i>Dissolve the organization</i>	<i>Manville's forced organization</i>

(Fisher, 1995:143)

Beyond the development of process of negative issues, organization used different response strategies on each steps. In many cases, organization used not only single strategy but also multi strategies. It can be using combination of several different strategies or mixing several strategies into one main strategy. The case of response strategy used by Mercedes A Class²³ is one example. Mercedes used combinations without such concerns in at least three situations. The first time was at the press conference where the company both denied the existence of the problem. Second, when it commented on the Auto Bild test and presented new test the A Class had passed, the company both denied and excused. Third, when Mercedes halted the production and introduced an action plan, the company used an excuse at the same time as it

²³ Mercedes Benz faced a major public relations problem when the newly launched A Class overturned during a test drive journalists in Sweden conducted. The reputation of Mercedes' star was at stake as critics accused the German Company of producing an unsafe car. (Ihlen, 2002:185-206)

apologized. These combinations were argumentatively incoherent and, as mentioned earlier, in ignoring several facts and issues, they also become materially incoherent (Ihlen 2002:202-203). According to Ihlen, the last strategy is most effective to restore the corporate image. However, he said that to combine several different strategies needs carefully consideration. The coherence among strategies is necessary. Ihlen also said that to respond to the crisis, organization needs to consider the public acceptance and the situation beyond the crisis. It is because the strategy needs to be changed when the publics did not accept the certain strategy or the strategy is contra productive for organization or publics or the situation developed in unexpected way. It means that there is interaction between the selected strategy and the development of crisis situations.

Some other researchers also found that the strategies and tactics and techniques to restore the image or to respond to crisis are dependent on the other factors, such as (1) the accuracy of the critics, existence of scapegoat, and degree of organization mistake involved (Hearit, 1994,1995); (2) the organizational perception of involvement degree of the organization to the existence of crisis (Marcus and Goodman 1991); (3) organization reputation in crisis handling (crisis history) (Coombs 2001:321-340, Newsom 2000:498) and the existed quality of relationship between organization and its publics (relationship history) (Coombs 2001:321-340). These researches show that many factors contribute to the effectiveness of crisis resolution strategy. It is not only about how to react or response the crisis in the correct way but also about how the organization percepts the situation of crisis, the environment at that moment, the publics involved and other things.

It means to select the strategy of crisis communication leader or organization must have not only a better knowledge of the factors related to the crisis situation, but also knowledge of the organizational factors and any other related factors. It is one of the things not mentioned and explored by past researchers. Another thing is about the type of research object. Mostly researchers in the past focused on profit institution. In this kind of institution, the context of crisis, therefore, is surely an economic context. It is important to explore crisis in a political context. Only a few researchers explored the crisis in the public sector/ area, especially in the setting of government or state. Some researches are emphasized on how the government or state communicates to the publics in a crisis situation by using political communication theories as the basis of analysis. Most of the researches used mass media content analysis and some explored the message of the political elite's speeches in dealing with the crisis. It is almost rare

that the research focused on the apology strategy of organization, especially of public organization in responding to the crisis.

To find out about those missing knowledge, this research is conducted to explore how the government, as a public and political organization, deals with the political crisis, the strategy used to restore or reconstruct its image and the contextual factors might interact with the selected strategy, by answering the two biggest research question below:

1. What crisis communication strategy was applied by Megawati Soekarnoputri, as the fifth President of Republic of Indonesia?
2. What do the contextual factors interact with the crisis communication strategy choice?

This research is considered as the new knowledge in the field of public relations studies or organizational communication, especially in the context of political crisis and governmental crisis communication. It is also important, based on the research, I might find out the new model or strategy of crisis communication which is very tight by the certain local political, social and economical environment. Finally, the result of this research can be benefit for the government at present and in the future to work along with publics, including mass media and government's public relations spreading all over the provinces and the second-level local governments throughout Indonesia for the sake of crisis responses and crisis anticipation.

Based on the structuration theory, it can be assumed that the ongoing crisis which could not be solved faster than expected is caused by (not only) the organizational policies, rules, structured and strategic practices and actions, (but also) the personal character, skill, and all attributes of the individuals which is not appropriate and fit for crisis resolution. Structure, means rules and resources, could be the contextual factors in selecting of crisis communication strategy. By this structure, strategy is selected. Additionally, based on this theory, strategy is selected, not because of the structure, but because of people' own personal interests or goals.

It is important too to know deeper about the interplay between agency and structure when it is rest on the fact that during the crisis, Indonesia is living in the era of reformation. The efforts to change Indonesia can be seen by the change of authoritarian political system to democracy, followed by the changes of the presidential and governmental communication or public relations communication system. Theoretically, it is more and less influent on the communication strategy of the government to face the crisis.

The analysis is put on the frame of public relations. Many concepts in the area of public relations are used in this research. As a case for this study is Indonesian government and the presidents' strategy of crisis response. To understand the research questions, I need to answer first about:

1. The message strategies of the Presidents in responding to the critics or issues from publics which against them and government's performance in crisis resolution.
2. The relationship between Presidents and media/ journalists
3. The presidential communication mechanism.
4. The crisis situation itself and political situation.

1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.3.1. Research Methods

This research is laid on the constructivism paradigm in which ontologically look at people are flexible and discursive. Flexibility means there is no fixed set of principles or processes that underlie human thought and behavior. Discursivity means people's understanding of the world is based on what we say or talk about the world. Our understandings influence our choice. This paradigm also look at the social environment is socially constructed, ever changing and inherited from the past. **Socially-constructed** means that the environment is consists of a variety of other understandings (of other people) which may or may not make sense to the people at a fundamental level, but everyone tries to make sense of their world as they move through it and they attempt in some way to grasp and operate within the ideas of others. **Ever-changing** means that the environment is constantly reshaped by human action - the very terms of existence are subject to redefinition as people adjust their discourses in attempting to understand others better and in pursuit of agendas. **Inheritance** means people live within the context created by their predecessors – for instance, the last president's action cannot be simply ignored by the current president's action. The current action cannot simply make the world like it was, but it can and will be modified the understanding and waging of this.

By using this paradigm, reality is a virtual reality which is formed by people's meaning. The reality is not just a group of facts but meaning which is produced through the social interaction. Constructivism is always connected to the interpretive approach. This approach holds that social life is based on social interaction and socially constructed meaning system (Neuman, 1997: 67-73). This approach is related to theory of hermeneutic, a theory of meaning. It emphasizes a detailed of reading or examination of text. It could refer to a conversation,

written words or pictures. By using this theory, the true meaning is rarely simple or obvious on the surface. People need to reach the meaning of the text only through a detailed study, contemplating its many messages and seeking the connection among its parts. The assumption about meaning is supported by the theory of symbolic of interaction. This theory explains that a reality is socially constructed. Relationship are constantly formed, shaped and changed. Society is a network of relationships. Social reality is constructed by the society is in essence a matter of definition. It means a reality is a construction of people's definitions (Perdue 1986:164-167).

Stuart Hall (Eriyanto 2003:29) concerned on two things in the process of reality constructing, that is language and politic of meaning and how the social practices create, control and determine meaning. So, reality is meaning which is produced by language and politic of meaning of dominant powers. Fairclough (Eriyanto 2003:285) says that language is a form of action in dialectical relation with social structure. Fairclough sees a language as power practice. In this research purpose, I analyze the text to identify the strategy of the president in responding to the crisis. So the methodology I use for this research is critical discourse analysis. Meanwhile, the critical discourse analysis methodology emphasizes on the comprehensive analysis, contextual and multilevel analysis. By using this methodology, analysis can be done holistically, not partially. It means that to know the social reality we need to analyze deeply about historical context, social, culture, economy and politic. In this method, Fairclough integrates discourse analysis, based on linguistic and social political thinking, and in general it is integrated to the social changes. The discourse has comprehensive analysis levels to the research object that is textual level, discourse practice and social cultural practice.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) theoretically is characterized as "a dialectical view of the relationship between structure and agency, and of the relationship between discourse and other elements or 'moments' of social practices and social events." By using simple words, it can be said that the meaning of the text can not be separated from the context. Context can be activities, social relations, object and instruments, time and place, social subjects with beliefs, knowledge, values, etc (Fairclough 2005: 76-94).

For this research purpose, the critical discourse analysis is intended to explore the strategies of crisis communication of the presidents by identifying the meaning of the text -- written officially speeches -- of the president and the news about the president and the political situation through connecting the texts to the context. This context means the structure which can be defined as organizational events or practices, rules, guidance and the personal resources.

The context is divided into multiple layers. The first context, the closest layer to the textual speeches, is the organizational structure. In this layer, I have explored intra organizational communication structure of the government. It is represented by the practices of public relations within the organization and communication practices in the organization. The second layer is the social and political structure which exists outside of the organization. The media structure is one of the external structures. All layers are connected also by communication.

According to the system theory by Parsons, the second layer context above is called as an environment and the first layer is system. There is always interaction between organization and its social political structure, system and environment. By Luhmann theory, the social and political structure can be a part of the system if they are connected by communication and have same meaning about the symbols of communication. The structuration theory states, strategy of crisis communication can be a product of interaction between structure and agency. Strategy as an action of the president is not only a “repeating” product of the structure – rules and resources, but also “new” product of the structure. The member of the organization is agency, agent who is able to create new rules and resources. Based on this proposition, how the president acts and reacts toward the crisis could be determined by the structure and created by his free personal interest and purpose. By this statement, to know the factors could play behind the action is firstly to know the rules of the government, and secondly to know the personal background of the president.

For this purpose, I use the system theory, in order to compare with the usage of the structuration theory to analyze the same phenomenon. It means that there are two elements which interact to each other, (1) resources, and (2) rules. The two elements are identified as context, based on Fairclough’s statement, and, the textual speeches are the text. Through this text and context, I made a conclusion about the action and the interacted factors both in the structure and in the environment. The context is identified in three levels; these are the structure in the level of (1) individual, (2) organization, and (3) supra system. The text and context are analyzed by using Fairclough’s method divided in multi phase or stages as describe later.


1.3.2. Textual Analysis and Procedures

As mentioned earlier, to understand the meaning of the text, needs to analyze the relation or interaction between text and context. Fairclough divides context in three levels, namely (1) micro level or the text itself, (2) meso level or practice discourse; and (3) macro level or social

cultural practices. Therefore, for this research analysis will be conducted in each level. In micro level, textual speeches of the presidents are analyzed to identify the message strategy in crisis and the meaning of it by using linguistic analysis; in level of meso, how the structure and all elements of the textual speeches is produced is the focus of analysis. It is done by analyzing text in mass media which is about the president. What the media said about the presidents can be seen as the relationship between presidential organization and its publics. And in macro level analyzes the social and political practices by analyzing the text of mass media which deliver news about social and political issues and situation in Indonesia.

Operationally, there are three levels of analysis, these are (1) macro level, in which I describe a history situation as a second context; (2) meso analysis in which I described the characteristics of organization and its publics as a first context; and (3) micro analysis in which I analyzed the text. It is textual speeches. In the level of text, speeches is identified by the term thematic, schematic, semantic, syntactic, stylistic and rhetoric, more operationally, sentence, word, proposition, paraphrase, and so on. In meso level, the first context is analyzed, that is the structure of organization. It involves the rules and regulations production of the speech and public relations practices and rules. In macro level, bigger context is analyzed. That is the social politic practices, especially which occurred during the time of crisis. And the last procedure is the process of intertextualizing, process to analyze the interaction among the three discourses. The procedure of analysis is shown on model 1.

Model 1
Procedure of analysis



1.3.3. Object of research, unit of analysis and unit of observation

The object of research in the first level is communication crisis strategies are used by the Indonesian Presidents, namely HM Suharto (1998), BJ Habibie (1998-1999) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004). The first two presidents' strategies are analyzed in order to identify the structure or action in the past. The third one's strategy is analyzed in purpose to identify the current action and structure. The communication crisis strategy means the strategy used by presidents to respond the crisis and how they communicate crisis to the publics. Some of them usually are used to reconstruct or restore personal, presidential and government's image during and after the crisis. How the presidents and governments reconstruct their image is explored by analyzing President's textual speeches delivered during 1998-2004.

As unit of analysis is textual (written) speech of the President. It is emphasized on the speeches of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth President of the Republic of Indonesia, delivered between 2001-2004 contain the statements about crisis in general, terrorism and corruption, collusion and nepotism (CCN). Both issues are very connected with the presence of crisis in Indonesia. Megawati's speeches are selected to be the case due to the reason that the time of her administration is a time of the freedom euphoria. People have freedom to express the thought, opinion, including critiques even to the political leaders. It leads Megawati received many critiques and in turn, many statements she delivered as the response. More critiques and more statements, mean easier to be analyzed and identified. There are more than 200 textual speeches analyzed. It is also because of the duration of Megawati Soekarnoputri's presidency is longest than the others.

The object of research in the second and third layers is the structure in the level of individual, organization, and in the larger system. The structure is identified as context. To explore the context, both in the second and third layer, organizational archives and documents related to the structure and the editorial of newspapers published during 2001-2004 come to be unit of analysis. Two daily national newspapers, Media Indonesia and Kompas, were selected by reason, (1) Kompas is generally accepted as neutral positions. It means that Kompas is not a partisan media; and other hand, (2) Media Indonesia tends to side with the certain Indonesian Political Party, (3) the two newspaper can give different and complement perspective in viewing crisis and the responses of the Presidents.

Even though discourse analysis is more used for analyzing the content of mass media, as a method for content (textual) analysis, this research is relevant also to be used to analyze the textual speeches of Megawati Soekarnoputri. The meaning of the text, and then, can be

analyzed as the message strategy of Megawati in crisis responses, and also as the representation of reality which is created by the existed social and political structure.

Below, table 11 shows the unit of analysis of the first level (micro level). For analyzing the text, researcher adopts framing analysis method. Adoption means that framing analysis method is not totally used to analyze. There are few changes, to adjust the differences between the textual speeches and the textual news in mass media.

Table 11
Unit of analysis
(Textual level)

Frame Central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issues	
Framing devices	Reasoning devices
Metaphors	Roots Causal analysis
Catchphrases (Interested, contrast, emphasized phrase in discourse. For example, slogan and jargon)	Appeals to principles Basic premises, moral judgments
Exemplar (Relating to the frame with the example, description, can be theories, comparison)	Consequences Effect or consequences that are concluded from the frame
Depiction (Depiction of the issues that is connotative. It could be lexicon, vocabulary to label something) Visual image Picture, graphics, image that support the frame in the whole. It could be photographs, cartoon, and graphic.	

According to the unit of analysis, I identified the frame as two strategies: (1) defending, and (2) accommodating, by analyzing each statement elements, mentioned on table 12, based on the characteristics, below:

Table 12
Strategy and Indicators

No	Strategy	Definition/indicators
1	Defending	Treat someone as distinct from or unconnected with the wrong doing → mindlessness
	■ Denial	Refusing to admit that a threatening perception is relevant, by denying: (1) its existence altogether; (2) its relevance to self (3) postponing the matter
	■ Avoidance	Finding ways of keeping out of the way of threatening perception, by: (1) sitting silently – silent (2) spinning a verbal cocoon to prevent incoming messages from getting through (3) hiding from one another through “formula”, communication - drawing morals, creating slogans, adhering to social convention whereby they discuss safe topics instead of important ones. (4) making humor
	■ Repression	Protect the person from being aware of motives or emotions he or she thinks are undesirable
	■ Projection	Burying unwanted feeling inside, the person projects them outside and attributes them to someone else
	■ Rationalization	Making excuses for or try to explain away a frustration situation, try to find a ‘good’ reason for their behavior and its outcome
	■ Attribution bias	(1) Considering someone else behavior is a product of their personality but attribute our own behavior to situational factors. (2) Ascribing our own successful behavior to personal effort and our failure to circumstances.
2	Adapting	Actively seeking and interacting with information to create more useful interpretation and internal state (1) Attempting to resolve discrepancy of information that violates their expectation (2) Assessing the validity of discrepant information, examining and changing their existing conceptual systems. → mindfulness

Beside the two big strategies, the text is identified into the several strategies that are categorized as apology strategies, as described below:

1. Present a competing narrative describing the situation favorable to the organization.
2. Diffuse anger and hostility toward the organization through a statement of regret
3. Dissociate the organization from the wrong doing, that are divided into three types:
 - a. By judging the accusers do not have the facts, they only want to sell more

newspapers, and they do not have ethics and integrity.

- b. Blaming or scapegoat a specific part or group or individual as the person who have to be responsible;
- c. Saying that the wrong action can be admitted but have to be framed on a longer term or bigger issue.

These apology strategies can also be identified as defense strategy. All strategies and indicators are used to analyzing the statements of the Presidents about crisis (the first level of the text).

The object of research in the first and second level (context) is the organizational structure and the structure in the larger system or the environmental situation” can be seen on table 13.

Table 13
Unit of analysis in
Second and Third Context

Organizational Structure: 1st context			
Text Production	The organizational structure of government institution.	Document	Document analysis
	Vision, mission and goals	Document	Document analysis
	Public Relations' s human resources	Document	Document analysis
	The development of government public relations	Document	Document analysis
	Public Relations activities and programs during 1998 -2004	Document/ Interview	Document analysis
	Job mechanism of government public relations.	Document/ Interview	Document analysis
	The rules, regulation and policy about authority, roles, functions, and tasks of public relations.	Document/ Interview	Document analysis
Environment (2nd context)			
	Political and Social situation 1. Publics/ media confidence in government (Government's credibility or reputation in crisis resolution) 2. Government openness(Government and public/media perception): a. Degree of willingness of	1. Library (books, journals, literatures, newspapers)	Library/ transcript analysis

	government to communicate with publics/media b. Degree of ability to reforms or to change policies, strategies to crisis resolution, suggested by normative public/media critiques.		
	Crises situation 1. Degree of violence/ damage occurred 2. Degree of publics involved in crisis (affect and affected by crisis) 3. Degree of publics/media pressures 4. Degree of government and public's stress 5. Government and public perception about the degree of the threat of government image damage.	1. News editorial 2. Written speeches 3. Books	1. Content analysis 2. Library analysis 3. Transcript analysis

To find out the strategy of crisis communication strategy and the interaction factors, I linked the three layers by combining system and structuration theory. It means that to find out the answers of the research, I need to make links between (1) text and context, (2) system and environment, and (3) structure and agency.

1.4. RESEARCH DELIMITATION

This research is emphasized more on the Megawati's administration (2001-2004). It is based on the reason that her presidency and her government administration were longer than those of others. The longer duration of authority holding can be meant that the president and government's behavior, which is related to the crisis responses, was more established and persistent. Crisis responses of the president are also focused on the three biggest cases which have to be handled by Megawati and her cabinet, namely: (1) crisis in general, (2) international terrorism; and (3) corruption, collusion and nepotism. The last two cases are important issues that contribute to the prolonged crisis resolution.

As a unit of observation of this research is limited on the government and as unit of analysis is the president of Megawati. The president is selected as the unit of analysis based on the reason that she is one of most responsible persons in the government, especially in the situation of crisis. As a research object is her written speeches which are related to the crisis responses in the three cases above. However, this research was limited on the textual/ written speeches of the president of Megawati delivered during the crisis time (1998-2004). It ignored

the oral statements or the action which have been done by the presidents in crisis resolution. It leads the possibility that the statements were different from the real action. The factors which might contribute to the crisis response strategy were also limited only on the several factors which are mentioned on the theories. The other delimitation is to identify the contextual factors: personal, organization and environment, researcher uses only news editorial, organizational documents and archives and other printed references. It means that researcher did not collect the data by interview or observation. It is done by reason that the printed material can also give the picture of research object.

1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

The research report is divided into five chapters. **Chapter One** is an introduction, describing the research background Indonesian situation during the crisis (1998-2004), images of the presidents and their administrations and the several factors which were claimed by several people influence the crisis and their images. This chapter also describes research background which leads the researcher to explore the strategy of the presidents in responding to the crisis, and the factors might influence of the strategy selection and the effectiveness of the strategy for the crisis solution. It describes also about research methodology, includes the method of data gathering and analysis, and interpretation. In the final part, it describes the research delimitation. **Chapter Two** is description of system theories by Parsons and Luhmann and structuration theory by Giddens. These theories are used by reason that strategy can be made by the presidents not only because of the organization or social system determines what the president must do and don't have to do about the crisis but also because of the president itself has personal willingness to do or not to do. These theories are connected to the public relations concepts and knowledge in which the concept of crisis and crisis communication strategy is laying on. **Chapter Three** and **Chapter Four** are data description and analysis. The first one is the description of Megawati statements and reactions to the crisis in general. It is including her image based on media's point of view; the second one is the explanation about Megawati statements and reactions to the two cases: terrorism and corruption, collusion and nepotism (CCN). These issues are thought as the issues which shape and are shaped by the crisis. The final chapter is **Chapter Five**. This chapter is a conclusion. It covers summary, theoretical discussion and recommendation for the theoretical and practical aspects.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. INTRODUCTION

As mentioned in chapter one, there are several factors influence organization in strategy selection. One of these factors is related to the crisis situation. It assumes there are any other factors interact to the strategy of crisis communication. To explore any possible factors, system theory and structuration theory can be used. According to system theory, government institution is an organization, and president can be seen as a part of the organization. Organization as a system developed during 1970s and 1980s, especially regarding the organization-environment relation, work and the development of contingency theory, and self organizing system (Deetz in Jablin and Putnam, 2001:21). In the same time, there was a shift in perspective of view of organization, from objectivity toward subjectivity. The objectivist views focus on structure, on the other hand the subjectivist views focus on behavior. Based on objectivity view, organization is something concrete, with set, observable qualities; but based on subjectivity view, organizations (the order and meanings) created by the members themselves, are ongoing processes of organizing (Fisher, 1996:76). But, dichotomy of subjectivity and objectivity has been dissolved by Giddens through his structuration theory. Referring to the theory, I think that organization and organization behavior can not only be analyzed by macro theories but also micro theories. There is dialectic process between macro and micro. Therefore, for analyzing the selection of crisis communication strategies and the factors which interacts to it, we need to analyze two levels; macro level means structure and micro level is individual/agent/agency. Organization can be seen as structure, and the president and her strategy can be seen as agent and agency. Dialectic of structure and agency means there is interplay between organizational structure or system and the strategy as an action of the agent.

This chapter contains the description of the two theories when are applied to analyze an action of the President in responding to crisis. It is also used to identify the factors may be the context of the crisis communication choice. It is started by the description of an organization based on system theory. According to this theory, organization composed by several elements or units that have different, stratified, interconnected functions and roles. One of the elements has certain function and roles, especially related to crisis, is Public Relations (PR). This element interacts with other elements in the system and does information exchange with its

environment or with larger systems. The action of PR is always a part of the system action, and PR practitioners stand for organization.

In the next part, how the structuration theory applied to this research is describing to analyze crisis communication strategy and its contextual factors. According this theory, organization is seen as structure and strategy is action made by agent. There is interplay between structure and agency. It means strategy is not only seen as product of the structure, but also it produces the structure. By this theoretical frame, organization as structure means rules and resources. Public Relations procedures, mechanism, communication model, role and function are a part of the structure, where as the strategy applied by the president is action. President can be seen as an agent or agency. There is an interaction between PR and the organizational structure and the strategy.


On the basis of thinking that an organization is a system and also a structure, this description is started by description of the two theories, and finally of the description of theoretical implication for analyzing crisis communication strategy. Description about crisis communication strategy is divided into two elements, these are: (1) Public Relations, one of organizational elements, have role and function related to organizational communication including crisis communication. It is a part of the system and structure; and (2) crisis communication strategy – it can be thought both as personal and organizational action that is created by an actor, called as agency.

2.2. ORGANIZATION BASED ON SYSTEM THEORY

System is generally defined by its characteristics; (1) wholeness and interdependence among parts or elements which compose the system, (2) hierarchy, (3) self regulation and control, (4) interchange with environment, (5) change and adaptability, (6) equifinality (John, 2002:41045). On the other hand, systems can be distinguished by the different characteristics of the parts of the system, such as: (1) from quite simple in structure to very complex; (2) from highly stable in their state to highly variables, and (3) from relatively impervious to system forces to being highly reactive to the workings of the system to which they belong. Based on the differences parts and the relations, we can understand that systems move from mechanical through organic to social systems, in which of the parts of the system are composed more complex and variables. Ashby (1968) and Buckley (1967) as quoted by Scott (1998:83) said that in the mechanistic systems, the interdependence among the parts is such a way that their behaviors are highly constrained and limited. The structure is relatively rigid and the system of relations

determinants. In the organic systems, the connections among the interdependent parts are somewhat less constrained, allowing for more flexibility of response. In social system, such as groups or organizations, the connections among the interacting parts become relatively loose: less constrained is placed on the behavior of one element by the condition of the others.

Based on the complexity of their parts and the relations among the parts, Boulding (Scott, 1998:83) identifies the types or levels of system categorized into open system and closed system, which both are indicated as the degree of openness. Closed system is indicated by low degree in complexity, lose of tight, dependence on information flow, capability of maintain and renew, capability to grow and change and open for environment. Whereas, open system is indicated by high degree in all indicators. This model also shows that the degree of openness of system is relative. It means that there is no system absolutely open or totally closed. Social system is relatively more open than the others (see Model 2).



Cutlip and Center (2000:234) said that all systems –mechanical, organic and social - can be classified in terms of the nature and amount of interchange with their environments. The continuum ranges from closed system on one extreme to open system on the other side. Closed systems have impermeable boundaries, so they cannot exchange matter, energy, or information with their environments. Closed systems are insensitive to their environment. They don't take in new matter, energy and information. They don't adapt to the external change and eventually disintegrate. Meanwhile open systems exchange inputs and outputs through permeable

boundaries. Open systems are responsive to environmental changes. Survival and growth of open system depends on interchange with its environment. Open system adjust and adapt to counteract or to accommodate environmental variations. The goal state of the system is survival. In the dynamic environment, open systems must continually adjust to maintain states of equilibrium or balance. It means that the systems have to change to remain the same, an enduring set of interacting units. Social system cannot be completely closed or totally open, so they are either relatively open or relatively closed. The degree of openness is varied.²⁴

A logical application of system thinking describes the development, structure and maintenance of human organizations, as such the general system theory that was adopted by Katz and Kahn as a model for describing organizational behavior. As a system, based on Talcot Parsons in his structural functional theory²⁵, an organization is seen as one of an open system. Organization itself, based on Parsons' structural functionalism, is defined as "*social collectives in which people develop ritualized pattern of interaction in an attempt to coordinate their activities and efforts in the ongoing accomplishment of personal and group goals*" (Kreps: 1986:100). This definition is similar to the definition of organization represented by general system theory, that is "*a complex set of interdependent parts that interact to adapt to a constantly changing environment in order to achieve its goals*". (Cutlip, Center and Broom, 2000:233). Some of the key components of the make up organizations are individual organization members, structural and functional groups and organizational technologies and equipments (Kreps, 1986:99-110). Relating to the Parsons structural functionalism, an organization as a system means that the individual organization

²⁴ Kreps (1986:104-105) explained that openness of system is dependent on the degree of system in responding its environment, especially on the amount of information which is taken by system. It is no possible for system to ignore or receive all information from environment. in context of organization, Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000:233) said that the degree of openness of the system is dependent on the several factors. For examples, more competitive or more potential to conflict, more dependent on the internal and external resources, more rational or easier to predict the outcome of organization, more complicated the structure, more highly heterogeneous, also bigger of the organization, more decentralist in authority distribution will be followed by the more sensitive the organization to respond the changes of environment. It means in this situation, system will be more open.

²⁵ Mentioned by Parsons, there four functional imperative for all systems, that is popular with the term AGIL Scheme: A – adaptation: A system must cope with the changes of the external situation. It must adapt to its environment and adapt the environment to its need; G - Goal attainment: A system must define and achieve its primary goals; I - Integration: A system must regulate the interrelationship of its component parts, and also manage the relationship among the other three functional imperatives (A, G, L); L - Latency (pattern maintenance): A system must furnish, maintain and renew both the motivation of individuals and the cultural pattern that create and sustain the motivation. The behavioral organism is the action system that handles the adaptation function by adjusting to and transforming the external world. The personality system performs the goal attainment function by defining system goals and mobilizing resources to attain them. The social system copes with the integration function by controlling its component parts, and finally, the cultural systems performs the latency function by providing actors with the norms and values that motivate them for action (Ritzer, 2000:93-108).

members are functionally structured, having hierarchical status and different roles, interacting to each other in order to achieve the organization goals²⁶. It also means that an organization has a goal (s), or need(s) to be fulfilled²⁷. Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics, (Scott 1998:83) notes “*organization we must consider as something in which there is interdependence between the several organized parts but in which this interdependence has degrees*”. The open system approach to organization analysis recognizes the influences of environment upon the interdependent parts of the organization. Organization interact with the other organizations, associations and institutions in an interdependent manner and can be seen to be part of the sub system of the wider system-that of society. Scott (1998:89) said that open systems are capable of self maintenance on the basis of a throughput of resources from the environment.²⁸

An organization as an open system is also claimed by the design and contingency theorists. Based on contingency theory, organization whose internal features best match the demands of their environment will achieve the best adaptation, that in turn, best adaptation of organization to the environment leads best organizational performance. On the other hand, rules, hierarchy, and decentralization are viewed as mechanism determining the information-processing capacity of the system. Organization must select a structural arrangement that is appropriate for the information processing (Scott 1998:96). Based on contingency theory, the best organizational structure must be established in order to adapt appropriately to the environment. Weick (Kreps 1986:111-131) emphasized the term “organizing” means information processing in general, and in particular, equivocality removing. The activities of an organization are directed toward the establishment of a workable level of uncertainty, including three stages: enactment, selection and retention. The concept of enactment emphasizes the role of perceptual processes and it also recognizes that organizational members are selectively

²⁶ Parsons used the status-role complex as the basic unit of the system. Status refers to a structural position within the social system, and role is what the actor does in such position, seen in the context of its functional significance for the larger system. The actor is not viewed in terms of thoughts and actions but instead (at least in terms of position in the social system) as nothing more than a bundle of statuses and roles. In his analysis of the social system, Parsons was interested primarily in its structural components. Based on action system, Parsons made it clear the hierarchical arrangement and the levels are integrated in system in two ways, (1) each of the lower levels provides the condition, energy, that are needed by the higher levels; (2) the higher levels control those below them in the hierarchy. The lowest levels are the physical and organic environment, involves the non symbolic aspects of the human body, its anatomy and physiology. The highest level is a metaphysical flavor (Ritzer, 2000:93-108).

²⁷ That system has need(s) was criticized by Anthony Giddens in his structuration theory. This theory explained that the individuals have need(s) to be fulfilled. “Actors also have motivation to act, and these motivations involve the wants and desires that prompt action. Motivations provide overall plan of actions but not all actions are directly motivated.” (Ritzer:2000:392-397)

²⁸ These statements against the prior statements which claim that organization is closed system. Closed system means that organization can survive and grow and renew by itself, ignore the influence of environment.

perceived and they directly influence the state of their environment through their own action. That statement means that organization is not only capable to adapt but also adjust to the environment pressures.²⁹ The second process is selection, in which organizational members accept some information and reject other information. The third process is retention in which a certain thing will be saved for future used. The main goal of the three processes is that the activities of organizational members are to monitor information changes and determines degree of uncertainty. The degree of uncertainty can be identified by rule process and communication behavior cycles.

On the other hand organizations can be a closed system. It is characterized by a concept of self sufficient entities insulated from extra organizational factors and thus, the environment can be safely ignored. Based on Jerald Hage's statement (Clegg and Dunkerley 1990:192), one of the most important instances of a closed system model of the organization is the axiomatic theory of organization. Hage constructs the axiomatic relationship between organization goals and means to achieve these goals. It is similar to Parson's four functional problems. The first goal is adaptation or flexibility. Flexibility may refer to adaptations of the system to external disturbances. The second goal is production, the third is efficiency and the fourth and the final goal is job satisfaction. Whereas the axiomatic organizational means to achieve these goals; (1) complexity/ specialization, (2) centralization or hierarchy of authority, (3) formalization/ standardization, and (4) stratification. All means above are intra-organizational, which determine the goal achievement. It means that organizations can achieve their goals by themselves and by using the intra organizational resources.

The axiomatic theory of organization by Hage is supported an assumption that organization is rational. The rational model of an organization describes that the results of everything are being functional-making positive and give an optimum contribution to the overall result. All resources are appropriate and their allocation fits a master plan. All actions are appropriate and the outcomes are predictable (Thompson 1967, as quoted by Clegg and Dunkerley 1990:193). Because of its rationality, closed system is *autopoiesis*, the capacity for self production through a closed system of relations. The aim of closed system is ultimately to produce themselves; their own organization and identity. Maturana and Varela (Morgan 1997:253-254) argue all living systems are organizationally closed, autonomous systems of

²⁹ Based on Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000), adaptation means that organizations have to change themselves to make a best appropriateness for the environment, while adjustment means that organizations have capability to change their environment. There is interaction and interdependence between organization and environment.

interaction that make referring only to themselves. Living system is characterized by three principal features: autonomy, circularity and self reference. These characteristics make the system has the ability to self create or self renew.

The concept of autopoiesis was adopted by Niklas Luhmann in his system theory in 1990s. Luhmann (Ritzer, 2000:181-198) argued that social system is an autopoietic system which has the following four characteristics:

1. An autopoietic system produces the basic elements that make up the system.
2. An autopoietic system is self-organizing in two ways – they organize their own boundaries and they organize their internal structures. They organize their boundaries by distinguishing between what is in the system and what is in the environment. What is inside or outside an autopoietic system is determined by the self-organization of the system, not, the functional necessities of the system. Within its boundaries, an autopoietic system produces its own structures.
3. Autopoietic systems are self-referential, not refers to the individual.
4. Autopoietic systems are closed systems. It means there is no direct connection between a system and its environment. Instead, a system deals with its representations of the environment. Even though an autopoietic system is a closed system, the environment must be allowed to disturb its inner representations. Without such disturbances, the system would be destroyed by environmental forces that overwhelm it. In a closed system, individuals are not part of it, but they are part of the environment.

One of important example of social systems is society. The basic element of society is communication and communication is produced by the society. Participants in society refer to the society through communication. The individual is relevant to the society only if he or she participates in communication or can be interpreted doing participation in communication. Anything which is not communicated or is not communication, is not a part of the society, but a part of the society's environment. This includes the biological systems of human being and even their psychic systems.

The two parts of the systems based on Luhmann are the social and psychic system. The psychic and social systems – the systems of all of communication – have a property in common. They both rely on meaning. Meaning is related to the choices that a system makes. The meaning of an action (object) is different from those of other possible actions. An action


has meaning only to the extent that a selection is made from among a range of possible actions. Psychic and social systems that rely on meaning are closed because: (1) one meaning always refers to the other meaning; (2) only meaning can change meaning; (3) a meaning usually produces more meaning. Meaning forms the boundary to each of these systems. What is not meaningful is seen as the outside of the system, as a “cause” of our action, while what is meaningful is inside the system as a “motivation” for our action. In the social system, meaning is the difference between a communication within the system and noise from outside of the system. Psychic and social systems have evolved together. Each is a necessary environment for the other.

The social system based on communication creates social structure in order to solve the problem of double contingency – every communication must take into account how it is received, but how it is received depends on the receiver’s estimation of the communicator. Because of this, communication is improbable, but social structures have developed to make communication more probable. It can be done if the structures are developed to permit earlier communication to connect with later communications. The selection made in one communication is restricted by the selection made in the previous communication and the present communication also restricts future communication. Luhmann called it as “regulates the evolution of social systems.”

Based on Luhmann’s thought, as a system, organization is a closed system that is composed by the basic elements of the system that is communication. Individuals are not a part of the system if not bound by communication. It can be meant that organization means a set of shared meaning. Something which is not meaningful means noise, that is a part of the environment. As a closed system, organization does not directly interact with the environment, but it does not mean that the environment does not influence the organization. The changes of the environment have to be responded by communicating between the organization and the representation of environment.

Based on the explanation above, organization can be analyzed as closed and open system. For this research, I take assumption that organization is relatively open system. Besides has criteria as explained, organization also does the exchange of goods and services between organization and their environments. The linkage of input, throughput and output, and exchange of raw material between organization and environment can be indication of open system, as described on model 3 :

Model 3³⁰
Organization as an open system



Relating to the way of interaction between organization and its environment, Buckley (1967, as quoted by Scott 1998:90) distinguishes between two basic steps of system processes: morphostasis and morphogenesis. The term morphostasis refers to those processes that tend to preserve or maintain a system's given form, structure or state. Morphostasis in social system would include socialization and control activities. Morphogenesis refers to the processes that elaborate or change the system- for example: growth, learning, and differentiation. In adapting to the external environment, open systems typically become more differentiated in form, more elaborate in structure. Organizations exhibit such an amazing capacity to change their basic structural features, based on the input from the environment. In other words, source of maintenance, diversity and variety is the environment. There is a close connection between the condition of the environment and the characteristic of the system within it: a complex system cannot maintain its complexity in a simple environment. In the similar context, Luhmann (Ritzer, 2000:181-198) said that to reduce the complexity of the environment, the systems develop subsystems and establish various relations between these subsystems. System is increasing the differentiation. Differentiation is defined as the replication, within a system of the difference between a system and its environment. It means that there are two kinds of environments; these are one common to all subsystems and a different internal environment for each subsystem. Each of the subsystems has a different view of the internal environment of the system. This creates a highly complex and dynamic internal environment. This differentiation³¹ leads to increasing of the complexity of the system and allows for a

³⁰ Adapted from the system transformation model (Kreps, 1986: 101)

³¹ Luhmann (Ritzer, 2000:181-198) identifies four forms of differentiation, segmentary, stratificatory, center-periphery and functional. Segmentary differentiation divides parts of the system with the similar function that is to fulfill the basis of the need. Stratificatory differentiation is a vertical differentiation – different in rank and

greater ability of the system to respond to the change of environment, as well as to make evolution faster. It can be meant that based on Luhmann's argument, to adapt the change of environment, system can be self-organizing and self-referential, -- not dependent on the environment. In the context of an organization, as a system, to adapt the change of environment, an organization has to be divided into several parts (units) with the same function, or different rank or status or function. In other simple word, we can say that organization is structured.

What is environment? For a given system, the environment is the set of all objects whose attributes affect the system and also those objects whose attributes are changed by the behavior of the system (Hall and Fagen 1956, as quoted by Scott 1998:123). System theorists typically define the environment as anything that provides the change pressures—"matter, energy and information inputs"—to the system. On the other hand, Weick (Kreps 1986:115-116) defines organizational environment is not the physical surroundings but the information to which they react. The focus of the organizational environment shifts from a traditional structure, static view of the physical surroundings to an action, process view of the messages that organization members perceive and the meanings that they create in response to these messages. The concept of organizational environment, based on Weick, can be conceptualized as a communication construct. The organization's environment is derived from the exchange of messages and creation of meaning by organization members. In another part of Weick's explanation (Kreps 1986:240), environment consists of all external factors of an organization. To specify the element of the environment that is most critical to the organization, the concept of "relevant environment" that was introduced by Rogers. Relevant environment includes all factors external to the organization's boundary that have direct influence on the organization and its members. As Weick indicates, the relevant organizational environments are really information environments. This argument is similar to the Luhmann's definition about environment. As mentioned previously that whatever is not communication is not a part of system, but a part of environment. It can be understood that boundary of the system or organization can be identified by creating communication and construct shared meaning. This boundary can be used to define what elements are within in the system or which one is a part

status in a system, hierarchy. Every rank has different function in the system. Higher and lower rank may be unequal but both ranks depend on one another and the social system can survive only if all ranks successfully realize their function. Center-periphery differentiation is a link between segmentary and stratificatory differentiation. The fourth form of differentiation is functional systems. Functional differentiation is the most complex and the one that dominates modern society. It allows for the greater system flexibility, but if one functionally differentiated system fails to perform its function, the system as a whole may fail.

of the environment.

Lawrence and Lorsch and others define the content of environment. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967 in Clegg and Dunkerley, 1990:200) distinguish three elements in the environment – market, research and development, and technology. They show that they can change at any different rate. Hall (1999: 207-214) identified the general environment of organization, based on condition of the environment: technological condition, legal conditions, political conditions, economic condition, politico-economy conditions, demographic conditions, ecological conditions and cultural conditions. Scott (1998:124) said that conceptions of environments vary by level of analysis as well as substantive focus. An analysis level includes the organization sets, organization population, inter-organizational community, and organizational field. Each focuses on a somewhat different aspect of organization-environment relations. In substantive interest, environment has been devoted to the technical and institutional aspect of environment.

2.3. ORGANIZATION BASED ON STRUCTURATION THEORY

Analyzing a government as an organization by using system theory is not quite comprehensive. The action of the government or the member of the organization sometimes can not be determined by the system or organizational roles and functions. It can be a personal or individual action. Due to this reason, structuration theory is more useful to analyze what factors can be the context of the action. The following part explains the structuration theory and how this theory explains an organization.

Structuration theory was formulated by Anthony Giddens as reconstruction of social theory, by criticizing three schools of very important social theories, interpretive sociology, functionalism and structuralism. He purposed to maintain the three of social theories but he also tried to find out the way to eliminate their weaknesses and made a bridging among the differences. It covers re-conceptualization of relationship among action, structure and system, in order to integrate them into one new theory, and the later time, it is called as structuration³² theory (Ross in Beilharz 2003:191-198). Critics to theories which are analyzed by Giddens are focused on the concept of dualism. Dualism is a tension between subjectivism and objectivism, and, voluntarism and determinism. Subjectivism and voluntarism are the tendency of

³² Structuration is a process in which the unintended consequences of action create norms, rules, roles and other social structures that constrain or affect future action. Structuration occurs constantly in all social systems. (Littlejohn 2005:252).

perspective which has priority to personal act and experience meanwhile, objectivism and determinism focus on the general phenomena prior to act and personal experience. The main object of social science is neither on the social role, as in Parson's theory, nor hidden code as on the Levis Strauss's structuralism, and on the unique situational as written on symbolic interactionism of Guffman. It is not about a whole or a part, not structure or personal act, but it is about integration between them (Priyono, 2003:5-7). Giddens's critics to functionalism theory is on concept function and role. That the individual acts is only based on the social role constructed by society, not by himself, is the main focus of his critic. According to Giddens, there are some thoughts; (1) individual is not passive and stupid, they are not robot who acts only base on programs determined by society. An individual as an actor has capability of self introspection and control; (2) a social system does not have needs. Actor has; (3) social symptoms are bounded by space and time. Giddens also criticized structuralism and post structuralism which reject the existence of subject. Giddens saw that this school of thoughts is going to be imperialism of social object to subject or thinking which give priority to the structure, not to the actor. (Priyono 2003:7).

The basic domain of the study of structuration theory is neither the experience of individual actor, nor the experience of the form of social totality, but social practices ordered across time and space. The core of this theory is a theory of the relationship between agency and structure. Thus, agency and structure are not apart from each other; they are two sides of the same coin. They are duality. All social actions involve structure, and all structures involve social actions. Practices or activities are not produced by consciousness, or by the social construction of the reality, nor are produced by social structure. However, in expressing as actors, people are engaging in practice, and through that practices, consciousness and structure are produced³³. By simple words, it can be said that the main idea of structuration theory is that human action is a process of producing and reproducing various social systems. In his other thoughts, Giddens defines social system as reproduced social practices, or reproduced relations between actors or collectivities organized as regular social practices.

In organization context, structuration theory posits that communication contributes

³³ Structure, according to Giddens, is a set of rules and resources which creates repetition of social practices. The social practices, in turn, create rules and resources. It is the reason why Giddens created structuration theory to combine concept of structure and system, where the power of structure in system is implemented and reinforced in practices which establish systems. Thus, structure is social practices reproduced space and time. The concept of action, based on Giddens perspective, is neither object determined by structure, nor independent subject, but the subject who actively self creates through the ongoing social practices (Ritzer, 2000:387-395)

both to the formation of individual personality and to the development of the larger institution through the production and reproduction of structure. This structure can best be understood as the rules and resources that people use in everyday interaction. Individuals consciously draw upon interpretive schemes (standardized stock of knowledge) in the production of meaning. These interpretive schemes have a strong obligating quality – their chronic reproduction legitimizes the social actions they constitute. Interviews, business meetings, reports, and even incidental conversation can be analyzed through the interpretive schemes the people use in making sense of transactions. Social systems that are “chronically reproduced” in day to day activity are institutions. These regularized practices are sustained by systems of meaning, role prescription, and socialization (Goldhaber and Barnett, 1995:135).

The process of social structures shape people’s actions, while at the same time these structures are shaped by their action. Structuration refers to “the production and reproduction of the social system through members’ use of rules and resources in interaction.” Interaction means that people are relatively free to act as they will. Structure can be understood as rules and resources. Rules are implicit formulas for action, recipes for “how to get on in life”. Resources are all relevant personal traits, abilities, knowledge and possessions people bring to an interaction. Since rules and resources are constantly changing, structuration is a fluid process. Production happens when people use rules and resources in interaction. Reproduction occurs when an action reinforces features of systems that are already in place, and thus maintain the status quo. (Poole in Griffin 2003:244-257)

The structuration theory was adopted by Marshall Scott Poole (Griffin 2003:244-257) to analyze communication in organization. The core assumption of this theory is that a lot of times people in groups build up structures or arrangements that are very uncomfortable for them, but they don’t realize that they are doing it. The point of this theory is to make them aware of the rules and resources that they are using so that they can have more control over what they do in groups. Poole called his theory as an adaptive structuration theory because he observed members of task groups intentionally adapting rules and resources in order to accomplish their decision making goals. Rules were thought as “propositions that indicate how something ought to be done or what is good or bad.” These rules contain member’s collective practical wisdom on how best to reach the group goals. The resources, as Poole thought, is that the individuals bring to the task, such as materials, possessions, or attributes that can be used to influence or control the actions of the group or its members. Poole notes that group members

sometimes appropriate rules or resources in ways that thwart their intended use. He calls it “an ironic appropriation” because it goes against the spirit of the structure. Giddens’ “duality of structure” concept explains that rules and resources are both the medium and the outcome of the interaction. In context of the organization, Poole says that decision is not only affected by the structure of the group, but at the same time it also has an effect upon those same rules and resources. It helps explain why groups are sometimes stable and predictable, yet why they are often changing and unpredictable. It depends on how the group members appropriate rules and resources. Structure is stable if actors appropriate them in a consistent way, reproduce them in similar form over time. The implication of this assumption for group decision making is (1) groups create themselves, yet members don’t always realize they are crafting and reinforcing the tools that do the work, (2) groups step up from a passive role to have an active voice within your group, and (3) groups have knowledge of how rules and resources work will equip low power members to become agents of change.

Focusing on the communication action or organizational communication, Poole and McPhee define structure as both a manifestation and a product of communication in the organization. Organizational structure is created when individuals communicate with others in three metaphorical sites or centers of structuration. The first is conception. It includes episodes of organizational life in which people make decision and choices that limit what will happen within the organization. The second site is implementation. It is the formal codification and announcement of decision and choices. The third is reception. It is the organizational members act in accordance with the organizational decision. The communication activities at these three sites are often difficult and conflict laden and the communication patterns may be complex and time consuming and the outcome is very much affected by the skill of the people involved. Organizational climate is also mentioned in structuration theory. Here, the climate is the general collective description of the organization that shapes members’ expectation and feelings and therefore the organization’s performance. Poole and McPhee define climate as “a collective attitude, continually produced and reproduced by member’s interaction.” In other words, a climate is not an objective “variable” that affect the organization, nor is it an individual’s perception of the organization. Climate is a product of structuration: it is both a medium and an outcome of interaction. Climate is not static but is constant in the process of the development. Three interacting factors enter into this development; (1) structure of the organization itself; (2) various climate-producing apparatuses or mechanisms designed to affect

employee perceptions and performance; and (3) member characteristics, their skill and knowledge (Littlejohn 2005:252-254).

Table 14 describes briefly the differences of an organization based on four theories.

Table 14
Organization is analyzed by some theories

	Structural functionalism/ Parsons	System theory- Neosstructuralism/ Luhmann	Structuration/ Giddens	Adaptive Structuration/ Poole
Main assumption	Human and social action is determined by the structure	Basic element of social system is communication and information.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interaction/ dialectic relationship between agency and structure Integration between what people think/do and organizations must do. 	Decision making is affected by structure; and also it affects to the structure.
Survival and change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Socialization and social control to maintain equilibrium; Adaptation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Autopoietic: self organizing and self renewing Developing subsystems and establishing relation with those. 	Production and reproduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adapting to rules and resources; Change and stability Ironic appropriation
Structure	Status and role	Communication/ meaning	Rules and resources	A manifestation and a product of communication.
Actor	Passive, controlled by system, a part of the system.	Not a part of the system	Capable to self introspection and control	Powerful to become agents of change.
Environment	Anything that provides the change pressures	Whatever is not meaningful and not communication	--	--
Relation with environment	Direct interaction, adapt to environment change	No direct connection; Morphostatic and morphogenesis	--	--

2.4. THEORETICAL IMPLICATION

For this research, a governmental organization is seen as a relatively open system. The government is consisted of several elements (individuals, units, departments) that have

different, stratified and hierarchical roles and functions but interacts to each other, as well as to its environment, in order to achieve the government's goal. The government's members, including president, are a part of the organization. They make action based on roles and function set up by the organization. Strategy of crisis communication applied by the president, therefore, is action that set up by the government. It is considering as collective action, not personal action.

As an open system the governmental organization is dependent on the environment. The environment of the government's environment can be meant as information and communication which is relevant for the government. Government's environment can also be meant as a larger system or other systems. Situations or conditions composed by information could be government's environment. Condition or dimension is assumed to play the most important role in the governmental organization as the public organization is political condition. Politics plays a role at the local level as well as at the national or global level. Many researches on political conditions and organizations would undoubtedly reveal more such pattern. The collapse of the former East Germany is a case in point. The changed political system had ramifications for almost all organizations. Even cultural organizations such as a symphony orchestra, is affected by this jolt (Allmendinger and Hackman 1996, as quoted by Hall 1999:210).

In order to achieve the goal or organizational needs, the government always creates and develops interaction with its environment by communication and information exchange. Degree of the government interchange information with something external factors determines the degree of the organizational openness. As explained, the degree of openness of the government can change and different from time to time. For my purpose, it is difficult to claim that the organization is definitely set on the certain degree of openness without giving attention to time and current situation. In the past, Indonesian government can be a low degree of openness but in the different time and situation, it can change to be higher degree of openness. In crisis situation government can be highly open but less open in the normal situation.

Crisis response strategy which will be analyzed is seen as one of organizational behavior or action. It can also be seen as a product of organizational decision making. In the context of crisis that occurred in Indonesia, the organizational action which will be analyzed is the government's response to the crisis. By using system theory or structural functionalism by Parsons, the government as an organization can be seen as the example of the social systems.

The action of the organization can be thought as a social action. Strategy that is set by the organization or the members of organization is determined by the structure. What the members do means what the organization does. An organization has set each status and role for the members. In case of crisis, what responses of the members to the crisis, including of its leaders, are done as their status and roles. Looking at the government actions and the factors might interact with it by the structural functionalism is not so different from looking at it by the concept of bureaucracy. The concept of bureaucracy aroused firstly in the term of mechanistic organization by Max Weber. Bureaucracy theory provides a descriptive model of the nature and structure of effective hierarchical organization. It refers to the ideally structured human organization that can be achieved through the formalization of rules, structures and processes within organization. According to Weber (Kreps 1986:68-70), the ideal bureaucratic organization exhibit eight structural characteristics, namely: formal rules, specialization of organization members' roles, hierarchy of formal organizational authority and legitimacy of the power roles, employment of qualified personnel that is based on technical competence, interchangeability of personnel, impersonality and professionalism, detailed job description and rationality and predictability. These characteristics are indications that bureaucratic organization can be seen as machine. Each individual civil servant is a cog in the machine with no personal interest. They act if only it is related to their roles and functions in the organization that is hierarchically structured. Based on Parsons individual personally is not a part of the system, but a part of environment and what they act is determined by structure, not by themselves as personal or individual.

Those characteristics of mechanistic organization lead us to think that government bureaucracy is usually called as officialdom – a kingdom that is lead by a group of officials (Thoha, 2003:2). These officials have power because of their higher position in hierarchy. Higher position means higher power. These positions are completed by all facilities. Everyone who does not have position means powerless, and they are not a part of the organization. That is people who are powerless. Because of their powerlessness, people are very dependent on the government. The more dependent the people the more powerful the governmental officials are. In the term of system, officials who have position and power are within the system, and people who don't have power and position in the structure are outside of the system – as a part of environment. Officialdom can be understood by indication that there is no direct relationship between organization/ officials/ system with people/public/ environment. Officialdom is also indicated by unequal relationship between government and public. The concept of pyramidal

hierarchy or bureaucracy is usually called by businessman as the damn bureaucracy. It can be concluded that government is a closed system whereas the survival or existence of this organization is not dependent on the energy exchange with its environment.

On the other perspective, Heckscher and Donellon (Thoha, 2003:4) claimed that mechanistic organization, as described by Weber, can't be properly used in the modern era. The future bureaucracy is Post Bureaucratic organization, in which is not only focused on internal coherence and centralized power, but also concerned for external interaction and social interaction. Powering is not the only one method to operate the machine of bureaucracy, but also empowering the bureaucracy. Closed and centralized bureaucracy will change into open and decentralized bureaucracy. To remain the survival of bureaucracy, this bureaucracy has to adapt and adjust the changed environment, for example, by changing the structure and also reforming of mindset and behavior of government officials to be more open people³⁴. Decentralized bureaucracy means that the government is not the only power center. Government has to "return" the power to the people or empower them³⁵. Related to the future government bureaucracy, there are two contradictive models of government, these are (1) pluralist democracy, and (2) administrative efficiency (Yates 1982 in Thoha, 2003:30-35). The two models are antithetic to one another, whereas the one can be existed if only the other is not existed. Pluralist democracy model assumed as follows: (1) there are many group interests in society that are different to one another and compete each other; (2) government has to offer equal accessibility and means of participation for all group interests; (3) government has a balance of power by distributing power vertically or horizontally; (4) government and politics have to be accepted as arena of minority interests competition; (5) there is high probability that an active and a legitimate group in population can made this group listens to the crucial steps in policy making; (6) competition among government and non governmental institutions can cause bargaining and compromising, and also a power balance in society. The main assumption


³⁴ Actor, in this perspective, is very important. Structure will be not changed if it is not begun by the change of actor. To be open and decentralized government bureaucracy, structure and agent together determine the changes of organization and its environment. About the importance of individual, it is described in the structuration theory. Giddens in his theory criticized the theory of system and structural functionalism of Parsons. "Every research investigation in the social sciences or history is involved in relating action (often used synonymously with agency) to structure...there is no sense in which structure determines action or vice verse" (Giddens, 1984:219, in Ritzer, 2000:387-395). Thus, agency and structure are not apart from each other; they are two sides of the same coin. They are duality. All social actions involve structure, and all structures involve social actions. Giddens also said, "Whatever happened would not happen if that individual had not intervened". Giddens emphasized on the importance of agency. Agents have a great power and ability to make a difference in the social world.

³⁵ In the structuration theory, structure is not only constraining, but also enabling action. It can be used to explain why government is not only powering the people but also empowering them (Ritzer 2000:387-395).

of pluralist democracy model above is that government has to listen to the public or people and together with them in policy making. It can be said that this model assumes bureaucracy should be an open system, rather than a closed system. On the other hand, an administrative efficiency model is totally not giving the area to manifest political theories and ideology, as described by pluralist. This model seems so similar to the Weberian bureaucracy. Government as a closed system may apply this model.

For this purposes, government as an object of observation is seen as an organization that uses the model of pluralist democracy. It means that bureaucracy of government has to be an open system that is characterized by there is matter –energy, raw material or information— exchange between organization with its environment. In the context of bureaucracy, government has to interact equally with its publics. Publics, as mentioned before, can be defined as people who are powerless, are not within or a part of the structure. Bureaucracy should provide equal relationship among three components, these are government, citizen or civil society and business persons, people who work in the private sectors (Thoha, 2003:63-64), as described by the model 4.

Model 4
Equal relationship among three components
(Model of good governance by UNDP 1997)



By this perspective, it can be assumed that all public policies must be a product of the interaction among those three components. For this research purposes, it can be said that any communication strategies that carried out by government in crisis, those are determined by the government, but also the other two components, civil society and business people. How to

construct the image of government in crisis is dependent on a mutually interrelationship among those three components. It means post bureaucracy which is fit for democratic era needs the governmental system with high degree of openness.

Relying on the structuration theory governmental organization means structure and the president is an agent or agency, and the strategy of crisis communication applied by the president is an action. Structure means rules and resources. The rules in government are social and political practices or habit, norm, guidance, mechanism, procedures, regulations, policies and other similar things that help the organization and its members in doing action. The rules can be derived into stratified levels, from central to local or unit or sub unit level. Whereas resources are all relevant personal traits, abilities, knowledge and possession of the members bring to interaction. The members who have high ethic, discipline, skill, dedication, competence and professional can be good resources. These help members to interact and communicate to the other people, both inside and outside of governmental organization.

Different from system theory, based on structuration theory, the president is an organization's member can be not a part of the structure. She or he can do the action as a personal entity. The action can be made by a personal interest or a need of president. It means president's action is not seen as a government's action but a personal action or individual action. President is an active person who has his or her own needs, interests and capabilities to change and produce new structure. Even though, as described on system theory, president can also be a part of the structure. It means that the president shapes and strengthens existed government's rules and resources by his or her repeated action. By using concepts of structuration, we can say that president's action may produce and reproduce the structure.


Using this assumption, government rule, regulation, climate, role of each member, organizational structure of the government itself and the characters, skill and knowledge, and a perception of the members of government including the president are the factors or the contextual factor in crisis communication strategy choice. In addition, a larger structure, such as the social and political practices, regulation, norms, and habit can also be understood as other contextual factors. It means that the action of the president, -- strategy--, is selected, not only on the basis on the contextual factors determination, but also on his or her own willingness. The first one president reproduced the structure and the latest one president produce structure. Whatever action made by government, including in crisis or in not normal situation, must be thought as process of dialectic of the structure and agency.

In context of crisis, public relations structure is dominant. As a part of organizational structure, public relations has roles and functions of image building and communication. According to the system theory, to make easier in adapting to the high complexity of its environment, an organization needs to be divided into several sub systems or units with the different roles and functions. For monitoring environment changes, an organization takes its function over to the public relations (PR) as a sub unit to deal with it. PR is also responsible for establishing good relationship between organization and its publics. It is established by communication. There is some guidance, regulation and rule – what should do and shouldn't do, good or bad – for PR practitioners in doing their role and function. It can be called as structure, composed by rule and resources, as sub structure of the larger organizational structure. Some parts below describe about PR practices, called as “one of organization structures”.

2.4.1. Public Relations as a Structure

Since organization is set up as an open system and its bureaucracy is democratic, communication between an organization and its publics must be two ways and equal. It means an organization and its publics must have an equal opportunity to get involved in communication activities and processes. There is no domination in communication process by one part to another, including in the process of decision and organizational policy making. An organization must give opportunity to the publics to get information access about organization. It must be transparent in communication with publics. PR which is structurally represented organization must be open in communication with publics. So, the model communication of PR must be two way and equal. Model 5 below shows the open system model of PR.

Model 5 Open System Model of Public Relations



In crisis situation, the role of PR is to deal with crisis communication. In this not normal situation, an open system model of PR has to be applied optimally. In the situation in which uncertainty is going to be escalated, PR must be selectively sensitive to those publics and it must have the capacity for initiating corrective action within the organization and for directing efforts to affect knowledge, predispositions and behaviors of publics. It is one indicator of equal relationship between an organization and its environment or publics. An organization performs the function of PR by establishing mutual interrelationship with its publics.

The definition of public relations (PR) and its relation to the organization, crisis and crisis communication are described on the following parts. Firstly, it will be described the definition of PR. These definitions contain also PR's functions and roles. Secondly, it will be described about the implication of system toward PR's communication with its publics or environment. Finally, it will be explained how PR performed its function in the situation of crisis, and how strategy that carried out by this PR in order to main good image in publics' mind. In this part, it is also explained about the relation between PR practitioners and journalists. Good "personal" relationship is very important to explore because what they think

and what they do individually is also determinant on the social practices, as argued by Giddens in his structuration theory.

2.4.1.1. Roles and Functions of Public Relations

To understand the definitions of Public Relations we can search the Public Relations (PR) practices in the duration of its development. Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) divided the development of PR into many steps begin on the ancient genesis into the era of PR maturity. In early of development, PR is understood as information distribution, publicity, political campaign and persuasion, press agency, advertising. In the era of maturity, PR is posited as an organization's tool to defend the organization's image against the muckracing journalism, to promote ideas and products, and in the current time, PR is posited as a mediator for various interest conflicts. Referring to those roles, PR is defined as:

“PR is about communicating in order to achieve understanding through knowledge. The techniques of PR are to do with the sending and receiving of messages so that the both sides understand each other: in other words, two way education.”

“PR as inducing the public to have understanding for and goodwill.” (Edward L Bernays : 1955 in Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000:3)

“PR is the art or science of developing reciprocal understanding and goodwill” (Webster's Third new International Dictionary—During World War II in Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000:3)

“PR is the deliberate, planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain mutual understanding between an organization and its publics.” (The British Institute of Public Relations in Jefkins, Frank 1993:7).

“PR as an interactive concept, ‘the planned effort to influence opinion through good character and responsible performance, based on mutually satisfactory two way communications (Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000:3)”

“PR is the management of communication between an organization and its publics. (Grunig, 1992:4)”

“The basic function of PR is to reconcile or adjust in the public interest those aspects of our personal and corporate behavior which have a social significance” or “PR function is to help organization adjust to their environments (Childs, 1930s in Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000:3)”.

Based on these definitions, Public Relations can be understood as a communication

function that can be categorized into two kinds of different concept of communication; (1) PR as one way communication, which is implemented as communication practices, such as propaganda, persuasion and publicity, and (2) PR as two way communication function, which is emphasized on exchange, reciprocity, and mutual understanding between organization and its publics, such as organizational adjustment, counseling management and corrective action. Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) called it as “evolution of PR’s concept”. PR as communication function has been followed by the other similar definitions that more emphasize on the PR function in the context of organizational management processes, such as the following definitions:

“Public Relations is the management function which evaluates public attitudes, identifies the policies and procedures of an individual or an organization with the public interest, and plans and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance.(Seitel, 1995:7)”

“Public Relations is a distinctive management function which helps establish and maintain mutual lines of communication, understanding, acceptance and cooperation between an organization and its publics, involves the management of problems or issues; helps management to keep informed on and responsive to public opinion; defines and emphasizes the responsibility of management to serve the public interest; helps management keep abreast of and effectively utilize change, serving as an early warning system to help anticipate trends; and uses research and sound and ethical communication as its principal tools” (Rex F. Harlow , as quoted by Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000:4).

The definition shows the function of PR in practice, which also emphasizes its functions for publics, these are (1) management function, and (2) communication function. Management function means that PR has contribution to help or advise management in the decision making processing and has participation in management policy making. Communication function means that PR has responsibility build and maintain communication and mutual relationship between the organization and its publics. This definition also clearly shows that the role of PR has changed from the original one in its early stages. The early stage of PR in America was characterized by the need of companies for defending themselves from the attacks from the journalists who at that time tended to uncover their rottenness. Therefore, the relations of organizational PR and journalists tended to be adversary relations (Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000). PR played the role to defend organization’s interest by presenting information that is positive for company, on the other hand, journalists had an interest in presenting negative side of the company as an informational commodity. The description shows the communication

performed was defensive in nature. They manipulate the information if needed to cover the company's rottenness. Information provided by PR was developed based on organizational interest. PR's philosophy then emphasized how to persuade media to get them informing what the organization expected disregarding whether the journalists believed the informational content. Referring to PR's practices at that time it can be said that the communication of organization with its publics constituted one-way communication. The informational source was the organization and public was the destination. The function of PR was as the press agency, those are seeking public attention for the organization, in anyway possible (Grunig, in Heath 2001). On the later development, however, when democracy has been established, indicated by the freedom in expressing opinions and thought, PR did not think that publics were merely a passive object. Therefore, the PR-public model then became the public information. PR's function delivered accurate information to the publics, though the information was only limited to the advantageous information for the organization.

Concerning the operational roles of PR, from various studies on PR in practices, four main categories of PR's roles are found (Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000:37-44):

1. Communication Technician

In this role, the PR practitioner is oriented to perform technical jobs such as writing and editing newsletter, developing web-site, and developing contacts with media. In this role, PR is not involved by management in defining organizational problems and selecting the decisions. They are directed to operate communication tools, even with no need to know the motivation or purpose of the communication products. This role limits the PR practitioner to participate significantly in making management decisions.

2. Expert Prescriber

Practitioners who hold this roles have an authority to define problems, to develop programs and to be responsible for implementation the program. In an organization, a manager gives full power, and does not interfere in the PR's operations. Such role for the practitioner is indeed satisfying because of its independence in performing anything wanted, and it benefits the manager too because he/she can be sure on the performance of these experts. On the other hand, however, such PR's role makes the practitioner become isolated from the organization's dynamics. The manager may also feel irresponsible over the failure or success of the program performed by the PR practitioners.

3. Communication Facilitator

This PR's roles are to be a sensitive listener and information bearer. The practitioners serve as liaisons, interpreters, and mediators between the organization and its publics. They maintain two-way communication and facilitate the information exchange by eliminating the communication barriers and opening communication channels. This PR role understands that two-way communication can increase the quality of organizational decisions, which promote its own and the public's interest mutually.

4. Problem Solving Facilitator

This role means that PR's participation in overcoming organizational problems is substantial. They become a part of the strategic planning team, along with other managers.

The four PR roles can be reduced into two major roles, these are: technician and manager roles. The technician is not indicated as the member of the management team. They concern more with the process, which is producing and implementing various techniques used by PR. The manager's role performs research both formative and evaluative in their jobs. This research capability make them always be involved in the process of defining problems and making organizational decisions, as well as in strategic plans. They involve more in defining the outcome, not on the process to reach the outcome. PR manager uses more environment scanning, negotiating, coalition building, issue managing, evaluating and management advising. Cutlip, Center and Broom called managerial role of PR is functional, and technician role of PR is functionary. Functional means that PR plays more in decision making processes, whereas functionary means that PR in the organizational structure has no opportunities as member of strategic planning team along with the other managers. In practice, the role of PR in organization is based on the organizational environment. In organization with high degree in innovation because of the rapid environment changing and high environment's threat, the roles of PR is more on PR manager. In the crisis situation, for example, the roles of PR should be manager, especially be expert prescriber. On the other hand, in the organization which is relatively stable and low environment's threat, the role of PR is as technician.

Some studies show that PR practitioners play numerous roles, yet on a given time there is a dominant role. PR's role mainly met is the problem solving facilitator and the expert

prescriber, only a few that play the role as communication technician. In Japan, South Korea, India, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, Public Relations practitioners in companies work more in media relations activities that focus on the promotion or product publicity and the most of all, the role of PR are technician (Sriramesh et al 1999, Putra, I G 1996, Perbawaningsih 1991, Rhee, Yunna 2002). They believe that information that is written by journalist about the organization is more credible for publics. As a result, the media relations objectives are persuading journalist to inform good news for establishing the organization reputation. PR practitioners treat the journalist as very important public, so media relation is the most important activities. In China, Taiwan, Indonesia, India, Britain, Russia, and New Zealand, PR activities are based on government or political party's interests, which are emphasized on the educational persuasion or campaign for government's programs. In China and Russia the role of PR tends to be functional, whereas in India, Indonesia and Taiwan, PR is functionary for government (McElreath et al 2001, Miller and Schlesinger 2001, Motion and Leitch 2001, Samra 2001, Weaver 2002, Perbawaningsih 1999). Based on their studies, it reveals that PR in the developing countries or Asia tends to be technicians and the role is functionary for organization.

2.4.1.2. Communication Models of PR

The development of democracy that was characterized with the freedom in expressing opinion for wider community, even for criticizing the state, showed the people's power vis-à-vis the ruler. Democracy was clearly characterized with the existence of the equality between the people and the state. In such an era, the organization's public is not in the position as the object for PR's activities anymore. Therefore, the relationship between the organization and the public is equal. Grunig (Heath 2000) suggested that there were two models of relation of organization with the publics, these are the two-way asymmetrical model and the two-way symmetrical model. The first model shows PR persuading public's behavior which is expected by the publics, whereas in the second model, PR uses investigation and dialog with the publics to gain changes in ideas, attitude and behavior which are beneficial for both sides, i.e. the organization and its publics. The communication occurs in this relation was two-way communication. This relational model between organization and publics was labeled by Grunig as The Excellence of Public Relations. The use of two-way symmetrical model, or the combination of two-way asymmetrical and two-way symmetrical model (mix motive model) could increase the

contribution of PR to the accomplishment of organizational objectives. In most cases, Grunig believed that the two-way symmetrical model was normatively ideal. Nonetheless, this concept was criticized even Grunig himself saw that the two-way symmetrical model was utopian effort of PR. In practice, PR which is established and works on behalf of organization, would never be separated from its function to benefit the organization, even though evidently the organization is on the 'wrong' position. Van der Meiden (Grunig in Heath 2000) stated that "the two-way symmetrical model means that organizations would have to abandon their self interests, something considered as unrealistic".

Gordon and Kelly (1999) formulated operationally the PR models formulated by Grunig, as follows:


PR Models and Its Implementation

- **Two-way symmetrical model:**
 1. Determine how public reacts to the organization.
 2. Negotiate with an activist group.
 3. Help management to understand the opinion of particular publics
 4. Use theories of conflict resolution in dealing with publics
- **Two-way asymmetrical model:**
 1. Get publics to adopt behavior that your organization wants them to adopt
 2. Use attitude theory in a campaign
 3. Manipulate publics scientifically
 4. Persuade public that your organization is right on an issue
- **Public Information Model**
 1. Provide objective information about your organization
 2. Understand the news value of journalist
 3. Prepare news stories that reporters will use
 4. Perform as journalist within your organization.
- **Press Agency Model**
 1. Convince reporter to publicize your organization
 2. Get your organization's name into the media
 3. Keep bad publicity out of the media
 4. Get maximum publicity from a staged event.


The four model of PR demonstrates that there are differences in organization - public communication flow. It indicates also that there are differences of the importance of public opinion for organization. Press agency model shows one way communication that is from organization to publics. The main task of PR is building and maintaining organization reputation. The public information model implies the higher importance of publics for organization. It is indicated by the organization willingness to provide the objective information

about organization to publics, especially for media. Two way asymmetrical communication model focuses on changes public's attitude which is conducive for the organization by persuasion approach. The last model is the two way symmetrical communication. It means that public is important for the organization. PR efforts are to fulfill public's need by doing negotiate with publics. There are equal position between organization and publics.

Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) described the PR development in United States in a continuum line, started from 1850 when PR was used for the first time by the Press Agent for railway and circus, until in 1952 in which Cutlip and Center published their first book, "The Effective Public Relations". The continuum line also reveals importance of public for organization. A continuum line shows the changes in PR concept, as follows:



This Cutlip, Center and Broom's depiction was in line with the development of PR functions generated by Grunig aforementioned. The essence of this PR development was the evolution of PR communication function, from the one-way persuasive communication to the equal two-way communication. The evolution of communication functions is followed by the changes of PR's Role, as described by Crobb and Pincus (Heath 2000):



The model above describes that current PR's role is emphasized on maintaining the organizational positioning. It means that PR participates in strategic planning, together with other management. The recent role is different from the early role. It is only emphasized on technical or tactical function.

Similar to Grunig, Cutlip, Center and Broom also stated that the ideal PR was the one that develops relation of organization and public with mutual adjustment, willing to make

changes for the benefit of both parties. This meant that PR made a substantial contribution for the achievement of organizational objectives only when it used the equality relation model between the organization and its publics, as well as the two-way communication (Gordon and Kelly 1999, Grunig 2000, Plowman 1998). By other words, in crisis, Public Relations as a part of organization has role as communication facilitator and/ or expert prescriber and apply two way communication model. It is a kind of structure, as mentioned by Giddens or Poole.

About PR practices, almost in all Asian countries or in developing countries, PR was functioned more as the press agency with one-way linear communication. In Japan and Indian, as mentioned before, the main activity of PR is media relations, that is the principal form of press agency model (Sriramesh and friends 1999: 271-292). In Indian, none of the organizations engaged in sophisticated research, a key component of the two way model. It can be attributed to a lack of commitment to strategic public relations by the dominant coalition. This fact was not different from those in other countries such as South Korea. Beside through mass media, PR uses personal influence model. The personal influence model is a quid pro quo relationship between the PR practitioners and strategically placed individuals, such as government regulators, media persons and tax officials. The using of this model is supported by the culture, such as *nomunication*³⁶ in Japan, giving *Ddukgab*³⁷ and *chaebol*³⁸ system in South Korea. The three cultures above remain one way communication, even more, asymmetrical communication model. In Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia, that PR was also functioned as the press agency and Public Information model (Sriramesh et al 1999, Putra, I G 1996, Perbawaningsih 1991, Rhee, Yunna 2002). PR practitioners in China state that they apply two way asymmetrical communication and two way symmetrical communication with publics. Government PR said that they always listen to the public's voices in planning the national development program. In Russia, PR uses two way asymmetrical model in order to get publics acceptance. Generally, government uses media to do the propaganda, and to do the street demonstration (McElreath et al 2001, Miller and Schlesinger 2001, Motion and Leitch 2001, Samra 2001, Weaver 2002). Therefore, in general, the PR model used indeed tended to be the one-way communication.

³⁶ Nomunication is adopted from Japanese culture, *nomu* means drink. It means that to make a good relation between PR or organization and media people, company invites media people to make communication activity that goes on during this drinking session.

³⁷ *Ddukgab* is money for buying Korean cakes. Giving *Ddukgab* is culturally acceptable tradition, which conveniently circumvents laws against giving bribes.

³⁸ Chaebol system actually is coming from Japan, *chaibatz*, the system that remains collectivism, consists of a small group of business conglomerate s that dominates the Korean economy.

2.4.2. CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AS AN ACTION

In crisis, every members of organization should be responsive. Taking action in a right time by a correct way is very important. Furthermore, an action must be a part of strategic organizational action. In contrast, according to the structuration theory, an action can be personal and individual. Referring to Coombs (1998), understanding the crisis situation is important and basic for selecting best strategy. In order to understand it better, we need to explore more about the definition, typology, and the development stages of crisis, and finally followed by explanation of crisis communication strategy.

2.4.2.1. Crisis Definitions

There are many crisis definitions. All reveals the characteristics of crisis which are different from the other concepts, such as problem, disaster, breakdown, conflict and incident (Lagadec 1993, Bank 2000, Brecher 1993). Seeger (1998:233) quoted some crisis definitions from several communication researchers, are follow:

“Crisis is low probability/ high consequences events that threaten the most fundamental goals of the organization. Because of their low probability, these events defy interpretations and impose severe demands on sense making.” (Weick 1988:305).

“Characterize an organizational crisis as a situation that “is marked by a sense of urgency” and “close observation by the media” and that “interrupts normal business operation with the potential loss of revenues and credibility” (Williams and Treadaway (1992:57).

“Crisis that includes three conditions: (1) threatens high priority values of the organization goals, (2) present a restricted amount of time in which a decision can be made, and (3) is unexpected or unanticipated by the organization” (Hermann 1963:64).

Seeger (1998:233-5) concludes from various definitions of crisis that there are three components of crisis : (1) a trigger event that signals the threat; (2) decision makers have short response time. Crisis produces immediate uncertainties that create media scrutiny and pressure and pressure for immediate explanation; (3) surprise. It is a consequence of being suddenly confronted with circumstances seen as unlikely and inconsistence with routine, familiar activities. A crisis is by definition non routine and outside of familiar, predicted patterns of day to day life.

Some scholars also described the situation or characteristics that indicate the existence of crisis, as below:

“Crisis is a major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting the organization, company, or industry, as well as its publics, products, services or good name. A crisis interrupt normal business transaction and can sometimes threaten the existence of the organization. In crisis, emotions are on edge, brain is not fully functioning, and events are occurring so rapidly that drafting a plan during a crisis is unthinkable.” (Bank 2000:2).

“A crisis may contain a high degree threat to life, safety or to the existence of the organization, and that contain elements of the unexpected. Certainly a crisis can be put organization into the forefront of unwanted publicity and may call into question of competence of personnel” (White and Mazur 1995).

“Crisis is a major unpredictable event that has potentially negative results. Quite often it is not what really happened in the incident, it is what the key audience believe happened, that counts. It can damage its employees, products, services, financial condition and reputation and image.” (Barton 1995, as quoted by Dolphin 1999:120).

That description shows that the impact of crisis is not only in the material/ physical things, but also, in the perception of publics. What people think, feel and believe about the crisis and its impact on the organization’s future can deteriorate the impact of crisis itself.

Crisis does not only occur in business, but also in politic. Brecher (1993:3-4) defines crisis in the context of world politics, as follows:

“A change in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive interaction between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities, that in turn destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system.”

Brecher distinguished between crisis and conflict. Conflict is characterized by two or more parties engaged in mutually hostile actions and using coercion to injure or control their opponents. International crisis and international conflict are not synonymous, though they are closely related. Every crisis reflects a “state of conflict” between two or more adversaries, but not every conflict is reflected in crisis. In political context, crisis tends to affect on the perceived and established relations, structures, goals, objectives and values (Robinson 1968, Holsti 1972, Head, Short and McFarlane 1978, Nomikos and North 1976, Milburn 1972, Brecher 1993). In politic, crisis can be analyzed into two levels; unit level (actors, participants) and system level (organization, environment) (Wiener and Kahn 1962, Young 1968, McCormick 1978, as quoted by Brecher 1993:22). On the other aspect, Young mentioned that violence or subjective perception about the prospect of violence is existed in crisis (Brecher 1993:22). Violence on this perspective can be considered as an indicator of crisis. Concluding from all crisis definitions above can be concluded that crisis is:

“The event or the serial of events that occur unexpectedly; and are unpredictable, surprise, non routine, specific, inconsistent with routine, outside of familiar; and contain high level uncertainty and low probability for the future; and may potential to threaten, or are perceived to threaten, or damage the organization’s image, reputation, credibility, existence, high priority goals, fundamental goals, stabilized relationship and structure. It is the urgent situation in which leads on high degree of public and media exposure, high degree of public anxiety, and high degree of the prospect of violence, high complexity, interest conflicts and high ego involvement; and need organizational decision making and responses in the very short time”.

This definition contains the specific characteristics of crisis that is different from the characteristic of problem, conflict, breakdown or disaster of organization.

2.4.2.2. Typology of Crisis

Identifying type of crisis is very important to determine the strategy to resolve it. Seeger (1988:235-236) categorized the crisis according to similarities in the locus, source and cause of the threat, based on some researchers that usually occurred in corporation, as below:

1. Meyers and Holusha identify nine types, based on the sources:
 - (1) crisis in public perception: public confidence in organization or industry is threatened;
 - (2) crisis the sudden market shift, such as the changing of consumer’s preferences;
 - (3) product failure which include product recalls;
 - (4) top management succession;
 - (5) cash crisis;
 - (6) strikes and job actions;
 - (7) hostile take over;
 - (8) adverse international events;
 - (9) regulation and deregulation, which can create high levels of uncertainty.
2. Mitroff, Pauchant and Shrivastava (1988) have developed a more discrete system by grouping crises according to their underlying structural similarities:
 - (1) breakdowns or defects in product, plants, packages, equipment and people.
 - (2) extreme anti social acts directed at corporations, products, consumers, executives, employees, and employee’s familie.
 - (3) external economic attacks such as extortion, bribery, boycotts, and hostile takeovers,
 - (4) external information attacks, such as copyright infringement, loss of information, counterfeiting, and rumors.
 - (5) environmental accidents.
3. Meyer (1982) stated that the environment is a frequent locus for the development of organizational crises.

4. Smart (1985) and Smart and Verstinky (1977) argue that uncertainty and the inability to communicate with the environment completely are the central elements in most organizational crises. Based on Smart and Meyer, can be identified that locus for the development of crisis is environment and the capability of organization to communicate with environment. It means that unsuccessful communication between organization and publics (environment) can be a crucial source of crisis.

ICM (Institute of Crisis Management) identified four types of crisis, based on its causes (Center and Jackson 2003:321):

- (1) Act of God (storm, earthquakes, volcanic action, etc.
- (2) Mechanical problems (ruptured pipes, metal fatigue, etc)
- (3) Human error (the wrong valve was opened, miscommunication about what to do, etc)
- (4) Management decision, action or inaction (the problem is not serious, nobody will find out, etc).

By the same way, Newsom, Turk and Kruckeberg (2000: 482) divided type of crisis (typology of crisis) based on the causes or sources, as described on the table 15.

Table 15
Crisis Typology

Sources of crisis	Violent: cataclysmic – immediate loss of life or property	Nonviolent - sudden, upheaval but damages, if any, are delayed
Act of nature	Earthquakes, forest fires	Drought, epidemics
Intentional	Acts of terrorism, including product tampering, when these result in loss of life or destruction of property.	Bomb and product-tampering threats, hostile takeovers, insider trading, malicious rumors and other malfeasance
Unintentional	Explosion, fires, leaks, other accidents.	Process or product problems with delayed consequences, stock market crashes, business failures.

Mitroff et al (1998:85-86) proposed the framework of crisis factors that could be internal and external, and technical/economy and people/organizational/social, as described on model 6.

Model 6
Types of Corporate Crisis

Technical/Economic	
<p style="text-align: center;">Cell 1</p> <p>Product/ service defects Plant defects/ industrial accidents Computer breakdown Defective, undisclosed information Bankruptcy</p> <p style="text-align: center;">INTERNAL</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Cell 2</p> <p>Widespread environmental destruction/ industrial accidents Large scale system failure Natural disasters Hostile takeovers Governmental crises International crises</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EXTERNAL</p>
People/Social/ Organizational	
<p style="text-align: center;">Cell 3</p> <p>Failure to adapt/ change Organizational breakdown Miscommunication Sabotage On-site product tampering Counterfeiting Rumors, sick jokes, malicious slander Illegal activities Sexual harassment Occupational health diseases</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Cell 4</p> <p>Symbolic projection Sabotage Terrorism Executive kidnapping Off-site product tampering Counterfeiting False rumors, sick jokes, malicious slander Labor strikes Boycotts</p>

According to the list of typology of crisis, the sources of crisis can be identified, as: (1) human or nature (acts of God), (2) internal (organization) or external (environment), (3) unit level (actor/ participant) or system (organization/ environment), (4) technical or management. The characteristics of the source of crisis can be categorized into: (1) violent or non violent; and (2) intentional or unintentional. It is very possible that the crisis develops because of many sources, locus or causes.

2.4.2.3. Development of Crisis

Crisis can step up if it is managed improperly by organization. Responses of organization to crisis have impact on the next situation of the crisis. Identifying stage or phase of crisis can help organization to set the acts up, in order to respond to crisis. Each step of crisis might be responded in a different way.

Each communication researcher categorized development of crisis in a different term. Some researcher called phase of crisis, another one called stage, domain, or period of crisis for

the same thing. Sturges et al (1991) and Fink (Seeger 1998:237) stated that there are four stages of crisis (1) crisis build up or prodromal period. In this stage, the crisis signals already emerge; (2) crisis breakout or acute crisis. In this phase, the damages resulting from the crisis is already apparent both physical, fiscal, and emotional damages; (3) abatement or often called chronic crisis. In this period, effects of the damages mentioned in the acute crisis stage continue taking place, even more severe. Public claims, demonstrations, repression against the demonstrators, legal actions, interrogation, and media coverage continue to take place, that likely to exacerbate the crisis effects; (4) the 'termination', that is the phase in which resolution signals occur suggesting that the crisis will soon be over, and it is not felt threatening the viability of the organization and its publics. Crisis, according to Fink, is cyclical, with repeated prodromal, acute, chronic, and resolution stages.

In another context, Turner (1976, as quoted by Seeger 1998:237-9) proposes a comprehensive development sequence of stages of crisis. He argues that crisis may be understood as "a disaster occurs because of some inaccuracy or inadequacy in the accepted norms and beliefs". The stages of crisis are described as follow:

1. Stage I: radical departure from the pattern of normal operations.
2. Stage II: the incubation period, events that are outside the parameters of and/or at odds with the accepted belief about hazards and the norms for their avoidance accumulated unnoticed.
3. Stage III: trigger event that signals the inadequacy of accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for their avoidance. This is the important first step to readjustment of belief about hazards and avoidance.
4. Stage IV: the onset of the crisis and its immediate, direct and unanticipated consequences.
5. Stage V: the rescue and salvage, where the immediate collapse of belief about the world, its hazards and avoidance norms are recognized.
6. Stage VI: a full cultural adjustment takes place in beliefs about the world its hazard and avoidance norms, so that they are compatible with the new insight and understanding.

Bank (2000:8-13), in relation to the crisis management, describes five stages of a crisis. He argues that the different stages must be managed in the different approaches. Those stages are described as:

1. Detection: this phase may begin with noting warning signs. Some crises have no noticeable prodromes, but many do.
2. Prevention/ preparation: phase in which organization prevents the blows of crises, or limit the duration of crises. This phase is called also as crisis preparation when organization deals with crises that cannot be prevented.
3. Containment: referring to the effort to limit the duration of the crisis or to keep it from spreading to other areas affecting the organization.
4. Recovery: involves efforts to return the company to business as usual. Organization wants to leave the crisis behind and restore normalcy as soon as possible. Recovery may also mean restoring the confidence of key publics, which means communicating to normal business.
5. Learning: a process of examining the crisis and determining what was lost, what was gained, and how the organization performed in the crisis. It is an evaluative procedure designed to make the crisis a prodrome for the future.

In the context of international politic crisis, Michael Brecher (1993:25-29) states four interrelated domains/phases of crisis:

1. Onset: identifies the initial phase of an international crisis. This coincides with the per-crisis period of a foreign policy crisis, in which the non-crisis norm of no (or low) perceived value threat by a state's decision makers gives way to low (or higher), that is increasing, threat from an adversary and with it. Low (or higher), that is increasing stress. Onset is indicated by outbreak of a crisis, that is, the eruption of higher than normal disruptive interaction.
2. Escalation: denotes much more intense disruption than onset. Escalation may – but need not – be characterized by a change from no violence to violence, or from low level violence to high level violence.
3. De-escalation: the “winding down” of a crisis. At the macro level, it is indicated by reduction in hostile interaction leading to accommodation and crisis termination. At the state level, de-escalation is operationalized as a decline in perceived threat, time pressure and war likelihood toward the non crisis norm. As such, it denotes the end crisis period and is characterized by decreasing stress for the decision makers.

4. Impact: designates the phase following crisis termination, that is, its aftermath, the counterpart of post crisis or beyond crisis. It identifies the consequences of a crisis.

PHASE	Onset	Escalation	De-escalation	Impact
Interaction	Incipient distortion	Peak distortion	Accommodation	Non crisis interaction
PERIOD	Pre-crisis	Crisis	End-crisis	Post-crisis
Perception	Higher than normal value threat (increasing stress)	Acute threat + finite time pressure + heightened probability of war (maximal stress)	Declining threat, time pressure, probability of war (decreasing stress)	Below-crisis level of threat, time, war (non crisis stress)

Brecher clearly stated that the steps of crisis link to one another. It means that crisis handling or crisis management in the certain step affects on the situation of the next step. In this categorize steps of crisis Brecher mentions stressful and feel threatened in each step of crisis. Higher steps means more stressful and more threatened. It declines since the crisis is going on termination.

Generally, scholars define that crisis develops in the period of time, that is started by the existence of signals of crisis which intrudes the normal operational/ established values of organization and ended by the crisis resolution. Even though scholars used the different word such as phase, stage, domain, and period, all explained about the process of crisis development. Table 16 reveals the description of crisis development that has been explained before.

Table 16
Crisis Development
(Stage, Phase, Domain of Crisis)

Fink (1986)	Turner (1976)	Bank (2000)	Brecher (1993)	Sturges (1991)	Indicated by
Prodrome	Stage I: departure from normal pattern	Detection	Onset/ Pre-crisis	Build up	Crisis signals are existed/ initial phase of crisis
Acute	Stage II: Incubation period	Prevention/ Preparation		Break out	The damages of crisis are existed
Chronic	Stage III: inadequacy accepted belief Stage IV: onset crisis, unanticipated consequences	Containment	Escalation/ crisis	Abatement	More damages
Crisis resolution	Stage V: rescue and salvage	Recovery	Deescalation/ end-crisis	Termination	Signals of resolution are existed/ the end of crisis
	Stage VI: cultural adjustment	Learning	Impact/Post-crisis		

On the other part of their research, some scholars (Bank 2000, Turner 1976, Fink 1986) believe that crisis is a cyclical process. The output of the end stage of crisis will be input for the initial or early stage of crisis. Bad output of bad crisis management will cause a new crisis. Based on this point of view, Bank (2000) mentioned learning phase to emphasize that an organization must learn from the crisis that has occurred before. It is important for an organization to prepare or to improve its ability to detect the new signal of crisis. It is called as “sense of crisis”.

2.4.2.4. Crisis Communication

As explain earlier, immediate and accurate responses to crisis will inhibit or even stop the development of crisis to be worse and minimize its impact. As happened in Indonesia, the failure of government to predict potential crisis and detect crisis signals in early step of its development caused its development is uncontrolled. It brought negative impact not only on an area but in many areas of Indonesian life. Indonesian image worsened, as bad as the

government image on national or international publics. In crisis resolution, good image helps publics to set the predisposition toward organization. Image is going to be very important to recover the crisis. Therefore, it is described the importance of image in relating to the image restoration strategy.

2.4.2.4.1. The Importance of Image

There are many definitions of image. In the simple way, image is defined as a person's perception or impression about an object. More comprehensive, Aaker and Myers (1982, as quoted by van Riel (1995:78) states that "an image is the set of meanings by which an object is known and through which people describe, remember and relate to it. That is, it is the net result of the interaction of a person's beliefs, ideas, feelings and impression about an object." Image is also defined as "a representation of mind. It affects attitudes which in turn affect behavior. The impression creates –consciously or unconsciously, whether it wishes to or not- inevitably affects people who do business with (Bernstein 1986, as quoted by van Riel 1995:76). Based on these definitions, it can be understood that image has a close relationship with the impression, perception, belief, feeling of a person or people. In general, image is created based on the audience's perception about object that can be things, ideas, products, and also an organization. Perception does not always reflect accurately the profile of the object but for one doing the process of the perception, the perception is a reality (Gregory, 1996:2). Using this point of view, image means reality, even though it is accurate or not. Image is not about right or wrong, but it is what the public think of. On the other side, Baker (2000:314) suggests that the reputation is more real than image. The reputation itself is given meaning by Baker as not really different with the understanding of the image that is "public's judgments of the organization's behavior." Reputation is the credibility about what to say, to do and to fix on the future hopes for the organization. Therefore, an organization should communicate the right reputation to the public in order to create organizational credibility.

The relation of image building by communication is also stated by the group understanding the image from the sociological point of view. Using this point of view, in the beginning image is the representation of the reality, but eventually, reality becomes the representation of the image. Alvesson, as quoted by Van Riel (1992:80) suggests that the image consists of two things, i.e. (1) the **sense of image** that is the one's depiction on perception object, (2) the **communicated image**, that is the impressions on what to communicate by the perception of the object. Communicated image is in general born from the impression of

information conveyed by the press or interpersonal communication, it is rarely born from direct experience with the object of perception. The concept acquires criticism since it ignores the possibility of image discrepancies between the one shaped by the direct experience (personal experiences) and the image created by the press. The criticism rises with the background that Alvesson conceives that Western people are overwhelmed by the image created by the press, and there is such a great discrepancies between *sense of image* and *communicated image*. Therefore, among such people, the organization is very oriented to strengthen its image among the public to counter image created by the press that could be less accurate. The organization thought it is necessary to have strategies of mass communication in order to build the desired image. In this sense, corporate communication then plays an important role, mainly the communication with the external public. In performing the communication, the press becomes an important tool for the organization.

Why should image be established, maintain and repaired in case that it is threatened? Van Riel (1995:75-77) writes that image is not only important for the object of perception, but the subject who perceives. In the terms of corporate image, image is very crucial for the corporate or public who perceive. For an organization, the positive image is the basic precondition to build commercial relationship with the target groups, while for the public, the image helps the subject to simplify or conclude *the truth about the organization*, in certain terms such as good-bad, useful-useless. The higher organizational image affects the public in making decisions, the more important for the organization to build an image. In general, image determines the success, continuity, credibility and reputation of the organization. Understanding that image is determinant for the existence of an organization, it is very important for an organization to construct and to remain the positive image on publics' view. Good image or favorable image is very helpful for an organization when: (1) information on the basis of which people have to make decision is complex, conflicting and/or incomplete, (2) information is either insufficient or too wide-ranging to be able to judge, (3) people have a degree of involvement that is too low to be able to go through an extensive information – processing process, and (4) certain conditions in the environment that obstruct the decision making process, such as time constraints (Poiesz 1988 as quoted by Riel 1995:76). Situation as described above is clearly happened in crisis. Organization that already possesses good image or favorable image will respond to the crisis in a better way.

It can be concluded that in crisis to established positive image of an organization is very helpful for publics to maintain or to build trust to organization and in turn the public trust

is very useful for an organization to reconstruct its image. Referring to description in chapter one, we can see that image of Indonesian governments were not quite good in time of crisis. Crisis that can't be resolved quickly worsened the government and president's image, and vice versa. In other word, there is a chain of effects. The chain can be broken by the appropriate and accurate communication crisis responses and good image of an organization on its publics, both communicated image and sense of image.

Related to good image building and well crisis management, an organization does not have to wait for the crisis to happen. Crisis management should be done as one of organizationally operational management. Thus, an organization needs to build high sense of crisis and capability in crisis management, including crisis communication management, by doing risk communication and issues management. It is one of PR responsibility in an organization.

2.4.2.4.2. Risk Communication and Issues Management

Crisis management does not mean only overcoming crisis that already happens; more than that, crisis management means "strategic planning to prevent and respond crisis and negative events, a process of eliminating risks and uncertainty and making the organization more able to control the achievement of organizational objectives" (Banks, 1998). In this framework, crisis management is not only an effort to control crisis but also to arrange strategic plans for preventing and anticipating crisis. This concept of crisis management emphasizes that there is no event or problem that can not be predicted before by the organization. This differs from the traditional concept on crisis that defines as "unpredictable course of events that threatens the organizational image, so that it must be dealt with within very narrow range of time".

The understanding that crisis as one of functions or phases in organizational development is characterized by incorporation of crisis management as a part of organizational operations. With such understanding, the PR practitioners are involved in crisis and monitoring issues, risk assessment and communication, and the crisis planning, as well as the PR's involvement in disseminating information post-crisis, management and the recovery of organizational image (Seeger et.al., in Heath 2000:155-165). Thereby it is clear that crisis is not an event that can not be anticipated. Issues management and risk assessment constitute PR activities related to the monitoring of changes in internal and external environment of the organization, that constitute an early detection of crisis signals. This activity is an effort to minimize the uncertainties and to improve the predictive capability toward the future of the

organization by making adaptation to the changes. Such activities are called by Weick as organizing. Weick in his theory suggests that “Organizing consist of adapting to an enacted environment, an environment which is constituted by the actions of interdependent human actors”. In other words, Weick said that organizational environment as a communication construct, comprising interaction processes of communication among people. This communication is performed to overcome “information equivocality”, the comprehensibility of communication. Some of the aspects of equivocality are ambiguity, complexity, and unclearness level of information (Kreps 1985). Referring to this theory, then the contemporary concept is justified on crisis as a natural process in the organizational development, and crisis management constitutes the organization’s effort in communicating with its environment, to create mutual understanding on the part of the organization as well as its publics about the organizational circumstances.

A part of the organizing process within the context of crisis management is issues management. This includes activities of identifying, monitoring, and analyzing trends of key public opinion that can become public policies or rules. Issues management argues that an organization should adopt an external focus and enact their environment by attending to relevant issues (Seeger, in Heath 2000:155-165). Newsom et al (2000: 495) called it with the term “issue monitoring”. Based on his point of view, it is the one of invaluable contribution of PR. When an organization fails to respond to crisis, it is often because of the irresponsible reaction to crisis signals or forewarnings. There are three responses of organization that cause trouble; (1) arrogance, (2) failure to get objective information from all publics that might be involved in a potential problem, and (3) using bad judgment. Arrogance leads to making some assumptions that some publics are just not important enough for consideration. Failure to get objective information might caused by unwillingness of the organization to communicate with all publics. This response may lead to making bad judgment. Responsibility of PR is to manage, include monitor issues in good manner is very important in the situation of crisis. Crisis that contains high degree of uncertainty creates public debate about the event. Public opinion might break down into two groups; pro and contra or positive and negative opinion for organization. Based on Sturges et al (1991:22-27), there is public opinion node that usually occurs at the break out stage in duration of crisis. In this time, the minimal objective of the issue management is to maintain positive public opinion and to limit negative public opinion. Howard Chase (Seitel 1995) defines issues management as the capacity to understand, mobilize, coordinate, and direct all strategic and policy planning functions, and all public affairs/public

relations skills, toward achievement of one objective: meaningful participation in creation of public policy that affects personal and institutional destiny. The most important from this definition is that issues management is intended to involve public participation to create public policies that have an impact on their personal or institutional objectives. While another part of organizing is risk communication. Risk communication is PR research performed based on the understanding that “organization must promote informational exchanges among related parties on the nature, importance and control of risk”. This reflects informational exchange and knowledge sharing, based on the dissemination of messages on the relative size of risk, prevention norms and risk reduction strategies. The crisis communication strategy itself depends on the risk size, such as the damage or loss that will be experienced by organization, including organizational image impairment. This is also suggested in the conclusion of Coombs study (1998) “communicative response options for overcoming crisis are determined by the appropriate understanding on the prevailing crisis situation”. In other words, overcoming crisis effectively is determined by characteristics of the crisis situation. The more the organization recognizes the crisis potentials or signals, the better the organization in responding to the crisis.

Some studies show that an organization that is very cognizant on the importance of crisis management, and performing issue management, risk communication and crisis planning, will be more successful in overcoming crisis than the one that does not perform those activities in the organizational processes (Coombs 1998, Pratt in Heath 2000, Heath 1997, Wissenblit 1989).

The above description clearly shows the role played by Public Relations in relation to organizational crisis. PR not only has a role in the crisis recovery stage but also has roles in each phase or stage of crisis. The failure of PR in playing its role will result on the failure of conflict resolution and the achievement of organizational objectives. The failure of PR to take responsibility at each phase of the crisis will contribute to create bad image for the organization. It is obvious that bad image on an organization might represent a bad organization. What the PR has done on each phase of crisis? What are the function and roles of PR in crisis? Whereas, on the other hand, some studies show that technician role makes only a few contribution to the organizational effectiveness, including in the crisis resolution. In relation to the crisis occurring in the organization, the two-way symmetrical model between the organization and publics, that also indicate two-way communication, in fact it is more effective in anticipating, preventing and overcoming crisis (Banks 1996). The two-way communication between the organization and its publics demonstrates the understanding that organizational environment constitutes an

extremely strong influence factor in the organizational life. This environment consists of the organization publics. In Weick's organizing theory, the environment intended consist of human interaction, the process of information exchange and communication. Thus it is clear that in crisis condition, PR practitioners can make considerable contribution to deal with the crisis if they do their role such as defining problems by conducting research on the human interaction, and together with the other managers arranging strategic planning and making organizational decisions. In other words, PR's role that is contributive for the crisis resolution is the managerial role by implementing two-way communication method between the organization and its environments, and using the two-way symmetrical relations model or the combination between the two-way asymmetrical and the two-way symmetrical models.

2.4.2.4.3. Dealing with the Media in Crisis

Whatever crisis communication strategy is undertaken by an organization, media is one of the extremely important parts. What are media's roles in crisis? How much is media's contribution to the crisis resolution? As mentioned previously, crisis is any event that threatens the personal, organizational, and social-system images. The image itself is shaped more by the subject through what he/she receive from media on the perceived object. Therefore, organizational image is the image created on the organization that is perceived through mass media, not as the product of direct experience of public with the organization. From this perspective, it is clearly demonstrated that the shaped image is influenced much by media. Public Relations, that is essentially responsible in influencing public perception on the organization, has huge interest in (mass) media. Moreover in the crisis situation in which public obtains information on the crisis more through media than from any other channels, PR must work harder in handling media (Banks 1999). A bad relationship between an organization and media will have a fatal impact for the crisis resolution because mass media will not have much time to compromise on what it will report on the crisis. In some events it is admitted that media contributes more in exacerbating the crisis than resolving it. It must also be admitted that media plays substantial roles in provoking conflicts and wars, that ends with creating crisis (Raboy and Degenais 1995). This condition raises many ethical and political questions on media's role in growing democracy. In one hand, media promotes democracy, but on the other, media kills democracy. In case of an organizational crisis, it is not rare that a bad relationship between public relations practitioners, as a representation of an organization, and journalist, as a representation of

media, lead to the crisis worse. It is usual, sometimes the journalist construct news about crisis in a negative way.

Speaking about the relationship between the PR practitioners and the journalists, we can understand it by searching the root of PR development in United States. PR in the early time is positioned as defender of an organization, against the journalists that published bad news about the organization. Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) called that a journalist and PR practitioner relationship is adversary. Journalist tends to expose something bad about organization, whereas, in contrary, PR practitioner in that time hired by organization to defend the organization's image that was attacked by media. This adversarial relationship is believed still remain in recent times. Newsom et al (2000: 497) explained that there is a number of difficulties for PR practitioners when they have to work with mass media to communicate the reality of a crisis. One is the inclination of reporters to be more interested in the rare and unusual, especially in communicating risk. The second one is the difficulties of PR practitioners to get access to communication channels. Communication channels are usually disrupted by crisis. In either case, extra efforts have to be made by an organization (PR) to get information to mass media. Another problem is the tendency to close down the normal communication channel. Often the crisis is such a threat to an organization that either the organization itself or others with control over it, like the government, severely limit information about the crisis.

The adversarial relationship between journalist and PR practitioners is also supported by Sallot and his colleagues (1998:366-377). Based on their research, there is misperception between each other about news values. Even though journalists and PR practitioners have the similar news value, journalists tend to be underestimated to PR practitioners in relation to the news values. Journalist perceived PR practitioners hold inferior values, in which more emphasized on the values "depicts subject in favorable light" and "interest to reader" than focus on the values "factual accuracy" and "fairness to different views". Sallot also found that the discord between journalists and PR practitioners involves more than just news values. In an effort to gain ink and air time, PR practitioners offer journalists unsolicited assistance in the performance in their job. In the other side, journalist perceived that practitioners have self-serving motives for offering this "services". Based on journalists' perception the "service" is their job. Cameron, Sallot and Curtin (1997: 111-155) listed many researchers such as Jeffers (1977), Swarts (1983), Aronoff et al (1984), Kopenhaver (1985), Stegal and Sanders (1986), Sallot (1990), Carrol (1994), Cline (1982) who found the similar data about the underestimation

made by journalist to PR practitioner in relation to the news value.

Moloney (2000:119-132) described the same thing about the relation of journalists and PR practitioners, that he called it as “hostility”. In the early history in UK and USA, journalists tended to make a distance to PR practitioners because of their judgment that all PR is bought with gold, can corrupt other weak ones with gold. However, recent studies show that the relation of journalists and PR practitioners has been changing. More and more journalists depend on PR in composing news story. PR’s influence on the news is getting stronger (Turk 1991:211-222, Sallot et al 1998:366-377) that is indicated by more published news stories in mass media are based on news release or “hand-out” of PR. The similar statement launched by Moloney (2000:119-132). He said that there many kinds of news are the product of the merger between journalism and PR. The PR practices and journalism are becoming borderless.

Referring to the media’s strength during crisis in this democracy era, the PR practitioner clearly has to work together with the journalist. The relationship between an organization and media is divided on two situations, (1) organization is highly depended on the media, it means an organization is under media control; (2) media is under an organization control. The first condition, an organization does more bagging to the media in releasing or not releasing organizational information. Doing “blackmail” to organization usually is utilized by media, in these bagging efforts. In the second condition, organization has high power to influence media. An organization can do everything to the media in goals attaining, including manipulating information. The principle of PR in crisis that says, “the most important thing is persuading media to cover the organization as expected, not to persuade media to entrust or distrust the information reported” can be implemented easily. This kind of PR’s principal is usually increasing the number of unethical journalist, the journalists who are persuaded easily to publish or perish certain information, as long as they are paid for it. In an organizational crisis, “buying” a journalist is becoming usual because there is too much “sensation” information, that it can be negative for organization but positive to increase the media selling. The organization and media relation as described above is apparently not a good relationship between organization and its publics that mentioned on PR functions. This concept runs against the journalist as well as its own ethics that the one is to present accurate and correct information. Good relationship between journalists and PR practitioners should be indicated by willingness to communicate the crisis that co-orient to publics’ interests. Contribution PR in dealing with media or journalist is (1) conducting the delicate negotiations that have to go on between

source and media about what to use and what not to use; (2) providing enough opportunities for information to be given to the media, such as distributing news releases and conducting news conferences, (3) educating as well as informing, so that journalists don't fall back on stereotyping to explain the incident itself or the people involved in it. This stereotyping leads bias crisis reportage that in turn, it creates crisis impairment. Good relationship between PR practitioners and the journalists, in the larger context, good relationship between an organization and its external publics could influence an effectiveness of crisis resolution efforts.

2.4.2.5. Crisis Communication Strategies

Strategy determines the effectiveness; therefore strategy must be planned carefully. Strategy, according to Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) is the entire conceptual approach or program planning in general that is designed to reach an objective. Strategy can also be defined as the determination of organizational objectives and goals, a series of actions performed and the allocation of resources needed, in order to reach the objectives. Thus strategy includes objectives and goals, actions and allocation of resources in order to reach the objectives and goals. Crisis communication strategy therefore is the planning of the entire communication program including the formulation of objectives and goals, and the resources allocation, that is designed to anticipate, prevent and overcome crisis.

Many researchers have explored crisis communication strategy in context of organization. They focused on analysis of the message of communication between organization and its publics in crisis. Some researchers called it as crisis communication strategy, other researchers used the different terms such as image restoration strategy, crisis response strategy and apologia strategy. All terms reveal the same thing, "how organization communicate to its publics in defending its image in crisis." Dionisopoulos and Vibbert (1988), as quoted by Coombs (1998) said that organization frequently use apologia, how individuals use communication to defend their character (image) from public attacks, as the one of image restoration strategy in crisis situation. Identifying and evaluating of strategies open to communicators during crisis, to repair an image and to respond to criticism or to accusation of wrongdoing is called "rhetorical tradition of apologia". (Benoit 1995, Hearit 1995, as quoted by Seeger et al 1998: 249, Ihlen 2000). Most often, these efforts draw on the rhetorical genre of apologia (Downey 1993, Ware and Linkugel 1973, as quoted by Seeger et al 1998:248). Hearit (1994) defined the goal of apologia is presenting "a compelling, counter description...to situate

alleged wrongdoing in a more favorable context” and Ryan (1982) and others have broadened the scope to include all speech of self –defense, such a form of discourse.”

According to many researchers, there are many strategies of communication to respond to crisis, in order to defend the organization’s image, as the following list.

1. Benoit (1995, as quoted by Coombs and Schmidt. 2000: 163-178) described five image restoration strategies: (1) Denial: organization did not do anything wrong – organization is not involved in a crisis. Denial strategy is divided two kinds: (a) simple denial: denial of an undesirable act; and (b) shifting denial: moves the guilt from one person to another; (2) Evasion of responsibility: organization has limited responsibility for the crisis; (3) Reducing the offensiveness of the act: organization tries to get publics to see the crisis or organization as less threatening; (4) Corrective action: organization attempts to repair current damaged, prevent a repeat of the crisis, or both; (5) Mortification: organization takes the responsibility for the crisis and issue an apology. This typology is defined by Benoit, based on his analysis of words and actions of the organization employed to defend its image. There is no evaluation to define the appropriated strategies for the certain crisis and stakeholders.
2. Coombs (1998) based on Benoit (1995, 1997), Allen and Caillouet (1994) and others who have articulated crisis responses, grouped crisis-response strategies into seven categories. The seven categories are described on table 17 as follows:


Table 17
Crisis Communication Strategies Defined

1. Attack the accuser	Crisis manager confronts the person or group who claims that a crisis exists. This may include a threat to use “force” (e.g, a law suit) against the accuser.
2. Denial	Crisis manager states no crisis exists. This may include explaining why there is no crisis.
3. Excuse	Crisis manager tries to minimize the organization’s responsibility for the crisis. This can include denying any intention to do harm, claiming the organization had no control of the events that led to the crisis, or both.
4. Justification	Crisis manager tries to minimize the perceived damage associated with the crisis. This can include stating there was no serious damage or injuries or claiming that the victim deserved what they received.
5. Ingratiation	Action is designed to make stakeholders like the

- organization.
6. Corrective action Crisis managers seek to repair the damage from the crisis, take steps to prevent a repeat of the crisis, or both.
 7. Full apology Crisis manager publicly states that the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks forgiveness for the crisis. Some compensation (e.g. money or aid) may be included with the apology.

Marcus and Goodman (1991), as quoted by Coombs (1998), divided strategy to respond crisis into either accommodative or defensive. Accommodative strategies accept responsibility, take remedial action, or both, whereas defensive strategies claim there is no problem or try to deny responsibility for the crisis. Model 6 places Crisis Communication Strategies that is formulated by Coombs (1998) onto the accommodative-defensive continuum.

Model 7 Accommodative-Defensive Continuum



In a crisis situation that is a perception of crisis organizational responsibility strengthens, the threat of image damage should strengthen, meaning crisis managers need to utilize more accommodative strategy. On the other hand, the defensive strategy logically become less effective as an organization is viewed as more responsible for the crisis. In the crisis situation that has weak personal control, crisis managers need to utilize more defensive strategy. On the other side, in the crisis that has strong personal control, crisis manager has to utilize the

more accommodative strategy. Based on that approach, to analyze the strategy of crisis communication, we need to know the type of crisis. How far the responsibility of an organization does for crisis depends on the degree of organization involvement in building the crisis up. Higher involvement of an organization in crisis meaning organization needs to utilize the more accommodative strategy.

3. Brinson and Benoit (1999, as quoted by Coombs and Schmidt. 2000: 163-178) define image restoration strategies, based on their analysis of Texaco racism crisis. Texaco messages were analyzed and revealed the use of four image restoration and a fifth strategy that combined three image restoration strategies:
 1. **bolstering**: reminding people of organization's policies against discrimination and noting the actions where outrageous;
 2. **corrective action**: indicating of investigation of allegations and policies designed to prevent a reoccurrence of the problem;
 3. **shifting blame**: identifying the problem employees as bad apples who are not representatives of Texaco as a whole;
 4. **mortification**: admitting guilt and apologizing for the racist comments;
 5. **separation**: a combination of bolstering, shifting blame and corrective action. The analyst called it as a new form of image restoration strategy. Bolstering note an act violates a company's policies; shifting blame, creating a scapegoat that can be separated from the organization itself; and corrective action, action taken to prevent a repeat of crisis.

According to Coombs and Schmidt (2000), separation is not a new strategy, because there is the other strategy that captures the separation strategy.

4. Hearit (1994, 1995) identified an individual and group dissociation strategy that involves blaming or scapegoating a specific part or group within the organization. Based on research on organization and apologia strategies he has identified three typical objectives of organizations seek when charged with wrong doing:
 1. Present a competing narrative describing the situation favorable to the organization, often by strategic definitions that seek to delimit the issue by establishing certain premises.
 2. Diffuse anger and hostility toward the organization through a statement of regret.
 3. Dissociate the organization from the wrong doing, that are categorized into three types of dissociation in its apologia: (1) Opinion/ knowledge: the charges are deemed groundless. The accusers do not have the facts; they are stating an opinion. This could

take the form of a counter attack. The accusers are not interested in acquiring the facts because they want to sell more newspapers. The apologist also could challenge the ethics or integrity of the accusers; (2) Individual/ group: individuals are said to be responsible (i.e scapegoat) for the wrongdoing; they are acting without organizational sanction; (3) Act/ essence: it is admitted that the act may be wrong, that it has happened, but the apologist begs it should be judged on its along term record; “this does not represent the true nature of the organization”.

Drawing on the research of a number of scholars, Hearit (2001: 501-511) concludes that corporation regularly takes one of five stances when dealing with the problem of their guilt: denial, counterattack, differentiation, apology or legal. Each of the five stances is rooted in the notion that the fundamental problem in apologetic situations is that of guilt and that the motive for apologist to distance (or dissociate) themselves from their guilt (Benoit 1995 a, Fisher 1970, quoted by Hearit 2001:505). **Denial** is chosen by organization because either (a) they are not guilty; (b) they are in position to deny that the action were intentional (and therefore of limited culpability), or (c) they choose a defensive strategy out of fear of liability in which they deny guilt regardless of the public evidence. **Counterattack** is a variant of denial. In such occurrences, organization not only deny that they are guilty of the charges, but also take the criticism one step further and allege that their critics are ethically suspect for having leveled false charges. Here, organizations deal with the problem of guilty by denying it and subsequently attempting to transfer it to the accusers. Unfortunately, the organizations that are guilty use also the counterattack strategy. In this case, counterattack is an unethical tool for an organization to seek to extricate itself from criticism. **Differentiation** is one most frequently strategy that employed by an organization. It is because corporate acts are seldom guilt free. Companies bear some level of responsibility for the alleged wrongdoing although the degree to which they are guilty is not always entirely clear. Organizations are most likely to engage in some forms of an individual – group dissociation in which they find scapegoats and then argue that individuals act on their own behalf without organizational sanction. In some cases, organizations shift the blame to their employees who can then be disciplined, fired and/or prosecuted by the authorities. This leaves the organization to play the role of innocents. Both employees and their subsidiaries are scapegoating target. The fourth strategy is **apology**. In this posture, an organization has no other choices, although it is seldom that an organization offers clear statements that seek forgiveness. They tend to make use of

statements of regret in which companies extend how sorry they are that the accidents occurred. In the same time, they carefully avoid any acknowledgements that they are indeed responsible. The fifth strategy is **legal**. In this strategy, organization adopts a legal stance toward their alleged wrongdoing. Organization is using an **opinion-knowledge dissociation** to argue that those who criticize the integrity of their products do so without full understandings of “all the fact”. Fitzpatrick and Rubin (1995:22, as quoted by Hearit 2001) described the component of legal strategy:

(1) say nothing; (2) say as little as possible and release is as quietly as possible; (3) say as little as possible, citing privacy laws, company policy, or sensitivity; (4) deny guilt and/ or act indignant that such charges could possibly have been made; or (5) shift or, if necessary, share the blame with the plaintiff....Never admit blame.

5. Hobbs (1995, as quoted by Coombs and Schmidt 2000:163-178) identified a similar strategy in his analysis of Toshiba’s illegal sale of weapons technology.
6. Apologia strategy is called by Ware and Linkugel (1973, as quoted by Ihlen 2002: 202) as “the speech of self defense” of character. They suggested that four different strategies for apologist:
 1. Denial: disavow committing an act or an attempt to present a disclaimer of intent.
 2. Bolstering: identify with something viewed favorably by the audience.
 3. Differentiation: separate some facts, sentiment, objects or relationship from some larger context within which the audience currently views the attribute.
 4. Transcendence: join some facts, sentiments, objects, or relationships with some larger context within which the audience does not presently view the attribute.

The first two strategies are reformative - do not alter “the audience’s meaning for the cognitive elements involved”, but work in the accepted understanding of the publics, where as the latter strategies are transformative, that organization tries to establish the new meaning, which may be achieved by asking that an act should be judged in a different temporal perspective or by requesting that an act should have been seen in a larger context.

7. In the context of defensive behavior in small group, Roger Harrison (Fisher 1996: 246-253) said that when something violates our expectations, our first tendency is to respond defensively. This is the natural reaction because we have formed and confirmed the validity of most our existing conceptual systems through experience. There are two general types of responses. These are possible when expectation have been violated: defending and adapting.

Defending involves denying, falsifying, or distorting reality in order to maintain an existing conceptual system. Adapting, on the other hand, involves examining the discrepant information, testing new ways of understanding it and forming new and more adaptive conceptual systems. The **defense** mechanism is classified by Harrison are **denial, avoidance, repression, projection, rationalization and attribution bias**. **Denial** means refusing to admit that a threatening perception is relevant, by denying its existence altogether (“This isn’t so”), by denying its relevance to self (“This has nothing to do with me”), or by postponing the matter (“I needn’t pay attention to this right now”). **Avoidance** involves findings ways of keeping out of the way of threatening perception. It can be done by sitting silently in a meeting, spinning a verbal cocoon to prevent incoming messages from getting through, and hiding from one another through “formula” communication: drawing morals, creating slogans, and adhering to social conventions whereby they discuss safe topics instead of important ones. Another way to avoid is making humor. **Repression** is a mechanism that protects the person from being aware of motives or emotions he or she thinks are undesirable. Feelings of hostility are often repressed. **Projection** is a variation of repression. Here, instead of burying unwanted feelings inside, the person projects them outside and attributes them to someone else. **Rationalization**, the most frequently employed defense mechanism, occurs when people make excuses for or try to explain away a frustrating situation. People try to find “good” reasons for their behavior and its outcome. **Attribution bias** centers around how people explain behavior. We generally consider someone else behavior is the product of their personality but an attribute of our own behavior to the situational factors. We also tend to ascribe our own successful behavior to personal effort and our failure to circumstances. On the other hand, when we explain the success of another we tend to make attributions the other way around. The second type of response is **adapting**. It means that people actively seek and interact with information to create more useful interpretation and internal states. They might attempt to resolve the discrepancy of information that violates their expectation. Adapting is involving assessing the validity of the discrepant information, examining and changing their existing conceptual systems. This defense mechanism is not different too much, comparing to the defense strategy in response to the crisis that is explained before.

Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded that the strategies of communication by organization in order to defend its image are moving on the organization – publics’ interest

continuum. It means that in one side, the strategy that is concerned for the organization's interests – defensive strategy -- and in other side, the strategy is concerned for the publics' interests – accommodative strategy -- as described on table 18.

Table 18
Strategies to respond to crisis
(crisis communication, image restoration, crisis responses, and apologia strategy)

Benoit (1995)	Coombs (1998)	Brinson & Benoit (1999)	Wage & Lunkagel (1973)	Herit (1994)	Harrison (1996)
Denial: 1. Simple 2. Shifting	Attack the accuser Denial	Shifting Blame Separation	Denial Bolstering Differentiation Transcendence	Dissociation: 1. Denial 2. Counterattack 3. Differentiation 4. Apology 5. Legal	Defense: 1. Denial 2. Avoiding 3. Repression 4. Projection 5. Rationalization 6. Attribution bias
Evasion	Excuse				
Reducing offensiveness Of the act	Justification Ingratiation	Bolstering			
Corrective action	Corrective Action	Corrective Action			
Mortification	Full apology Mortification	Mortification			Adapting

In addition to the crisis response strategies which are taken place on organizational setting, Robert Harrison (Fisher 1996:246-253) analyzes crisis response in personal or individual setting. He said that in the situation in which someone's reputation, image or existence are attacked by another person, people normally will protect, self defense and fight for their existence. Harrison divides responses into two; (1) defending; and (2) adapting. Defending involves denying, blaming and distorting realities to maintain the established conceptual system. Defending is a natural reaction of human when his existence is being threatened. Not all defense reaction is bad. It is going to be bad since the self defense is going to be a habit. It makes people do not have willingness to try to understand or accept the other perspectives which might be worse or better than our own perspective. In context of intercultural communication, Ellen J Langer (Banks 1995:121-123) said the condition in which people

focuses only on their own perspective and ignores the others is called as mindlessness. Furthermore, people who are mindless mean people who rigidly adhere to preset categories of knowledge, exhibit automatic behavior and act from single, narrow perspective on the world. Where as mindfulness is characterized by always create a new category of understanding, open to new information and aware of multiple perspectives. We can say that defending responses have a close relationship with mindlessness and adapting responses have relationship with mindfulness. Adapting response is used in a situation in which people are mindful. Mindfulness needs dialogue that is the communication which is equal between communication participants, equal in accessing the standard for responsible treatment, equal in fundamental human rights, such as quality of life and success (Niel Thomassen in Bank 1995:120-121). Thus, in crisis, not only organization image, reputation and existence is in danger, but also those of the actors or the members of an organization. In case of crisis, people should be more mindful than mindless in order to create the effective response. It means that the selection process of strategy making also interacts with the openness of individual mind in responding to the change tensions which is inherent in the crisis.

For this research, the analysis is relied on the crisis communication strategies below. These strategies are the summary of several strategies constructed by few researchers above. Crisis communication strategies for this research are focused on the strategies of image reconstruction or restoration. Table 19 is a list of the strategy and tactics, which are inferred from many crisis communication strategy explained above.

Table 19
Crisis Communication Strategies

Personal	Organizational	Tactics
Defending	Dissociation	Denial
		Counterattack
		Differentiation
		Apology
		Legal
Adapting	Apology	Evasion
		Reducing offensiveness of the act
		Corrective action
		Mortification

2.5. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

2.5.1. Crisis Factors


Beside the strategies of crisis response, there are few researches which show that there are several factors influence the selected crisis responses strategy. Coombs said that the manager needs to evaluate the crisis situation in order to select the strategy of crisis responses. He believed that a better crisis understanding of crisis situation should produce a more effective crisis response (Coombs and Holladay, 1998). It means that crisis situation is one of several factors that can influence the strategy of crisis response, even though this factor indirectly influences the strategy. Crisis situation just affects the perception of crisis responsibility and in turn affects the threat of image damage. In detail, Coombs describe crisis situation in three elements, (1) crisis attribution, (2) organization performance and (3) severity of the crisis. Crisis attribution involves two dimensions: (1) external control and (2) personal control/ locus of causality. External control is the degree to which external agents could control the crisis events. Personal control/ locus of causality is the degree to which the organization itself could control the crisis events. Organizational performance is mentioned frequently as an element that should influence crisis management efforts. It is believed that an organization with history of positive performance and good deeds should find it easier to maintain a positive image during a crisis. Crisis damage varies in degree and intensity. It seems reasonable that more severe crisis should produce greater image damage than crisis trivial damage.

Based on his research, it can be concluded that the external control was found not to be unrelated to either crisis responsibility or organizational image. The personal control was positively related to crisis responsibility and negatively related to organizational image damage. Organizational performance intensifies the perception of crisis responsibility and image damage for the accidents and transgression crisis types. Crisis damage does not consistently intensify perception of crisis responsibility. In the end of his conclusion, he said that defensive strategy is most useful when crisis responsibility is weak, accommodative strategy is more useful when the crisis responsibility is strong. It means that only in the crisis in which personal or organizational control is high, crisis situation becomes an influent factor for the perception of crisis responsibility, threat of image damage and in turn it affects the selection of crisis response strategy.

In another research, Coombs (2001) divided organizational performance's history, as one of three elements of crisis situation, into two things; (1) crisis history (whether the crisis was isolated or part of a pattern) and (2) past relationship –good works. On another way, the

early tests show limited, minor support for crisis history and the impact on the crisis situation (Coombs 1998, Coombs and Holladay 1996). However, past relationship or relationship history between an organization and its stakeholders is believed to influence a crisis situation and response (Coombs, 1999b). An unfavorable relationship history shapes how people perceive the crisis and the organization in crisis. An unfavorable history or crisis history leads people to perceive the organization as having more responsibility for the crisis. The effect on perceptions of organizational reputation is much stronger than the effect on crisis responsibility. Relationship history appears to be a more powerful predictor of organizational reputation than crisis history. The crisis situation can influence the selection and the effectiveness of crisis responses strategy. Organization which has bad crisis history and bad relationship with its publics can lead to the worse situation of crisis, and in turn, the bad crisis situation can lead to the selection and effectiveness of crisis responses strategy.

On the basis of the two researches of Coombs and his friends, it can be concluded that there are factors that influence an organization or person to select the strategy of crisis response. The following model shows the connection of those factors.



Newsom supported by Coombs et al (2000:498) said that the more experienced an organization in handling crises, the better response it will do. It means that crisis history – how organization has experience to handle crisis in the past, affects in crisis responses strategy selection.

Other researcher, Ihlen (2002:202-203) said that media pressure may push an organization to change its responses strategy. If the arguments in the crisis responses are proved wrong or are not accepted by major publics such as the media, the crisis response strategy has to be changed. An organization can mix or combine responses strategies, when the material and argumentation is coherent. Based on the research of the case of Mercedes A-Class,

Ihlen found that Mercedes used the combination of three image restoration strategies, these are attack, denial and excuse. This combination is argumentatively and materially incoherent. However, in the end, Mercedes restored the company's reputation and that the A-Class turned out to be a success. In other way, Ihlen argues that "the success was perhaps due to handling of the crisis in its latest phases, but also it may be evidence of the unique position. Mercedes enjoys in the automobile market". According to Ihlen's argument, the using of strategy of crisis communication is determined by media and public acceptance of the initial strategy that is undertaken by the organization.

Hearit (1994,1995) stated that the using of such dissociation techniques usually depends on the particulars of the accusation and potentially the intention and identity of the accusers and the context of mediation. They are influenced by the validity of the charges, the existence of a scapegoat, and the degree of guilt. Marcus and Goodman (1991), as mentioned before, explain that the strategy is determined by organization's perception toward the degree of organization involvement in building crisis.

Based on many researches above, the factors that could influence an organization or a person to select the crisis response strategy or the factors that can be related to the effectiveness of the crisis response strategy are: (1) crisis situation; (2) crisis history; (3) media and public acceptance; and (4) validity of the charges, the existence of a scapegoat and the degree of guilt, (5) perception of crisis responsibility, (6) threat of image damage. All factors are much more perceptual than factual. It means that in identifying those factors, an organization relies more on perception. It is about how and what the organizations think about those factors.

2.5.2. OTHER STRUCTURAL FACTORS

Beside factors related to the crisis communication, the strategy also relates to the structural factors. Rules and resources of an organization, especially those of public relations, are the other contextual factors. Table 21 below describes the relationship between the structure and the strategy will be selected. An organization with closed structure indicated by a model of bureaucratic organization, administrative model of administration, one way communication, one way relationship between an organization and its publics and the mindlessness of human resources will respond to the crisis by applying defensive strategy. Contrarily, an opened structure of an organization which is indicated by a post bureaucratic organization, pluralist democracy, two way organizational communication, two way relationship between an


organization and its publics and mindfulness of human resources will apply accommodative strategy. It can be meant that the action can be in line with the structure.

Table 20
Conceptual Framework

		Closed System	Open System
Model of Bureaucracy		Bureaucratic organization	Post bureaucratic org.
Model of Administration		Administrative/Weberian	Pluralist democracy
Model of Communication		One way	Two way
Model of Public Relations		Press agency/ Public information	Two way asymmetrical/ Two way symmetrical
Crisis Communication Strategy			
1	Personal/Individual	Defending	Adapting
2	Institutional/Organization	Dissociation	Mortification

In addition, not only an organizational structure is the contextual factor in crisis communication strategy choice, but also the larger structure, for instance, the social and political structure. It can be called as the structure which exists in the environment. For this research, there are three layers of the context of crisis communication strategy choice. It becomes a basis for organizational action, and also for individual action. After all, the relationship between public relations structure, organizational structure, the larger structure in environment and action is not linear. The three layers of the structure can be the contextual factors that help the members of organization to select the strategy. In this case, the structure becomes the medium for the action. On the other hand the contextual factors are composed and constructed by the members' action. Here the member of organization can be called as an actor, an agent or an agency. It means that there is interrelation, interconnection and interplay between a structure and an action. The interconnection between structure and agency is showing on model 8.

Model 8 Theoretical Framework of the Research



This model emphasizes on the interaction among elements, from actors/agents to the level of system/structure. It means the crisis communication strategy is produced by the structure, the interaction between rules and resources, but also produces the structure. In case of this study, the crisis communication strategy applied by the Indonesian presidents can be produced by the structure. And in the same time, it produces the structure. This research is intended to know deeper about the strategy and also the factors which might “play behind the stage”. The selected strategies can be meant as the individual mentality of the political elites when they must deal with crisis and situation, and when their reputation, image and existence are questioned by publics.

2.6. CONCLUSION

There is no dualism between structure and agency. It is duality. It means there is interaction or interplay between structure and agency. In crisis, organization’s members, including PR practitioners and the president select and respond to the crisis by applying a certain strategy. It is selected on the basis of the context. Context means a structure composed by rules and resources. The structure can be in an organizational level, unit level or in a larger organization structure. The structure in the level of organization is organizational rules, regulations,

mechanisms, procedures, norms, values and all kind of organizational guidance, which regulate organizational members' in creating action. For this research, an organizational structure is focused on the presidential communication, including communication procedures and mechanisms. Structure in the level of unit is public relations' rules and regulations, roles and functions of public relations, model of the relationship between the president and its publics, and all kinds of public relations practices in government institution. While larger structure means social and political practices outside of an organization which exist in the government's environment.

Strategy of crisis communication can be categorized in two types; (1) defensive strategy and (2) accommodative/adaptive strategy. Every strategy applied by the government's member, including by the president, relies on the three levels of structural context. It means that the strategy is created on the basis of the existed structure. In the same time, the repetitively applied strategy creates a structure. The selected strategy which is relied on the three levels of structures is called as reproduction or establishment, and the strategy which creates new structure is called as production or innovation/ reformation.

What strategy applied by Megawati Soekarnoputri, fifth President of Republic of Indonesia, and what contextual factors in crisis communication strategy choice will be explained in following chapters.

CHAPTER 3

CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY IN CASE OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL CRISIS

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the responses of the presidents to the crisis. Response means how the presidents, especially Megawati as the fifth President of Indonesia, communicated the crisis and how they reacted to the public, including the media voices who judge/ evaluate their performance in dealing with the crisis. The way they communicated to respond to the crisis can be seen as their strategy of crisis response.

This chapter is started by the description of Soeharto and Habibie's, the second and third of the president of Republic of Indonesia, perception about the crisis and their response to their image which is constructed by Indonesian people. This part describes the factors can be the context of the strategy choice. The next part explains the strategy of Megawati in responding to the public "attack" about her performance in crisis resolution. In detail, this part is divided into several sub titles. Firstly it describes Megawati's view on the multidimensional crisis. Secondly it describes her strategy to respond to the crisis.

3.2. HOW THE FORMER PRESIDENTS RESPOND TO THE CRISIS

The sense of crisis of the President is very important to deal with the crisis. Sense of crisis means that the President aware of the symptoms of crisis and the danger of crisis itself, so she or he is able to respond to the crisis accurately and properly. Without the sense of crisis, something unexpected can be occurred, crisis will really occur.

As explored by Soedarsono as explained in the prior chapter, the four Presidents of the Republic of Indonesia had acknowledged the existence of the crisis in Indonesia. Based on their speeches almost of all Presidents are aware of the crisis, even though some of them were quite late in realizing it. On that time, the crisis was getting worse. Based on their point of view, the crisis was triggered by the monetary problem which occurred in the middle of 1997. It means that the crisis was beginning in the era of HM Soeharto's presidency, the second of the President of the Republic of Indonesia. It was the sixth time of HM Soeharto's administration that ended in 1999.

That HM Soeharto admitted the occurrence of the crisis in Indonesia can be seen from his statements, especially in his last speech in 1998, in the political situation which was not really conducive for him. Below are his statements about the crisis.

“Last year we experienced many accidents in the land, sea and sky. Our life of economy got disturbance [...] Even though we have already had and started to execute the several clear and fundamental programs of reformation and restructuring, there is no indicator of progress and improvement. Even more, the life of people was becoming more difficult [...] Exchange rate of our currency is still in low rate, the situation is getting worse because there is someone who takes advantage in the difficult situation for himself [...] Economic growth is running slowly, inflation kept going on high rate till January 98 [...] We are really in the difficult economical situation.” (HM Soeharto’s speech, March 1st, 1998)

That Indonesia faced the difficulties in economy was clearly stated by HM Soeharto, but surprisingly, he believed that the fundamental of Indonesian economy was still quite strong, the development and reformation during 1994-1996 were quite successful. This statement shows that HM Soeharto did not see that there was a problem in the internal situation as a cause of the economic difficulty.

That the crisis in Indonesia was unpredictable was stated through the President’s statements. HM Soeharto did not think that the crisis in Asia gave a big impact on the Indonesian economic life.

“Surprisingly, since in the middle of 1997, monetary problem had appeared. This country was facing financial crisis. And then, the crisis was getting deeper and longer.”

“Since the second half of the last year the monetary problem had appeared. As if all the things we built by hard work was unsteady.”

“In fact, 1997 was a difficult year for us. But, in the second half of 1997, unexpectedly monetary problem came to Indonesia.”

After all, HM Soeharto said that the economic problem that occurred in Indonesia was caused more by international situation. Crisis in Indonesia was only the effect of monetary crisis that occurred in Asia, even in the world, but not a result of the national problem. Furthermore, HM Soeharto claimed that the crisis in Indonesia was unavoidable because it was only a small part of the huge crisis that happened in the world.

“It is not because we do not know about the possibility of the crisis. In the recent time, I have said for many times that like or dislike, want to or not, ready or not, we must

experience the consequences of global economics. The impact of it is coming faster than we thought. Its bad impacts were bigger than we thought.”

Based on his statement, it can be concluded that HM Soeharto seemed to have a good sense of crisis. However he has not. Indonesia was not ready in dealing with the crisis. HM Soeharto was also surprised when the economic life of Indonesia was in the very bad situation. He acknowledged that Indonesia was in crisis but it was not due to the weaknesses of the governmental performance. This statement was stated again in his speech in the end of his presidency in the front of the leaders of Indonesian Parliament, political fractions, social and political organization on May 1st 1998, two months after his annual speech. In that speech, he stated that Indonesia was in crisis, but in the other part of his speech, he said that Indonesia was in a good state.

“Beside Catur Krida³⁹, Kabinet Pembangunan VII has to finish the latest year of REPELITA VI and still has to face the monetary crisis situation and condition, which has impact on the economic crisis and trust crisis, both the trust to the currency value and to our banking system, world banking and market, especially in market of investment in Indonesia. This is not an easy task for us.”

“We do not need to be discourage, because of our efforts which must be handled are not easy, especially in the crisis. It is not our own problem, but it is a part of global problem which is very influent on the accomplishing the Indonesian development, start from finishing all crises we have faced.”

In that speech, HM Soeharto repeatedly said that crisis that occurred in Indonesia was a monetary crisis, which developed to be an economy crisis and trust crisis toward national and international banking system. It means that HM Soeharto did not admit that the crisis was caused by the weaknesses or failure or bad performance of the governmental institutions or internal problem of Indonesia. This kind of reaction can be called as self defense strategy or more precisely can be called as denial or avoiding strategy.

This strategy was used again by Soeharto when he reacted to the people’s demand that he had to resign from his presidency. People claimed that Soeharto has failed to recover Indonesia from the crisis effects and reform all aspects of the country. In this strategy, he shifted the blame to the third party. They were the student and people who were called by Soeharto as

³⁹ Catur Krida is the title of the Development Program Plan of Indonesian Government. Catur means four, Krida means activity. Kabinet Pembangunan VII is the name of the President’s cabinet of his sixth HM Soeharto’s presidency. Kabinet Pembangunan in English means Development Cabinet. REPELITA is abbreviation from Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (The Five Years of Development Plan).

militants. Soeharto saw them as the people who always create disorder of the development and reformation.

“We feel, before annual meeting of the Board of People Representative, there are people who discredit to the New Order Government. It was starting by the activities before General Election until the General Election was performed. Even, they have tried to defeat the performing of general election...[...] They have tried to discredit, even to break down all the development activities. They entered to campus by using the term of academic freedom, demanded for reformation, both economy, politic and law...but because of the continuing of the activities of a small group of activist or militant as if all the universities have been influenced, so they claimed that their activities are the movement of people power. Of course, this thing is not beneficial for New Order efforts in the future and also it can disturb the national and political stability.”

Soeharto's statement above indicates that he suspected the third party, higher education students, through their movements, were the actors of disturbance of Indonesia development, and they were also the people who always tried to break down the development and reformation. Soeharto claimed that the people power never existed, but it is only a few of activities of small activists and militants who entered to some universities. The second President of the Republic of Indonesia also showed his response to the people who were responsible for the development failure, by attacking and challenging them.

The form of the attack and challenge shown by usage of the word “against”, “take actions against”, as written below:

“I hope that the campus communities who really want to reform this nation must understand it in the constructive way and do not trap into the activities which disturb the politic and national stability. If it must be happened, indeed we have to be up against them because development must be kept as people mandate as written on GBHN, and it must be accomplished carefully. I am responsible for it. If, after they listen to our explanation and don't want to accept it and keep going to do the harmful activities, we have to take actions against them...[...] Honestly, I have authority, which is given by the Board of People Representative in last Annual Meeting, to do this.”

The strategy of dissociation was also shown by Soeharto when he responded the critics that he has failed to reform. He said that the critics which were brought up by the students were not relevant because the reformation had been implemented since some years ago. He divided reformation program into some steps based on the period of time, namely: (1) before freedom proclamation, (2) after freedom proclamation, (3) after sovereignty acknowledgement in 1949, (4) Old Order, (5) New Order, (6) latest time reformation. Based on his explanation, it is clear that Soeharto has tried to dissociate from the wrong doing in case of the crisis. He denied to be

judged as the leader who failed to overcome the crisis. Even, he launched counterattack against the people who gave that statements. Soeharto said that the statements about the failure of Soeharto to do reformation were wrong, inaccurate and illogical. His speech as printed on the 23 pages did not imply and contained the statement that there was something wrong with his cabinet and internal governance that might become the cause of the crisis. He also shifted the guilt to the people and students who mobilize “the people power”.

This Soeharto’s speech can’t be trusted by people. Indonesia situation was getting worse. The demonstration by students and many groups of people which demanded the resignation of HM Soeharto as the President keep going on. As described on the earlier chapter, on May 13th 1998 there was a big mass riot. It is followed by the other accidents in which many more people, including students were killed. The political situation in Indonesia was getting much more difficult. On the May 21st, 1998 Soeharto resigned. BJ Habibie took over the position. This event was controversial. Some people said it was not constitutional, but another part of people said the opposite. Some people believed that BJ Habibie will be able to make progress in post crisis reconstructing.

On August 15th, 1998 in his official speech, the President BJ Habibie spoke more about crisis. Habibie admitted that he did not think that Indonesia would be in crisis. It was shown by his speech, below:

“We are shocked by the monetary crisis that occurred in July 1997. We do not expect that economy crisis would come. And it was much more surprisingly, we did not think that our economy system and national financial institutions actually were not able to anticipate the strong barriers toward the fundamental of the national economy.” (Habibie’s speech, August 15th, 1998).

It shows that Habibie as a President did not have enough sense of crisis. He and the prior President and his cabinet might not apply the issue management, which can help people to be aware of the possibility of the crisis. By applying issues management, people are able not only to prevent the crisis but also to recover the crisis better and faster. That Indonesian leaders do not have enough sense of crisis is the common criticism, as written on prior chapter. Based on his speech, the low sense of crisis of the higher leader of Indonesia is reaffirmed the people criticism.

As well as Soeharto, Habibie saw the crisis in Indonesia was a monetary crisis which developed to be economy crisis. However he was different from Soeharto, Habibie mentioned

that Indonesia also faced political crisis. The economy and political crisis accumulated to be much more difficult crisis. It becomes the trust crisis.

“The accumulation of economy and political crisis are becoming triggered factors of the harder crisis, that is trust crisis. People do not trust, not only to the leader and the governmental institutions, but also to the values system and the fundamental of law in which the governmental institutions is built. (Habibie’s speech, August 15th, 1998)

The same statement was launched again by Habibie on August 16th, 1998 in his official speech in the Board of Parliament meeting. The speech that was written on the 45 pages was a long explanation about crisis and the description of the government’s effort to recover Indonesia. A small part of his speech is written below:

“At the same time, economy situation in Indonesia is facing the consequences of globalization, which is indicated by trade liberalization and speed capital movement. Crisis in Asia caused Indonesian economy to be in very harmful crisis.”

That Indonesia was in crisis is admitted by Habibie, as written below:

“We still remember, more than one year ago, our economy situation was really not good. [...] At that time, we were going to enter the door of hyperinflation... [...] In the same time we met many sad stories. International trust was decreasing to the lowest level, negotiation with the potential donors and investors was canceled [...] Our country was almost isolated from international communities, not physically but economically and financially [...] Remember, the crisis situation was very serious last year... “

Habibie claimed that the Indonesian political situation which was not transparent and not democratic were two triggered factors of political crisis. Political crisis was indicated by the crisis of trust to the capability of the Indonesian leaders in crisis resolution. The crisis, mentioned by Habibie, was also triggered by the violation of the law in all area: politics, economy, social and culture. Law or regulation was only a tool for the leaders to establish their power and position. Unfortunately, it is not a tool to promote the justice and welfare for publics.

In the following time, Habibie finally recognized that the problem would be more difficult if the current crisis did not handle rapidly and accurately. He said that Indonesia needed systemic crisis resolution, which was started by exploring the source of crisis.

“The impact of economy crisis causes the number of poor people was increasing, health services couldn’t be applied for publics...All makes our national defense was weakening, that it could cause of the economic bankruptcy and national disintegration.”

“...approximately for one year, we have worked hard to prevent the situation to get worse. The effort was started by understanding the main problem, not just the symptoms.”

“The effort of economy improvement still takes time, and needs much more attention and systematic, professional and holistic approach in resolving our problem.”

“To handle the difficult problem and the serious damage, we have to improve and change systematically, integrated and in detail.”

“Based on our experience in handling the change through revolution, and so many victims of it, I decide to choose evolution as the best way, or more specific, accelerated evolution.”

Habibie differentiated between evolution and revolution. Evolution is the fundamental changes which are created systematically, gradually, and it is planned, controlled and it is sustainable. On other hand, revolution is the fundamental changes which are created in a relatively short time and unsustainable. By choosing evolution for crisis resolution, it means that Habibie applied the strategy of systematic crisis resolution. Based on Soedarsono's premise, as explained before, systematic crisis resolution is the right strategy to resolve the crisis in Indonesia. On the other part of his speech, Habibie admitted clearly that Indonesia was really in crisis and it had to be handled as soon as possible. Crisis in Indonesia, is admitted by Habibie. It was the result of the failure and the weaknesses of our economy system and national banking institutions. And it is influenced by the same crisis that occurred in Asia. It means that he admitted that the crisis was not only caused by the crisis in Asia but also national economy weaknesses.

“Economic growth which was 7% per year could be maintained continuously for more than two decades. Unfortunately, in the era of New Order, it can not followed by democratically and transparently political and economical situation.”

Based on his acknowledgement, it can be said that Habibie applied full apology strategy, even though he still shifted the blame to the international situation as the cause of the crisis. Habibie also admitted that weaknesses of the Indonesian government. Moreover he apologized to the Indonesian people for the inappropriate political and development strategies applied by the government. At that time, Habibie was criticized by people about the physical violence and human right violation which were done by the government's apparatus/police/military.

“I believed that we concern to the violation of human right in Indonesia. With patience, in order to give respect and perform human rights, I apologize to the family of the victims.” (BJ Habibie's speech, August 15th 1998).

“I assume as the heaviest task as a president is having responsibility for the violence that was done in this country. We grieve for the people who died because of violence, we do not have the strength to see that so many people use violence as a way to solve the problem. I grieve for the victims of violence, and their family [...] Whenever people die because of the incapability of the state, because of our inappropriate political strategy, I apologize to you...please accept my sympathy.” (BJ Habibie’s speech, October 17th 1999)

The Habibie’s apology can be meant as the admission of guilt of the government’s apparatus. Unlikely of Soeharto, Habibie also positioned the students or people as the victims of the arrogant apparatus’ behavior. He did not see the student movements as the source of crisis and the cause of failure of reformation and development. The response of Soeharto and Habibie to the crisis in Indonesia is shown shortly on table 21 below:

Table 21
HM Soeharto and BJ Habibie about crises
(Based on Presidents’ speeches 1998-1999)

About Crisis	HM Soeharto (1966-1998)	BJ Habibie (1998-1999)
Time of occurrence	Mid of 1997	July 1997
Type	Crisis of monetary, crisis of economy, crisis of trustworthiness toward rupiahs and banking	Monetary crisis, economy crisis, political crisis, crisis of trustworthiness toward leaders, governmental institutions, value systems and the fundamental of law.
Causes Factors	Monetary crisis in Asia, <i>global crisis</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Monetary crisis in Asia 2. The weaknesses of Indonesian banking system. 3. The ignorance of law in social, economical, political and cultural aspects. 4. Inability of the government in economy and political life.
Public criticism toward the Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HM Soeharto was unable to solve the crisis. • Government failed doing reformation • Public forces the resignation of the President 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BJ Habibie and his cabinet was still a part of HM Soeharto cronies. • The inauguration of BJ Habibie as the President was not constitutional.
Crisis response/ crisis communication strategy*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scapegoat • Opinion-knowledge dissociation • Counterattack 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Full apology • Mortification

HM Soeharto was the second President of the Republic of Indonesia. He was the President since 1966 and 1994 until 1999 was his sixth presidency. It means that in 1997, when the crisis began, HM Soeharto was still in charge as a President. During his era, Indonesian people judged that Indonesia was lead by his authoritarian leadership. In the area of presidential communication, he was also very strict and centralized in structure. He used government public relations (GPR) as a means or a channel to disseminate his policies, information and statements. He also controlled mass media or press, by applying rules which gave the President right to publish permit and perish or close down the operation of mass media. In contrast to HM Soeharto, BJ Habibie, the third President of the Republic of Indonesia, had been trying to develop the democratic leadership. He chose the method of leadership to ensure Indonesian people that he had goodwill for improving Indonesia to be more democratic. The first step of BJ Habibie was the revocation a publish permit and let the Indonesian mass media was growing up without strict control by the government. It became the significant step of BJ Habibie to build the open and transparent dialogue between the government and its publics. This kind of communication style was followed by the open and transparent presidential communication. The structure of the presidential communication tended to be free flow communication. He wanted to listen from everywhere and widespread information by various communication media. It brought about the negative effects, such an opportunity for outsiders to intervene the formal information flow that caused the bias information. For the certain public, BJ Habibie's leadership was called as "management by fear". He listened to and concerned for public demands because of his fear to the public pressures. For another part of Indonesian people, BJ Habibie was still called as HM Soeharto's cronies. It means that his leadership characters were not so different from HM Soeharto's leadership.

Based on Presidents' statement in reacting to the crisis, for different cases, shown on table 22, they have different point of view about crisis. HM Soeharto looked the crisis as an unavoidable situation which was caused by the same crisis in Asia. He stated that the root of the crisis in Indonesia was not the result of the problems in the area of Indonesian governmental institutions, but in the area of external/international problems. Therefore it can be said that HM Soeharto tended to use **self defense strategy**. There are three strategies used by Soeharto, all are categorized in self defense strategy, (1) scapegoating strategy; (2) opinion-knowledge dissociation; and (3) counterattack strategy. Quite different from HM Soeharto, BJ Habibie saw that the weaknesses of the government in many aspects contributed to the occurrence of crisis. It can be concluded that BJ Habibie admitted that the Indonesian

government has made wrongdoing in relation to the crisis. This kind of statement can be an example of **apology strategy**.

Table 22 below describes a comparison between HM Soeharto and BJ Habibie, related to the other factors of the two Presidents and the strategy of crisis response.

Table 22
Contextual factors of the crisis response strategy
Case on HM Soeharto and BJ Habibie

	HM Soeharto	BJ Habibie
Leadership Style	Authoritative	Democratic
Communication Style	Centralized, formal, one way communication	Decentralized, informal, open, free flow communication
President – Mass Media Relation	Structured, strict control	Freedom of the press
Crisis response strategy	Self defense	Apology

The fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia was KH Abdurrahman Wahid, usually called Gus Dur. In his inauguration as President, Gus Dur did not mention anything about crisis. He just said, for many times, that he had very hard tasks, duties and responsibilities because he faced two things: (1) hard competition in the era of international free trade; and (2) disintegration threat. In his first presidential speech which was very short, he said: “I do not need to talk too much in this time, because the longer the speech, the more responsibilities I have to take in the future.”

As written before, there are a few written speeches of Gus Dur during his presidency. It is because of the vision handicap of Gus Dur to read the text. He frequently gave speeches orally without text. Surprisingly, even though Gus Dur did not mention crisis so many times, he said that Indonesia was out from political crisis. Based on his statement, he said that the government would focus more on establishing security development and supremacy of law.

3.3. MEGAWATI'S STRATEGY

3.3.1. Crisis in Megawati's View

3.3.1.1. Year 2001

Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth President of the Republic of Indonesia, during her presidency, had given a few hundred speeches, both oral or textual. Since her inauguration as a

president, Megawati gave many statements about crisis. She acknowledged that Indonesia has been in crisis since the middle of 1998. A few of her statements about crisis is written below:

“...current months which are so depressed, full of political conflict, even constitutional conflict...” (Megawati’s speech August 16th, 2001).

“...in the latest four years our nation has been living in the anxiety because continuously we have been facing monetary crisis, economy crisis, security crisis, political crisis and more than this, we begin to face the institutional crisis and conflict. It happened not only in national level but also in local level.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2001)

“The dreadful economy difficulty and its impact on the missing of the field of endeavor for our people, in turn, has affected to the raising of social problems. Sooner or later if the problem is not quickly handled, the social problems will be followed by political problem and security disturbance.” (Megawati’s speech, October 5th, 2001)

“In the uncertain world situation, and together with the condition of the nation which is still in difficulty...” (Megawati’s speech, December 27th, 2001)

“...When the national situation has been tested, as happened recently, and when many various conflicts have been spreading and endangering the national unity, oneness and wholeness, most of all was socked.” (Megawati’s speech, December 29th, 2001)

In early of her first official speech, Megawati mentioned crisis with the term of “conflict”. She said that Indonesia was in a political and constitutional conflict. However, in the next part of her speech, Megawati admitted that Indonesia has been in a crisis since the middle of 1997. She said that Indonesia faced a monetary crisis, it was continuing to be economy crisis, security crisis, political crisis and finally to be institutional crisis. Therefore, Megawati claimed that Indonesia has been in multidimensional crisis. Different from Megawati, HM Soeharto and Habibie did not mention about political and institutional crisis. It is clear why Megawati mentioned about security crisis. It is because in her presidency, Indonesia was full of terror of bomb and anti America movement which triggered the act of sweeping to the foreigners. Based on her statement, multidimensional crisis in Indonesia was triggered by the politic and constitutional conflict. But, when the conflicts uncontrollably developed, it became more intensive and to be an unexpected form, the conflicts change to be a multi dimensional crisis.

Political and constitutional problem were also stated by Megawati in her speech at the anniversary of Indonesian Military, 5th October, 2001. She explained that all the problems influence one to another.

“We also face so many problems in term of ideology, constitution, and politics. All must be handled simultaneously in the frame of national reform. These problems are related to each other.” (Megawati’s speech October 5th, 2001)

“As I know, during our national historical journey, we have not ever face hard temptation yet as we experienced in the current years. In the past, the temptation existed because of our own behavior which created problem. This time, we do not only face that problems but also face the new problems which are a result of our mistake in planning and impatience in achieving the goals. We often see that our efforts to resolve a problem created another new problem which is more difficult than the first problem. One problem is related to another problem, old or new.” (Megawati’s speech, December 13th, 2001)

“The probable factors that can disperse our country are many, both internal and external factors. In the recent years, all factors exist in the same time and relating to each other.” (Megawati’s speech, October 5th, 2001).

These statements are asserted that the multi dimensional crisis in Indonesia was a systemic and serial crisis, which is indicated by the interaction among the problems, one problem influences to the other problems. Based on her statements, Megawati mentioned several term that replace the term of crisis. These terms are “problem”, “difficulty”, “fluctuation”, and “disturbance”. These terms are indicators of the existing of crisis.

In the other parts of her speeches, Megawati also spoke about the conditions experienced by Indonesian people. The conditions can be called as the symptoms of crisis. Below is the several citations of her speeches.

“We have been living too long in the uncertain situation.” (Megawati’s speech, August 30th, 2001)

“...normalization and stabilization are the preconditions have to be accomplished because in the last four years we have been living in the not normal and stable condition, where is so many national resources are damaged.” (Megawati’s speech, August 30th, 2001)

“I don’t want to talk again about how hard and complex the situation we have to face.” (Megawati’s speech, November 30th, 2001)

The uncertainty, abnormality, instability, anxiety and complexity mentioned by Megawati are indicators of crisis. Based on the criteria of crisis, it can be concluded that Indonesia was really in crisis, multi dimensional crisis. And, that crisis is not a single crisis, but a serial and systemic crisis. The several crucial events accumulated to be a very harmful crisis.

Based on the quotation of her speeches, it can be concluded that the level of development of the crisis was in the chronic level. That very serious crisis and the government’s

efforts to resolve was stated by Megawati almost in every speech since her presidency. How difficult to resolve the crisis is shown by the government statements. The government needed time, public patience, slow resolution and gradual efforts.

“...are we able to solve the multi dimensional crisis quickly and simultaneously? Of course not...there are many problems and systems we have to be restructured, not only the technical things but also function, structure and work methods of the nation and state institution, both in the level of supra structure and infrastructure.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th, 2001)

“We are able to solve all problems gradually, begin from the urgent matter. This kind of crisis is really impossible to solve in the short time and simultaneously.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th, 2001)

“How hard we tried, it is not easy for the government who is very busy and every time they are pressured by public opinion.” (Megawati’s speech, August 30th, 2001)

“I don’t want to explain again how difficult and complex the problem we have to face recently.” (Megawati’s speech, November 30th, 2001)

“I feel, in our national historical journey, we have never fought against problems as we face now. We concern as if the ordeals never end.” (Megawati’s speech, December 22nd, 2001).

“Every one knows that almost all of the people feel discourage in resolving the never ending problems.” (Megawati’s speech, December 27th, 2001).

“There is no formula or one model can be used to solve all problems simultaneously, quickly and completely. We must have priority. We need patience, seriousness, and strength of attitude to solve the problems. It needs wisdom, and professionalism to handle these problems gradually, one by one.” (Megawati’s speech, December 13th, 2001).

“By our limited capability, we must be one by one, little by little...” (Megawati’s speech, February 14th, 2002)

“Realizing we have many limitation in our national life.” (Megawati’s speech, February 14th, 2002)

Based on the explanation above, table 23 below describes the Megawati’s statements about crisis and how she looked crisis in Indonesia based on several elements.

Table 23
Crisis in Indonesia
(Megawati's Speeches 16 August 2001-31 December 2002)

Crisis characteristics	<i>Systemic, serial of events</i>	The problems were bounded one to another
The terms are related to the crisis		Conflict, disaster, problem, difficulties, trouble, disturbance
Public situation		Anxiety, tension, uncertainty, deviation, instability, complexity, difficulty.
Type of crisis	Multi dimensional, many faces	Politic, constitution, monetary, economy, security, institutional, ideology, social, leadership, trustworthiness.
Level of crisis	Chronic	Very hard, the damage of fundamental nationality and state.
Crisis resolution method	Systemic, process	Gradually, step by step, little by little, one by one, slowly, need long time.
Public responses to crisis resolution	Unsatisfied	Disappointed, angry, emotional, make fun of and heap on curses, not patient, in haste, skeptic, not believe, mock.
Desired public responses		Patient, calm, realistic, hardship.
Period of crisis		Beginning on July 1997 and can be getting resolved on August 2002 (one year after Megawati has the authority)

Similar to BJ Habibie, Megawati tried to overcome the crisis systematically. She began her efforts by identifying the source or the root of the crisis. Based on the quotations of her statements in 2001, Megawati said that there were several factors which triggered, aggravated and complicated the crisis and the crisis resolution. She divided these factors into two categorizes: (1) internal factors, these are the national factors, and (2) external factors, these are the international factors. The internal factors are:

1. A mistake in achievement management and impatience in performing the goals.
2. Weaknesses of political supra structure and infrastructure.
3. Public policy in the past which was inflicted a loss upon the people.
4. Weakening social discipline, inconsistency in performing what we have planned indicated by disobedience of the law.
5. Collusion, corruption and nepotism practices.
6. Misperception of the concept of reformation.

7. Misperception of the concept of human rights.
8. The weaknesses of Indonesian National Police and military.
(Megawati's speech, August 16th 2001)
9. The selfishness of the people.
10. The ignorance of any group of people to the expected vision, policy and new strategy
and inhibition in goal achievement.
11. Bad development strategy
(Megawati's speech, August 30th 2001)
12. Bad character and mentality of the law enforcer.
(Megawati's speech, September 3rd 2001)
13. The usage of violence, terror and anarchism.
14. Ideology fanaticism.
15. Unstable political life.
(Megawati's speech, October 5th 2001)
16. Less attention and moral education
17. Weakening of social solidarity
18. Weakening of humanity
(Megawati's speech, October 29th 2001)
19. Disappointment and bitterness of life which is caused by injustice in the past.
20. Inappropriate primordialism.
21. Not proportional primordialism, ethnical and religion egoism.
(Megawati's speech October 29th 2001)
22. Inappropriate debate about autonomy.
(Megawati's speech, November 16th 2001)
23. Defensive attitude toward the threat of imported products.
24. Fighting too strong to the national potency which is going to grow up, partial policies
which inhibit national development.

(Megawati's speech December 5th 2001)

25. Not trust to each other

26. Life without the spirit of God and humanity

(Megawati's speech, December 27th 2001)

27. The weakening of the spirit to solve the problem and skeptical attitude

28. Minimal and out of date military and police weapons system

29. Unprofessional Indonesian Military

30. Low in prosperity of Indonesian Military staffs

(Megawati's speech, December 29th 2001)

All the weaknesses above are internal inhibited factors which are rooted on national problems whereas the external factors are (1) international terrorism, (2) global economy crisis; and (3) imbalance international reportage. Table 24 shows the internal and external factors which are categorized into two: (1) individual/actor/agent, and (2) institution/ organization/ system/structure.

Table 24
Triggered and inhibited factors for crisis resolution
(Megawati's speeches August –December 2001)

	Internal (National)	External (International)
Individual/ Actor/Agent	The weakening of social discipline and disobedience of the laws	None
	The improper knowledge of human rights	
	Mindlessness	
	Bad characters and mentality of human resources	
	Anarchism	
	Primordial	
	Ideology fanaticism	
	The weakening of the spirit of devout	
	Misconception of reformation	
System/ Structure/ Institution	The weaknesses of infra and supra structure of politic	Monetary crisis in Asia
	Problems in the past	
	Corruption, collusion and nepotism	
	The unprofessional human resources	International or global economy crisis.
	Inaccurate planning	
	The ignorance to the expected vision and mission.	International terrorism
	Resources/limited financial support	International violence
	The improper policies and strategies for national development	The imbalance of international media coverage

Megawati's speeches in 2001 are emphasized on the crisis as the biggest national problem and the crisis resolution as the biggest Indonesian government and governmental responsibility, task and duty. The crisis in Indonesia is very serious and hard crisis, multi dimensional and systemic crisis. Indonesian crisis is systemic because the problems which are triggered the crisis influence to each other. Because systemic, crisis has to be solved by systemic resolution efforts. It was the evolutionary process, gradual resolution and it also needs time to look the result of the resolution efforts.

Even though in her speeches she stated that economic condition seemed better in a few months after her presidency, Megawati admitted that the crisis was not totally resolved yet. It was because our national and statehood problems were also contributed to the main crisis. The two problems were the old problems which accumulated with new problems. The several internal problems and weaknesses and also the external or international crisis were mentioned persistently by Megawati as the source or factors of the existence of the crisis in Indonesia. It

can be concluded that Megawati admitted that crisis in Indonesia was not only because of the influence of internal or national problems, both institutional and individual, but also international problems. Even, based on her speeches in 2001, the internal weaknesses or problems were claimed by Megawati contribute to the prolonged crisis and the difficulty of crisis resolution.

3.3.1.2. Year 2002

More than six months after Megawati was inaugurated as President, crisis was still ongoing and more difficult to be solved. It was mentioned by Megawati many times in her speeches.

“Recently, the life of nationhood and statehood must be tested by the very serious problems, even by very hard crisis. It makes us to realize that the damage of fundamental social system has a very serious effect. (Megawati’s speech, February 8th 2002)

“If we want to look back for a while, I think, all of you understand that the several problems we have are started by the problems of Indonesian economy. Certainly, we also realize that it is not only economic problem we have to face but also several social and political problems.” (Megawati’s speech, May 10th, 2002).

The statements above show how hard the crisis was. It is shown by her statement that the crisis was caused by the damage of social system. It means that crisis is affected by the abnormality of the fundamental matters. On her speeches, Megawati also stated that not only fundamental social system which is damaged, but also the law and the political systems. About systemic crisis resolution, as the best method, has been stated for many times by Megawati.

“To resolve all the problems we face is absolutely not an easy task or can be done simultaneously and quickly. We all know about it. We know too that our resources are very limited. Therefore, we have to finish all the problems step by step, one by one, as our priority.” (Megawati’s speech, February 8th 2002).

“There are still many problems we have to solve...We do not need to deny even though we have to solve it one by one, step by step. We do not need to be worry if to resolve the crisis, we need time.” (Megawati’s speech, April 19th 2002)

“Different from our neighbor countries which have come out of the crisis quickly, we need longer time because our problems are not only economic problem but also social, politic and culture problems, even the problem of constitution which related to the whole system of the governance and state. (Megawati’s speech, October 5th 2002)

Megawati also said that it was important to be patient to know the result of the crisis resolution. As she has said for many times, to solve the crisis is not easy because of its complexity, its high degree of damage, and the limited resources and human resources we have.

“Not only difficult, but also we need to be patient.” (Megawati’s speech, February 8th 2002)

“I know there are many people who becoming not patient with the process. Some of them are angry...[...] How great our expectation, we really can not solve the crisis quickly and simultaneously. The limitations of our capability and human resources, insist on us to be realistic. We have to solve it one by one and not in a short time.” (Megawati’s speech, April 19th 2002)

“The problem is, when we have to start to work, in the same time, we still have to work hard to solve many difficulties which are not solved in the past. I have said for many times, that is the reality. Like or dislike, we have to solve all the problems one by one, step by step. We have to be patient. It is because of our limited resources.” (Megawati’s speech, May 24th 2002)

“We need to be patient and need to work hard to make peace and quiet, so we are able to work better. Based on our experiences, we need a longer time. We have to take action step by step, how great our expectation to solve the crisis. We need to be realistic, that there is no instant and quick solution for our complex problems.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002).

“Our patience and firmness are very important because reformation is a long process and it needs time.” (Megawati’s speech, October 3rd 2002).

“To improve or change the old condition or even life pattern needs process and time. Often we need to be patient. In the very complex situation, there is no something better but to be calm and patient. We will be not able resolve so many works without these attitudes. I believe by being calm and patient, we will be able to consent our attention to solve all problems one by one and gradually.” (Megawati’s speech, November 21st 2002).

Even though Megawati said that we need patience to find the output of the crisis resolution, and to eradicate the crisis since it can not be done in a short time and fast, contrarily she also said she and her cabinet had made Indonesia better than the prior condition in the last four years. The movement to the better condition in the area of social, economy, politic, and security was also mentioned by her, especially in her speeches in the first year of her presidency.

“Even though it is very difficult and complex, I believe we are getting closer to resolve our national problems well.” (Megawati’s speech, April 16th 2002).

“We have really done all efforts in order to raise our nation up from several complex difficulties. We can see and feel these improvements but there are still some of big

problems have to be handled fundamentally and carefully.” (Megawati’s speech, May 20th 2002).

“However, we can’t say that there is no impact of our effort to eradicate the crisis. We all can see and feel that. At least when we do not want to say it verbally, I believe we still have capability to see and feel it by our heart.” (Megawati’s speech, May 24th 2002)

“We should thank to God, in the condition we have limited resources, we are able to manage the dynamic of the nationhood and statehood which keep going forward.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002).

“Recently, our political life keeps developing to be more democratic, as our reformation goal... The threat of national disintegration which occurred since some years ago and social and political problems which are caused by inter group conflicts in several areas have also subsided.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002).

“In general we see a progress in our social life. All shows that the government has willingness to improve the situation and our past mistakes.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002).

“By working hard and using our capability, we are able to move forward. Even though not always in the same time and quality, we can see and feel the positive changes in all area of life.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002).

“By working hard, we just resolved monetary crisis that occurred four years ago as well as the various difficulties followed, included the threat of national disintegration. All is done by hard working and maximizing our limited resources.” (Megawati’s speech, August 20th 2002).

“In Indonesia, now we have made progress, several steps forward from the condition of crisis in 1997/1998. The improvement of political condition and security and also macro economic are expected to give the positive impact on the economic growth in 2002.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2002).

The statements above show that five years since the crisis occurred in 1997, Indonesia has started to enter to the phase of declining of tension and crisis threats. Based on the theory, Indonesia was in the phase of resolution where there are improvements in many aspects of Indonesian life. If there are still weaknesses or even no progress as output of crisis resolution, Megawati said that it was because of many weaknesses or situation, as written below:

- (1) Limitation of human resources and minimal another resources.
- (2) New problems as impact of old problems resolution, such as threat of national disintegration, horizontal and vertical conflicts.

- (3) The difficult and systemic crisis because of the fundamental damage caused by that crisis.
- (4) Indolence in reform.
- (5) A bad plan and schedule of development.
- (6) Imbalance between the expectation and the capability to accomplish it.
- (7) The weakening of togetherness and nationalism.
- (8) Political and security instability.
- (9) Low degree of professionalism
- (10) Unprofessional and unproductive bureaucrats and public officers
- (11) Unprofessional journalists and press.
- (12) Has no newest arms
- (13) Realization of reform is not carefully measurable so that causes an excess or new problem.
- (14) National reform is done partially and one-sided.
- (15) Low in social discipline and bad attitude and mentality of the certain people.
- (16) Misunderstanding about differentiation and pluralism of Indonesia which influences the existence of social conflicts and bad social tolerance.
- (17) Group interests are more important than national interests.
- (18) Disproportional relation between center and local government, unfair power struggle, complicated services and procedures in business propose, low ethic and behavior of business.
- (19) Potential alienation between political elite and their supporters.
- (20) Arrogant, not sensitive to public voices, mindless leaders.
- (21) Unprofessional Indonesian National Police and military, both in knowledge, skill, mentality and behavior.
- (22) Not completely recovering of the banking system, slow resurgence in real sectors, deficit budget, high amount of national obligation installment, decreased investors trust.
- (23) Uncertain law, instable policy and security, and not conducive labor force and manpower policy.
- (24) Not sophisticated education system.
- (25) Improper understanding about the concept of freedom.
- (26) Using violence to solve problem.

- (27) Slandering is usual in our social and political life.
- (28) Increasing in number of corruption, collusion and nepotism action and violation of law.
- (29) Disproportional democracy euphoria (ultra democracy)
- (30) Few budget for Indonesian military.
- (31) High discrepancy between expectation and capability.
- (32) Temperamental, emotional and not patient attitude.
- (33) Bad performance of the members of legislative institutions.
- (34) Disproportional demonstration.

As stated on Megawati's speeches, there was no significant change of the crisis situation in 2002 from the situation in 2001. The weaknesses and factors inhibited the crisis resolution were quite similar. Table below shows all inhibiting factors in crisis resolution, based on her speeches in 2002.

Table 25
Triggered and inhibited factors for crisis resolution
(Megawati's speeches in 2002)

	Internal (National)	External (International)
Individual/ Actor/ Agent	Unprofessional human resources	None
	Weak nationality and unity	
	Do not have spirit of pluralism	
	Bad social discipline	
	Arrogant leadership/cannot be criticized	
	Misconception about freedom/ euphoria of democracy.	
	Anarchism	
	Slander was becoming Indonesian culture	
	Disobey the law	
	Not realistic	
	Emotional	
	Disproportional demonstration	
System/ Structure/ Institutions	National disintegration	International organized crimes
	Disproportional goal and policies making.	
	Improper planning	Imperialism
	Political and security instability	Global/ regional conflict
	One side and partial reformation efforts	
	Bad relation between center and local govern.	International terrorism
	Limited resources and financial	International violence
	Uncertain law	The inability of the world institutions to promote the truth and justice
	Dysfunction/ malfunction of economical institutions	
	Not sophisticated education system	
	Not conducive policies	
	Bad quality and performance of legislative institutions	
	Inefficient and ineffective public service procedures	

These factors, based on Megawati's speeches, are a kind of weaknesses and limitations of Indonesia in resolving crisis. This is also a picture of crisis situation in the area of social, politic, economy, ideology, culture and security and defense, which can not be solved in 2002. Compare to her speeches in 2001, the factors mentioned by Megawati are not different. There were some factors in 2001 that still existed in 2002. It can be concluded that there was no significant change in the crisis resolution and in basic influent factors. In 2002, Indonesia was still in a crisis situation, and Megawati emphasized the weaknesses of the human resources was the most important factor which contributed to the crisis and the difficulty of the crisis

resolution. Dissatisfaction of the Indonesian people to the performance of the government in the crisis resolution was not because of incapability of the government, but more on the people themselves who were not patient to see and feel the result of crisis resolution and people who were not want to understand how hard the crisis is. Based on Megawatis' speeches, many Indonesian people did not accept the fact that the crisis that happened in Indonesia was not similar to those in Asia. The crisis in Indonesia was multi dimensional, fundamental and it is an accumulation of many problems in the past.

It shows that there is no clear explanation and communication by Megawati about the crisis. In one part, she admitted that the crisis and prolonged crisis resolution was the result of the incapability of human resources, but in another part, she did not accept the people's opinion that the crisis and prolonged crisis resolution is as the result of the incapability of the government. She tended to blame the people who were not patient to wait for the crisis is resolved. She saw that some people individually and personally had attitude and behavior which were not conducive for the crisis resolution and reformation.

Based on her speeches in 2001, Megawati tended to apply apology strategy to respond public's criticism about crisis and crisis resolution, but in 2002, Megawati tended to shift the blame to the people who didn't react to the crisis and crisis resolution done by government positively. Shifting the blame to the other parts is one kind of denial strategy or dissociate from the wrong doing.

3.3.1.3. Year 2003 and 2004: The end of Megawati's Presidency

In 2003 Megawati rarely mentioned the words that related to the difficult situation as the impact of the crisis, as well as the factors which contributed to crisis. At that time, Megawati emphasized more on the crisis resolution progress and improvement made by her cabinet and government. Here are her several statements about the progress.

“Even though there are still many problems that have to be handled, and some of them are very difficult, step by step we are able to feel that in the current years our national life is becoming stable and other aspects are improving. More than that, with all weaknesses and limitations, we are able to make our national life still exists as a unitary state.” (Megawati speech's, August 1st 2003)

“In the field of economy and finance, I can say that even though in the real economy sector has not been completely recovered and the rate of unemployment keeps high, the macro economy shows that the Indonesian condition is going to be better.” (Megawati speech's, August 1st 2003).

“Actually, our efforts to resolve the crisis are not useless. Even though not all, we have improved many aspects. Economy recovery can be done successfully after the economy crisis had destroyed our banking system. The problems that exist in many areas in Indonesia, which triggered by group conflicts and almost destroy our nationhood and statehood, can be reduced. The threat of separatism in many regions, which is using labels of democracy, transparency, and human rights can be eliminated by building dialogues and using comprehensive and integrated development approach. Of course, not all can be solved, but at least direction and the forms of problem solving principally are visible...[...]. All is our reality, indeed we are in progress.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2003).

“The government keeps going to try to maintain political stability and security, which is, time to time, improved.” (Megawati’s speech, February 27th 2003).

“Inter group clash in our society or even the expectation of the people to be separated from Indonesia, recently decreased and is under controlled. (Megawati’s speech, August 8th 2003)

“We are also successful in handling monetary and economy difficulties, which in the first time they almost destroyed our national life. Furthermore, we are also successful to establish our politic, governance and security which in the past they were unsteady. Even we are getting more capable to improve our macro economy and we are strong to make progress. All is factual, they do not need to be covered.” (Megawati’s speech, October 2nd 2003).

“We are happy that the autonomy is getting stronger, real and now, it is growing.” (Megawati’s speech, September 5th 2003).

“...Our economical condition has been running again after all efforts to recover the crisis has affected in positive way. In the higher tempo and dynamic, we create a stability of social and political life, particularly after we have applied our new social institutions and after we successfully eliminated the conflicts and the threat of armed violence in the certain areas.” (Megawati’s speech, December 23rd 2003).

In 2004, almost in all her speeches Megawati mentioned the progresses and improvements made by thr government, as the result of the crisis resolution.

“No need to talk too much, it is the fact that our efforts to overcome the difficulties in economy and financial that in the past was spreading in the other areas, have given us positive result. (Megawati’s speech, January 12th 2004).

“We should not deny that our movement is also still shrouded by the weaknesses, and even shortcomings. However, with a clear mind and an open heart, let us admit that we have actually achieved a lot all this time. This is all owing to our hard work, seriousness and patience.” (Megawati’s speech, May 1st 2004)

“Now in general everything is going to be under controlled. [...] Now we see that the condition is going to be better, especially if we compare it to the last year’s condition.

Security disturbance has been reduced and fear from armed violence is getting subsided. Economic activities restore and the Indonesian governance in all levels is becoming better...[...]. The situation improvements as mentioned above are indeed possible because we take firm and clear attitude in the field of security and law enforcement, and we also took our real steps to increase the social welfare.” (Megawati’s speech, May 18th 2004).

“Even though so many crises we have faced, the unity and oneness of our nation are still remained well. Bad predictions, which wondering about disintegration, do not come true. Facing all problems, we have improved and reformed all aspects of our life.” (Megawati’s speech, May 24th 2004).

“But, in other side, we are also finding our nation is not unsteady, our unity state still exists and not to be separated. From time to time, strength to maintain and establish our unity state and national life is growing.” (Megawati’s speech, May 27th 2004).

“Our efforts are not useless. We can see its positive impacts in the last three years.” (Megawati’s speech, June 5th 2004).

“Even though it is very slow, we can see the progress. Our concern to the environment keeps going to be increasing [...] The efforts to improve social prosperity are going to be sustainable activities and needs time...[...]. We can see the result even though only in some aspects. All is well done even though not completely finish yet. No need to be arrogant, our efforts within the last tree years, can increase the degree of social prosperity. In three years, we worked so hard and little by little we were able to repair many things. Aware or not, we have done so many works and its results.” (Megawati’s speech, June 7th 2004).

“Even though sometimes we are very tired, we have really stepped over the difficult time. Our efforts to be free from many difficulties, even though not in all aspects yet, are going to be effective. Once again, even though it is not as successful as we expect, and sometimes it accumulates with the new problems, because of our hard working, the economic activities are going to work.” (Megawati’s speech, June 17th 2004).

In her state address in the Indonesian Parliament Meeting August 16th 2004, Megawati said that the crisis is over. She said that Indonesian government had successfully recovered Indonesian situation that had been destroyed by crisis. When she delivered the speech, Megawati claimed that Indonesia was in the better time and better condition.

“We all understand about the very heavy problem we have. Only by hard working, we finally resolved all the difficulties caused by monetary crisis, as well as all its impacts on our economy and social situation. In the same time, we also have a task to accomplish our reform goals in our national life. Together with all excesses which are also difficult to be resolved, all becomes uneasy works. We are the witnesses who see how difficult of the conflict and the threat of disintegration in our unity state. Only by our hard working, we can eradicate the crisis impacts. Our existence as a nation, are still remained. Our government stability, especially in the relation between center and local government, can be more established. Even though is not completed yet, we have been able to pass to the hardest part of our transitional situation that is usually existed in every reformation steps.

We do not be unsure that we all together have been able to solved an hardest part of our reformation.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2004).

The several improvements made by Megawati and her cabinets as a result of her crisis resolution efforts were also mentioned by Megawati in her dialogues with various foreign publics, both in Indonesian and overseas forum.

“Since the time of departure until today, all Indonesian situations are running well. Indonesian security can be controlled and stable. Economy activities are also running well, Indonesian currency is not fluctuate too much, the prices are not too high.” (Megawati’s statement, April 17th 2003).

[...] Especially in Indonesian situation. But, *alhamdulillah*, since we have entered to reform era until now, Indonesia is getting stable. Because in the several area in Indonesia which are in conflict in the past, now the conflicts can be reduced.” (Megawati’s statement, April 19th 2003).

“In the conflict area, it now relatively is stable. The economic growth and development are running well [...] Our national life is also getting better.” (Megawati’s statement, April 26th 2003).

“*Alhamdulillah*, that within two years everything is going to be better, security, economy and social culture.” (Megawati’s statement June 22nd 2003)

“...[...] Now, there are so many things can be solved. There are many development projects can be approved, executed and ...[...] a difficult project can be executed.” (Megawati’s statement. June 24th 2003).

However, Megawati still mentioned that the national crisis recovery, after six years the crisis was started, was a long and complicated process that needed hard working to solve. Reformation in all aspects was a main way to eradicate the impacts of crisis. This reform process, based on Megawati’s speech, needs many pre conditions. Even in some speeches, she frequently criticized Indonesian people who did not support the government in crisis resolution. She saw people tended to be apathy to the effectiveness of government’s crisis resolution efforts, by saying that the crisis resolution runs very slowly and ineffective. She saw that kind of people attitude had precisely made the ineffectiveness of government’s reform efforts. Below are some statements which contain a picture of Megawati’s responses to the people reaction.

“It is weird that for their own interests and by whatever reasons, people like to tell about the failure and the bad side of the government performance and even use it as a tool to discredit or assassinate or show the bad picture of others. This attitude, in the same time,

only gives us a bad picture of our own nation in which its people like mocking to themselves and using themselves as an object of mockery. Like or dislike, some days we will feel that blaming ourselves, showing our own failures or bad side or incapability off, keep growing as our nation attitude.” (Megawati’s statement, August 1st 2003)

“The bad attitude, as explained before, actually makes us as an object of mockery and laughing stock for others. We have to leave the bad and unbeneficial attitude out from our life. There is no part of our nation will take advantage from this attitude. Contrarily, all only makes us discouraged us. In this forum and through all the leaders and the people’s consultative assembly’s members, I ask my brothers and sisters in Indonesia, together to change that attitude. If we have any mistakes or weaknesses, let us fix it together.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2003).

[...] I think that each of us understand that for our pluralistic nation, reform activities are not a simple process and easy to be accomplished. During the fast changing of value system in our environment, and also compiled by the difficult and complicated problems caused by the past mistakes, many of us are not patient to wait for the positive effect of our own reform efforts.” (Megawati’s speech, February 9th 2003).

“There are many of us do something, based on their assumption that in the reform era everything from the past have to be changed or removed. On the other side, in this time also, there are many of us, coming from various different social backgrounds, create assumption that in the reform era or by reformation, we can do or can’t do everything as we want.” (Megawati’s speech, February 9th 2003).

“Often we hear the explanation – even though it makes boring image—that all is just excess of the transitional situation, that is usually happening in the society who is looking for the best way or suitable form in self actualizing and expressing their thought and aspiration and role in the process to enter the new institutions.” (Megawati’s speech, February 9th 2003).

“Whoever in our lovely country knows that the trip to get the direction of our reform needs long time and it is not always smooth.” (Megawati’s speech, February 9th 2003).

“Democracy euphoria that was born in the reform era has displayed so many politicians who do not only less understand about the complexity our nation, but also do not know better yet about the ethic of politic.” (Megawati’s speech, May 20th 2003).

“It is indeed impolite and also exceptional not beneficial, in the time we need good spirit and support the contradictive attitude and activities take place. We have already known that in our community developing attitude and behavior that tends to mock and blame ourselves, always asses everything we have done by negative view and sometimes laugh ourselves. That kind of attitude and behavior are displayed or followed by various mass media. It is actually not only different from reality, but it also scrapes the spirit and national proud which we need. (Megawati’s speech, October 2nd ’03)

Based on the several statements above, Indonesian people who gave critics about the low performance of the government in crisis resolution were accepted by Megawati as people who

like mocking their own country. For Megawati, this attitude is not good and need to be revised because it is definitely not conducive for reform efforts and crisis resolution. In the end of 2002, Megawati already mentioned it, but in the last two years, 2003 and 2004, the similar statement had stated repeatedly. It shows that Megawati was very disappointed to the people reaction or response which did not appreciate and respect to the government's efforts to eradicate the impact of crisis. Moreover, in 2004 she preferred not to mention too many about crisis. She did not often criticize herself or her cabinet, as she did in 2001 and 2002. For Megawati, 2004 was the era of her to proclaim the successful stories of her cabinet, progresses and positive impacts in crisis resolution and reformation. In this time also, she talked more about the general election that would be performed in 2005, which used a new methods of election as written on the constitution amendment. Beside general election, Megawati emphasized her speeches more on the national disintegration problems as an effect of the various inter ethnic conflict or conflict among the members of different religious community, included the conflict as an effect of the national and international terrorism issues.

However, Megawati said that if the problem or difficulty which is still remained, it is only because of the excess of every policy, procedure and new action made for resolving the crisis, and not because of weaknesses or failure of the government. In the end of her presidency, Megawati still saw that the criticism about government who failed in crisis resolution as a discouraged form which was expressed by people to discredit the government, even to their country. Megawati also expressed her disappointment to this kind of criticism in her several speeches, as following statements.

“Whatever the result or the meaning of the government's efforts to resolve the crisis, as usually mentioned by observers, we have made many meaningful improvements and chance to progress...[...] We have to see all of this by honesty. Only by the simplest logic, it is so weird if people say that our efforts are useless for reducing the number of unemployed people. It precisely is illogical, if day by day we accept comments or opinions about the high rate of the unemployment.” (Megawati's speech, January 12th 2004).

“While we criticize so many weaknesses and flaws, I hope my brothers and sisters always remember about our success and other positive things, whatever its degree, the progress must exists in every aspects. I think it is not exaggerated if I remind you that for all members of this society, even for the members of the society who involve in the difficult situation, hopes or opportunities can determine their future. Dosage of critics, in the normal situation, can be a panacea, but sometimes it causes destruction in a very sensitive situation.” (Megawati's speech, February 10th 2004).

“We should not deny that our movement is also still shrouded by weaknesses, and even shortcomings. However, with a clear mind and an open heart, let us admit that we have actually achieved a lot this time. This is all owing to our hard work, seriousness and patience. Don’t forget this achievement. Do not let a momentary interest or any short-term political interest disturb us and then we close our eyes and heart and deny, defame, or cover up the results and progress that we have achieved. Do not make it as a temporary campaign.” (Megawati’s speech, May 1st 2004).

“I want to say that we need to be honest and balanced in assessing our progress and viewing the problems. This problem is very important in order to view everything we have done not only in the negative aspect but also in the positive way. Conveying problems inaccurately is absolutely indicating an inequitable attitude.” (Megawati’s speech, June 5, 2004)

“I believe we see and feel the results and positive improvements. It is because of our hard working. The government is only a part of a long chain of distribution in order to eradicate poverty and unemployment [...]. Therefore, it is illogical if any one of us, for our own interests, said that the poverty and unemployment in Indonesia are increasing. It is as illogical as the promising statement that the poverty and unemployment can be eliminated in a short time. Beside not realistic, it is also a misleading statement.” (Megawati’s statement, June 7th 2004).

“As I feel, I believe that you know more and feel how hard the criticism about the performance of Indonesian attorney in general. Often, this criticism is not only too hard, but also precisely makes people feel discourage. [...] Even though, in fact, your performance is not too bad.” (Megawati’s speech, July 22nd 2004).

Megawati also said that many of the critics were not accurate, subjective, imbalance and tended to emphasize only on the negative side and ignored the positive side. She also said that people or publics did not have good capacity to help government, nation and Indonesia in crisis resolution and reformation. Often she attacked publics by her statement that they were improper to criticize her and government because of their own weaknesses.

“We have to look at all things here with honesty. Only by the simplest logic, it is very ridiculous if people say there is nothing, as a working result, which can be contributed to eliminate the number of unemployed people. It is illogical, if day by day we have to see some comments or opinion about the huge number of unemployed people.” (Megawati’s speech, January 12th 2004).

“Especially I appeal for all national journalists to be willing to intensify education function of the press, as well as information and entertainment function.” (Megawati’s speech, February 10th 2004)

“[...] Short cut in the level of political infrastructure can be a form of riot, mass violence action, “revolution” even, anarchism which can not be controlled. Frequently we hear that the kinds of short cut are claimed as “reformation” or even, democracy. This claim is wrong or can be said, extremely it is not true.” (Megawati’s speech, February 11th 2004).

“No need to say again, the same as the many number of criticisms to executive, a huge numbers of criticism is also addressed to the legislative, both in the local and national level. As the side effect of the reformation or realization of the concept of National Reform Movement, so many people accept the concept of local autonomy as a concept about a freedom for a certain region to do everything for their own interest. This kind of concept is absolutely not right.” (Megawati’s speech, February 11th 2004).

“No one should not think and behave that autonomy means small states in one big state which can do everything as they want. Many times I have received reports about the local governments in *kabupaten* or *\kotamadia* which ignore the direction and instruction from their governors, by any reasons.” (Megawati’s speech, February 11th 2004).

“It becomes a public knowledge that we do not have good discipline in implementing urban plan which we have already planned. Not only because of the changes of space function, but also because of the changing process is done without legal procedures, as written on the urban plan regulation.” (Megawati’s speech, March 8th 2004).

“Therefore, when many of us have been easy talking about the low cost education, or even free of charge, we know the kinds of statements are not only contradicted with the fact, but it also mislead.” (Megawati’s speech, May 5th 2004).

“[...] Religion education has created fanatic people – even though not all— which tended to see a certain religion is the best and look at the other religion in contrast. This attitude creates a hostility behavior to the other religion communities. We also witness the birth of people who, in the following time, always see their own religion is the best, and show the very sensitive attitude and aggressive. And then, militancy, the next behavior, usually emphasizes on the concept that everything which is different has to be pushed away, or if it is necessary has to be destroyed, and it becomes honorable task.” (Megawati’s speech, May 17th 2004).

“Now, we know better our faults are more on the method to handle the pluralism. So far, we have handled this pluralism by ignoring the nature and meaning of that pluralism itself. It should be handled by accommodating and managing pluralism, by decentralizing, not centralizing.” (Megawati’s speech, May 24th 2004).

Table 26 below describes the critics of Megawati to the Indonesian people who have judged her and her cabinet in the crisis resolution and reformation. In general, based on her speeches, the critics to the government and her are not positive attitude and just a character assassination, which are done by people who do not have sufficient knowledge and capability.

Table 26
The Negative Reaction of the Indonesian People
(Based on Megawati's speeches in 2003-2004)

Statement	Date
Impatient, not understanding people about crisis	February 9' 03
Improper understanding about reformation. Reformation means: (1) "freedom to decide what have to do or not to do, and say or not to say"; (2) "anarchism, mass violence, riot"	February 9' 03 February 11' 04
Our politicians have no enough knowledge about the complexity of the Indonesia and political ethics.	May 20' 03
Give inaccurate, subjective and imbalance information	June 5'03
Give unrealistic and false information	June 7'03, May 5'04
Give disproportional and illogical criticism	July 22'03, Jan 12'04,
Define autonomy as freedom for the local government to decide everything by and for themselves	February 11'04

Based on her statements, it is clear that Megawati saw Indonesian people or public were not critical or did not have good critical thinking. They tended to criticize Megawati and her cabinet's performance in illogical, emotional and subjective ways. People also did not have proper understanding about some concepts, such as democracy, reformation, autonomy, politic ethics, and freedom. People also did not have good social discipline, low commitment to the regulations, even to the regulation made by them. The incapability of the people, based on Megawati's point of view, is the main contributing factor to the crisis and crisis resolution. In 2004, she looked at the weaknesses of people or individual are the cause of crisis than those of the government. The mentality, character and personality, rationality and morality are the several individual factors which inhibit the crisis resolution. Therefore, the main source of crisis came from the Indonesian people themselves. The act of collusion, nepotism and corruption are the biggest contributor of the crisis development. It means that the source of crisis and prolonged crisis resolution is in the individual/actor/ agent level, not in the system or structural level. Thus, crisis, then, was resolved by improving the individual capability, not the structure or system. It is firmed by another statements of Megawati that there are many progresses in the level of structure or system.

In general, referring to her speeches, Megawati mentioned clearly about crisis as the hardest problem of Indonesia to be solved only in the first two years (2001-2002). In this time, Megawati admitted that the crisis was not only caused by the bigger problem, international problem, but also caused by the weaknesses and the failure of the government and its institutions. Inaccuracy and improperness of the rules, regulations and policies, both in the past

or current times are the factors of the failure. By another words, Megawati claimed that the untidiness of infra and supra structure of the state and nation is the source of crisis. Therefore, to solve the crisis and restore the Indonesian conditions, we have to reform all aspects in the structure level. However, she did not ignore the incapability of the individual was also the inhibiting factor in crisis and crisis resolution.

Different from her speeches during the first two years of her presidency, in the last two years (2003-2004) Megawati saw that the ongoing crisis and the difficult crisis resolution in Indonesia, was caused more by the mentality and professionalism of the Indonesian people. The critics about the slowness of the government in crisis resolution were responded by Megawati, by placing the people as the most responsible part of the crisis. Impatience, subjectivity, inaccuracy, and one sidedness of the people in assessing the government's performance in the crisis resolution are the main cause of the government and all its institutions failure in resolving the crisis quickly. Therefore, the best way to solve the crisis, eliminate its impact and repair the conditions is by improving the mentality of these people. Until the end of her presidency, Megawati still saw that the critics are ridicules as they exacerbate the crisis resolution, and also deteriorated the reputation and image of the nation and state in international publics. In contrast, in the other parts, in the same time, Megawati emphasized more on the progresses and improvements in the level of system or structure made by governments and its institutions.

It can be concluded that the response by Megawati to the crisis in the first two years differs from those in the last two years. The responses of Megawati to the crisis in the early time of her presidency can be called as accommodative strategy, however, in the last two years, the strategy of crisis response used by Megawati was dissociation or denial or avoiding strategy. It means that Megawati used two kinds of strategies of crisis response, within four years; (1) accommodative strategy; and (2) dissociation strategy.

3.3.2. Megawati and Crisis: Media Portrayal

Referring to the theoretical framework mentioned on Chapter II, I would say that the crisis response strategy applied by someone or an organization is influenced by some factors; (1) the crisis situation itself; (2) the relation between someone or organization and its publics/constituents, such as media persons, and (3) social/political environment in time of crisis. Applying this hypothesis, I think that Megawati's responses to the crisis as explained before are

not free from the other factors. So, it is important to know how the situation of the factors above.

3.3.2.1. The Transition Time: 2001

How the social and political situation in Indonesia during the crisis, especially in Megawati's presidency (2001-2004)? The situation in the early of Megawati's administration was still colored by the prior situation; the situation produced by KH Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur); the situation which might be the product of interaction between procedures, policies and actions of the Gus Dur and his cabinet. Megawati, the next president after Gus Dur, could not ignore this situation, like or dislike had to face and take it as the consequences from the previous president. How did the situation in the end of Gus Dur presidency affect the situation during Megawati's presidency?

Two thousand and one was a transition year for Megawati. She lived with the situation inherited from Gus Dur's administration time. That time was very messy according to the media's point of view, as the following newspaper quotations below:

"If the students now say that Indonesian reform has failed, it must be asked to the President Abdurrahman Wahid [...]. The faults of the three presidents are getting hard because they precisely are holding the highest power. They hold mandate of people to be the leaders. But, surprisingly, in their hands, reform is dying to soon. Amien Rais, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri are enjoying their own games. They fight, not in the context of reformation, but power struggle [...]. Based on our history, we can see that the Indonesian people have bad character and mentality when they are offered the power." (Media Indonesia, January 25th 2001).

"The skilled military have been asked not to do anything during the mass riot, but, the police who do not train to handle riot and guerrilla – as happened in Aceh—must fight in front line. *Ya..amburadul...* The military are tempted to be back in practical politics area by weak, frustrated and greedy civilians." (Media Indonesia, March 8th 2001).

"Uncontrolled anarchism is rising because of grudge. We revenge when we are looking at military, military bear a grudge to the situation. Because of it, the confusion which happens in front of us can't be handled by the professional military. It is also only because they are afraid to violate human rights. It means, in one aspect, an ethical reason, but in other aspect, it is the death of morality." (Media Indonesia, March 8th 2001).

"Indonesia. It is the crucial name which is not cohesive anymore. The name which is not attractive and cohesive. [...] Land and water, from *Sabang* to *Merauke* which belong to us is separated in many pieces [...]. *Dayak* people chase away *Madura* people..in Aceh, Javanese people are raid, we chase away and are chased away from our own country. It is very awful. In a very big country and rich there are so many problems. All resources have lost... In time of the collapse of Indonesian symbols, we take our hopes only on the

leaders. But what happen? Surprisingly, Gus Dur disseminated the threat of disintegration...Gus Dur, aware or not, reduced his authority only in the area of East Java." (Media Indonesia, April 18th 2001).

"Now we begin to feel the democracy is being dominated by mass mobilization...we have to admit that the politic of mass mobilization still dominate our democracy. The truth tends to be measured only by the number of mass supporter, not by the quality of argumentation." (Media Indonesia, January 29th 2001).

"We witness the extreme political process. In a society, democracy is understood as anarchism. In the elite level, democracy is running to be dictators, who are becoming to be constitution and symbolizing their activities for nation and country." (Media Indonesia, May 31st 2001).

"But in time of transition, when we hold democracy as a way to develop our nation, the violence grows. Violence becomes a new identity of this nation. Violence does not belong especially to the security apparatus but to all people. Honestly, demonstration in this country and anarchism is identical. It is identical with the traffic disorder, public facilities damage and environment damage. Our demonstration is the representation of the way of thinking of the society who are dull in expressing their demands. So, it always ended by mass riot." (Media Indonesia, June 20th 2001).

All quotations above are expressed by mass media they give picture of Indonesian social and political situation in the end of Gus Dur's administration. By KOMPAS, 2000 it is called as the most insecure year for Indonesia. Until the end of 2000, 'storm' never ended. It was indicated by the various internal problems, such as conflict, mass riot and violence in our everyday life. Kompas, based on its polling, mentions that society tended to be pessimistic about 2001. For them, the following year was not promising time. It was the time which was full of the uncertainty. Pessimistic attitude was growing in the area of politic and economy. In the area of politic, pessimistic was growing because of the potential vertical and horizontal conflicts and structural and physical violence. Meanwhile, in the area of economy, pessimistic was caused by the improper and unsuitable resource management and the social and political stability which were not supporting for economic growth. In general, KOMPAS claimed that in 2001, the image and reputation of Indonesia in international publics were very awful.

In 2001, Gus Dur was in the difficult situation in which his power as president was in the edge. As explained before, he was suspected as the actor of the corruption in connection to the financial support from Sultan Brunei and BULOG budget. Based on this, Gus Dur was pressured by people to resign from his position. But on the other hand, Gus Dur said this pressure was not right to be directed to him. By mass mobilizing, Gus Dur tried to remain his position. The statements and actions of Gus Dur were understood by people as absolutely not

conducive for the nation in time of crisis resolution. The bad image of Gus Dur that was constructed during his presidency was another additional factor for this demand, even though, in the early of his presidency, his image was quite good for publics.

Below are the citations that describe the image of Gus Dur in the early and end of his presidency, based on mass media's point of view.

"...President Abdurrahman Wahid has shown the big steps of the statesman. The big steps are the capability of the president to differentiate between state issues, political issues and personal issues. Politics in one side, personal in other side." (Media Indonesia, March 6th 2000).

"...the humanity spirit is doing human reconciliation through the peaceful way. Visitation and friendship are two of that ways. The steps that look so simple and small. But, it is the big step, because it deconstructs the value system of old authority and creates new face of authority.[...] Gus Dur has answered many questions by talking, speaking...so far, only Gus Dur used this kind of way, solve the problem by developing discourse. He really has big modal to do it because he is free from primordial boundaries, partial and parochial small room." (Media Indonesia, March 22nd 2000).

"...Giving opinion, in the era of democracy, takes an honorable place and is a special honor. But, disseminate opinion to the publics and then make publics panic and confused, and then decide not to talk, are the bad behaviors which destroy the public etiquette [...] It is...from the President...uncontrolled talking." (Media Indonesia, May 22nd 2000)

"...Gus, in the past you criticized the New Orde because New Orde has been developing irrationality to keep the power. Now, you, yourself, intensively developing that kind of irrationality. In the time of New Orde, through the military, HM Soeharto made the power as a monster, but now, you, Gus, create the same thing by your followers." (Media Indonesia, April 20th 2000).

"Because of inconsiderateness, in the hand of the President Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia becomes a vehicle which runs recklessly [...] Beside inconsiderateness, Abdurrahman was also always talking too much and his legs can't be stop walking to overseas [...] The president who is an idol for any Indonesia people, actually, is not serious to eradicate the corruption." (Media Indonesia, November 12th 2000).

"...People have a long list, that Wahid as the President is more enjoying with his own interests and his stubborn, than concerning to the nation and state's goals. [...] A new dictator was born." (Media Indonesia, July 23rd 2001).

Mass media clearly shows us the image of Gus Dur. In the early of his presidency, the image of Gus Dur was constructed by media was so positive. Media hoped he would improve Indonesia. But, in the end of his Presidency (2000) Gus Dur's images was very negative, at least, constructed by Media Indonesia, Indonesian big national daily newspaper. The image of

his cabinet and his governance and the image of Gus Dur were identical. In the same time, time of crisis, 2000, Kompas, another national newspaper criticized the government and the government administration of Gus Dur, as below.

“...Because our problems are urgent and too many, people are getting not patient. People start to quest, the government is able or not to perform the government’s administration. Why do many problems keep unsolved? The perception that the government does not command or the government is making more statements than decisions, has given the disappointed impact and frustration.” (Kompas, February 16th 2000).

“...People begin to ask and make fun the government, by saying that the (Indonesian-add by writer) government is the government who always say ‘We will.’” (Kompas, February 16th 2000).

“Referring to the some cases, the issue about at least the senior state officials, even the President, like to directly intervene is developing. The government’ habit which must be criticized in the old regime.” (Kompas, November 4th 2000).

“The image of the government, now, is not only questioned in terms of the effectiveness and the coordination, but also the transparency, tidiness and free from collusions.” (Kompas, November 4th 2000).

“Nation can be changed inconsiderately for pragmatic interests. [...] Government is performing the administration based on impulses and obsessions or order by plan, program with anticipative attitude? The anxiety and questions are existed every time. The several important steps are taken, including replacement of the ministers and officials, often these make questions: the steps are impulsive and emotional or are considered carefully, including anticipation of the impacts, influences and effects.” (Kompas, November 22nd 2000).

“The one function of the government is giving the certainty. It is not given yet by the government. Even, the government’s effort itself gives contribution to the uncertainty.” (Media Indonesia , November 22nd 2000).

“In managing the problems, government creates the image that they are not professional who can show us their competency...the weakness is very fundamental, that is the weakness of the credibility and the government’s wisdom.” (Kompas, November 22nd 2000).

“The one of our awful disappointments is that our honored people and leaders as the people who have high humanity are actually showing the character of revenge, people who bear a grudge.” (Kompas, February 17th 2001).

“Economy crisis is not eliminated, but precisely is getting worse. [...] After one and an half years, where is the improvement of national, people and country life? Based on our views, based on our empirical experience, by polling, by voluntarily assessments of Indonesian and International people, it can be concluded that the condition is not

improving, but getting worse [...] Government makes us to make impression that they are more interesting to themselves, and even, finally, develop the impression that government is more concerning to their own interest than Indonesian people interests.” (Kompas, April 4th 2001).

“...Gus Dur creates the new method of communication, small talks [...] But so far, the effectiveness of this small talk is not accomplished yet. What more frequently happen is controversial effect and inconsistency.” (Kompas, April 4th 2001).

“Recently, when the conflict and political contestation in the level of political elites are growing, some people are asking: how does the effectiveness of the government and its administration?” (Kompas, April 4th 2001).

“Who can say that the security and national interests develop well during the last two years? It is not getting better but worse.” (Kompas, May 18th 2001).

“It can’t be justified, if the leaders are mobilizing the mass to keep the power remains. That way is not equitable for the spirit of democratic and constitutional process because there are so many possibilities and tension.” (Kompas, May 18th 2001).

“Moreover, this bad condition might be influenced by the approach, that is, the approach and political spirit of power sharing.” (Kompas, June 28th 2001).

Referring to the editorial of Kompas during 2000 and the first half semester of 2001, the Indonesian government and its administration the crisis has not been successful yet in crisis resolution and reformation. Kompas and Media Indonesia saw that the performance of Gus Dur and his cabinet are not good. It was the main reason why people suspected Gus Dur was doing corruption, in relation to the cases of *Bruneigate* and *Buloggate*. The image that Gus Dur divested money finally made him getting impeachment from the Parliament. Table 27 describes the image of Gus Dur and his administration during his presidency, the image constructed by two Indonesian National Newspapers (Kompas and Media Indonesia).

Table 27
President Gus Dur and his cabinet's image

The President	The Cabinet of Gus Dur
• Said anything that comes to his head	• Made public were disappointed and frustrated
• Destroyed public ethic	• Do improperly political practice
• Cultivated irrational for getting power	• Made more statements than decisions and policies.
• Talked inconsiderately, talked too much	• Dysfunctional
• Hard headed, stubborn	• Inefficient and uncoordinated
• New dictator	• Selfish
• Made more controversy and inconsistency than communicated effectively	• Just said "We will" but not followed by action
	• Mobilized people for getting power
	• Doubt about the government's integrity, purity – not free from collusion
	• Impulsive, obsessive and emotional
	• Failed to build national security
	• Failed to make the certainty
	• Unprofessional problem solving
	• Bad credibility

(Source: Kompas, 2001).

Under the same situation Megawati was the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Megawati, like or dislike, was inaugurated by the leader of this Republic, was hanged over by the image of the prior president and the situation was resulted by him. She had to take over Gus Dur's procedures, policies and actions and all its impacts. In the end of the first six months of her presidency, the above situation did not change. As a result, Megawati had to face the accumulation of the past situation and the new situation, with the following problems. Quotations below are the representation of the social and political situation, within the early of Megawati's presidency, based on 'Media Indonesia'.

"So, it is so strange if suddenly in the fourth step, Indonesian Parliament is ignoring the policies which have been agreed in the prior three steps of the discussion. The things make us laughing to the Parliament, because the mechanism made by them was violated by themselves. The things that make us to be distrustful is that there is a hidden powerfully interest which has effect on the existing of the compromise in the end of process...It is an evidence that the Parliament becomes a source of problem, not a source of solution." (Media Indonesia, October 25th 2001).

"...For four years we have been destroyed the authority and destiny of the people who have nationhood and statehood. As a society, we are a group of a wild people. As nation, we are a weak entity, and as a state, we have lost power [...]. The incompetent government will only speed up of this nation and the state enters to the bankruptcy." (Media Indonesia, December 14th 2001).

“Politics can mean anything. Politics is untruth. Politic tended to say something not clear. It is ironic, related to the spirit of reformation and democratization that the transparency, open dialogue is very important. In Indonesia, World Trade Center and Pentagon tragedies have made many reactions. There is coming from Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI/ *The Committee of Indonesian Islamic Scholars - writer*). There is demonstration from any various groups in front of the office of American Embassy in Jakarta [...]. One of the visible political faces is something called as jolting. [...] It is indeed awful. It is a kind of political compromising as an impact of the unawareness of safety importance. Our politicians have bad commitment. Only in one month of their authority, they have been jolted.” (Media Indonesia, September 30th 2001).

“Poso is outburst when the freedom comes, freedom which destroys the symbols of appropriateness of law, the freedom which is not followed by the strong government administration. This kind of freedom causes the existence of new dictators that bring the symbols of justice, religiousness, and primordialism, in the situation when law is disobeyed. Political intervention, internally and externally, causes the religion transformed to be sect or sectarianism. [...] The brutality, for any certain group’ interests, which happens in this country is caused by a fundamental fault: there is no supremacy of the law.” (Media Indonesia, December 21st 2001).

“Mega (*wati – writer*) keeps using the old methods, by signing epigraphy and the number of symbolic certainties, together with continuously shows the power of feudalism. It is proved by her impatience as a good listener. One interruption from a student has destroyed the hopes of many people to establish the dialogues with Megawati.” (Media Indonesia, September 9th 2001).

However, Megawati could not ignore the problems from the past. In time of her presidency, especially in the early of that time, was the transition era. The time, like or dislike, may contain an accumulation of the old and new problems. People who were represented by press did not create a good impression about Megawati. However, in a few editorials, Media Indonesia and Kompas wrote positive statements about her. At least, there were still positive wishes of mass media about the current President.

“There is a new awareness growing in the level of the government elites. The awareness that we have a debt from other countries is not a safe way. In contrast, it is a dangerous way for this country.” (Media Indonesia, August 29th 2001).

“At least, that is Megawati’s hopes. She believes that in the future, the institution, so far we know as “playing park” of the attorneys, can be changed into the good way. The attorney institution will be able to be the pioneer of law enforcement. [...] This president’s belief - in the very skeptic society – must be a good momentum to reach back all authorities and honor of the counsel of attorney general which has been so long decreasing. The counsel has to be able to find these missing things: law and justice.” (Media Indonesia, September 4th 2001).

“The President’s speech was positive in style, method and content. Many times audience gave applause. [...] The content was good because by her explanation about the main elements, it can show us the vision and the basic attitude of the President, which is actually good and so much different from the people thought about her. [...] The President showed she was not the same as people thought. She was the person who was not low intelligent and low competent. Even, she showed her wisdom [...] That is important for a leader to perform her administration recently; wisdom. A good start can be continued if the President and her cabinet keeps going to be open for criticism and correction.” (Kompas, August 18th 2001).

“President said: *“By a very deep concern, by unpretentiousness, and by honesty, I must admit that there is no good news.”* The situation does not improve yet and in some aspects, still remain or even are getting worse. [...] We appreciate with her honesty, concern and modesty. These are the valuable and important social modal to implement the three of the government’s priorities. But, the President, government and all of us have to work continuously; can be ended in every time. It is always sustainable. There are policies, concrete program, persistent direction and consistent and persistent implementation.” (Kompas, November 3rd 2001).

At least, Indonesian mass media still have positive assessment about Megawati, even though it is followed by hopes for the improvement in the future. Their assessments must be influenced by her successful facts, although not too many. In the early of her presidency, mass media saw Megawati had the competency to create a positive future of Indonesia. The structure of a good cabinet, improvement of the economy situation and political condition are the two good progresses made by Megawati, which are written by mass media. Unfortunately, in the following months of her presidency, Megawati could not be seen as well as in the early time. From time to time, media saw Megawati gave bad impression, at least for mass media. Her image, day by day, was getting worse for some people, including Indonesian journalists. However, for some other peoples, Megawati was still the president with all her competencies and capabilities.

As explained before, in the early of her presidency the image of Megawati was constructed positively by people. However, the prior presidents had also the kind of positive image. It is usual phenomenon that a president, in the early of their presidency, is constructed in a positive way by people. It is because in the early time, generally people see the presidents with all positive hopes. Table 28 shows the reputation of the three Presidents, based on their credibility during the first nine months of their administration.

Table 28
Presidents' credibility within the first 9 months of their Presidency

	Gus Dur	Megawati	SBY
Economy	52%	58%	77.5%
Social Prosperity	54.2%	63.10%	78.6%
Politic and Security	52.6%	60.2%	81.9%
Law	54,7%	55.7%	82.3%

(Source: SKH Kompas, Monday 25th July 2005)⁴⁰

The table above displays that the decreasing of their image on publics was experienced by all presidents. The credibility of Megawati in the first nine months of her presidency was better than those of KH Abdurrahman Wahid. It means that the reputation of Megawati on publics was positive for the half of the respondents, especially in the three aspects: economy, social prosperity, politic and security, law. The respondents saw that Megawati have made positive changes in the three aspects. However, this number of respondents who gave positive image for Megawati in the first nine months was decreasing from those in the first three months and six months. Of course, it is not only Megawati's experience. Gus Dur and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the next presidents, had the same experience.⁴¹

In addition, the reputation and credibility of the presidents is always following the certain political and social situation. For media, the image of Gus Dur and the political and social situation was very identical, especially in the end of his administration and in the early of Megawati's administration. Mass media, at that time, wrote that the situations under the two presidents were not quite positive. It happened, perhaps because of the two presidents held the power in the same situation of time, that is, the time of transition, the time of crisis which was full of uncertainty and unexpected changing, the time when the uncertainty and instability have been transforming into the reversed situation. Table 29 describes the social and political

⁴⁰ Table 29 was constructed, refers to the public polling was performed by research and development team of KOMPAS on 16-17 July 2005. This data were gathered by telephone to 1650 respondents in the age min.17 years old, by systematical method, quoted from current phone book. Respondent were living in 32 capital cities in Indonesia. The number of respondent was determined by proportionally sampling, The precision of estimation is 95%, sampling error is +/- 2.4%.

⁴¹ At the first state address of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in the first ten months of his presidency, he said that there were many progresses made by him and his cabinet. Contrarily, publics said in reverse. By research performed by Media Indonesia, in the economy aspect, people assessed that there is no significant progress, especially in the field of goods prices and man power, even though in another aspects, law enforcing, security and social prosperity, people have the same assessment with those of the president (Media Indonesia, 22nd 2005).

situation of Megawati -- compares to those of Gus Dur -- which is written on the News Editorials of Kompas and Media Indonesia, two national newspapers.

Table 29
Indonesian Political Situations
(Based on Kompas)

Gus Dur (2000-2001)	Megawati (2001-2002)
Government failed to reform	People were wild, entity was weak, government was powerless
Government fought for power, not for reformation	Parliament was a source of problem, not center of problem solution
Military was not professional	Politic was full of mistakes
Military was easy to be intervened by publics	Politicians were not committed
President disseminated threat of disintegration	There was no supremacy of law
Democracy meant politic of 'mass fighting'	President was not sensitive to the public voices
Democracy meant fighting by violence	President was feudalistic
Demonstration means anarchism	

(Source: Kompas and Media Indonesia 2001-2002)

Based on the comparison, it can be said that there is no significant improvement of the social and political situation made by Gus Dur and Megawati. What occurred in the time of Gus Dur, was still ongoing in the time of Megawati. In the two periods of time, we can see that the government, assessed by media, failed to reform, to eliminate the impacts of crisis and to improve the social and political situation. However, mass media saw that the failure was not only because of the incompetence and incapability of the presidents and the cabinets, but also because of the weaknesses of the people and another governmental institutions.

3.3.2.2. Period of 2002-2004

Is there any improvement for Megawati's image on public in the ongoing time of her presidency? The hottest issue in 2002 was the Bali bombing that happened on October 12th 2002, one year after WTC bombing in New York happened on September 11th 2001. The second event substantially has no relation directly to the Indonesia, but, in fact, the situation as an impact of this event was spreading to Indonesia. The efforts of United States (US) to against terrorism by attacking Afghanistan, the country thought as the hiding place of Osama bin Laden, was interpreted by some parts of Indonesian people as one of US's efforts against Islam. The kind of interpretation of the WTC bombing triggered the unexpected issues, such as inter-

religion conflict oriented – issues, made the situation in Indonesia was not conducive for crisis resolution and reformation. This situation was exacerbated by Bali bombing one year later. It made people focused their attention more on the attitude and action of Megawati in reaction to the crucial events. Inter-religion relation is the one of sensitive issues for Indonesia because of its pluralism. So, the two events are understood as a kind of terrorism, were very important works for Megawati to be handled in the early of her administration, together with her main task, solve the crisis and reform the nation. Terrorism, therefore, can be said not only as the one of triggered factors of the crisis, but also, the one of inhibiting factors of crisis resolution and reformation. How Megawati and his cabinet handled the terrorism as a part of the government's efforts in crisis resolution was being the one part of people assessment of the government's performance.

One hundred days of her administration, the performance of Megawati and her cabinet became a focus of the people assessment. Based on the performance, publics saw that Megawati, in the following years, did not make good progress. Her image, as constructed by mass media, was getting worse, and kept declining. Here are the media assessment of Megawati's capability after 100 days she held the power.

“Not good, is different from the performance in the first month. President is assessed as not active leader in performing the administration and the leadership in crisis resolution. People said that the President was silent. President made people impressed that she was passive.” (Kompas, November 20th 2001).

“One hundred days are too short to make assessment of the government's performance. But, one hundred days is not a short time to create impression or image on publics about the performance's government and her cabinet. Honestly, it is not our expectation. The policies are not visible, even for the people. People did not see that there was coordination. People said, government's coordination was implemented only in the form of meeting, discussion, and brainstorming. Not yet visible the performance and actively, comprehensively, coordinated responses and get things done, are really implemented.” (Kompas, November 27th 2001).

The negative assessment from the people to the Megawati and her cabinet's performance still happened in the following time of her presidency. The policies, decisions and actions by Megawati were often called as useless rumor, just promises and rhetoric. It was not easy to avoid that media often was doubtful about the president's statements about the policies or actions that would be done.

“Not many people trust about the statements of the President in the end year address that Megawati Soekarnoputri will proclaim to eradicate corruption, collusion and

nepotism (KKN-ind) [...]. The skeptical attitude is based on the fact that the practices of KKN are not eliminated, but in contrast, it is getting worse.” (Kompas, January 9th 2002).

“The performance of Megawati and her administration has not been satisfied yet. For the economy area, 75.7 per cent of the respondents was not satisfied. For the social prosperity, 68.5 per cent said not satisfied, politic and security 54.1 per cent was not satisfied also. Most of us also had the same impression. Publics were waiting for and not satisfied. The right policies and actions were not implemented yet. There is tendency, is the incompetence of current problems, was contrast to the fact that the government was busy preparing money politics for the next general election 2004. It is the transition to the wrong direction.” (Kompas, January 29th 2002).

“Just for instance, Megawati who has hold the power just for one year, the one of her functions as president is economy recovery, especially for eliminating the actions of corruption. But what does happen? When she accomplishes the function, there are many cases of corruption, collusion and nepotism that are not yet resolved. The public trust was declined. The quality of her leadership was decreased. Nurcholis Madjid sees Megawati is not communicative, the head of Indonesian Representative People Assembly gives her score 5.95.” (Kompas, July 26th 2002).

“It is really the politics. It is usual if there is any factor and other consideration, these are political factor and politics. For many times, including us, media have given opinion and reminded the government about their weaknesses, weak in their figure, intelligence, and the art of leadership. Related to this, for example, the persuasion of the president to get used to working hard and living modestly, at least creates any question, is Megawati serious with this persuasion, is this persuasion credible? So far, the willingness and its spirit are not shown by the government’s behavior itself. In contrast, people see the government behaves in the reverse side.” (Kompas, January 14th 2003).

“Even though the improvements are displayed, including the increasing of the number of conflicts resolutions in the several areas, but, in general, the national life is unstable yet.” (Kompas, January 14th 2003).

“If during five years the people’s disappointment has not reduced, but increased [...]...has not been out from the economy, social, security and public order yet [...] Except for the economy aspect, people concern deeply on the law enforcement, prevention and actions against corruption, collusion and nepotism. The complain is connecting to public order and security, which is relating to the daily activities of people and the protection and safety guarantee for investors...This dissatisfaction is not only in the area of government’s administration and the ministers performing but also in the area of the leadership.” (Kompas, May 20th 2003).

“The Republic of Indonesia looks like being stagnant in the latest year. Even in the area of security, we must admit that our condition gets worse. If it is not, how dare of the terrorists exploded bombs in Bali, in JW Marriot and the other places in the same year? ...The first step of the government which was informed the day after the bombing could be seen more as a warning to the potential bombing target, than as a warning for the potential actor of the next planned bombing.” (Kompas, August 16th 2003).

“Even though we have been living in the era of reformation and democratization, the President Megawati and her administration (including police, military and attorney) are not able to eradicate all corruptions. Neither nor the General Attorney and the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.” (Kompas, October 4th 2003).

“The change of the President and administration always bring about the opportunity for us to reach the expectation better...However, we know that the expectation is still as an expectation. We always failed to implement the expectation to be the facts which give us prosperity. There are many improvements but that is not enough for this nation to come out from crisis.” (Kompas, September 22nd 2003).

The media statements about Megawati and her cabinet as written above show that the image of the President and her administration is not quite positive. There are some positive statements, particularly about the progresses made by Megawati in crisis resolution and reformation in the area economy. The positive statements about economy are mentioned by media particularly in the early of her administration. However, the progress in economy is not enough for Indonesia to come out from crisis. It needs improvement in all aspect and all dimensions because crisis in Indonesia is multidimensional crisis. Unfortunately, media did not write about the progress the rest areas. It is different from Megawati's statements. In her state address, she said that Indonesia was successful in eradicating the crisis and restoring the image of the nation. There are contradicted assessments between government and media when talking about crisis and crisis resolution. Table 30 shows the comparison of Megawati statements about her performance in crisis resolution and media statements about the performance of Megawati in crisis resolution.

Table 30
Media and the President are talking about crisis
(2003-2004)

President's statements	Media's statements
The national life was getting established	Government and its all related institutions have failed to eliminate the corruption, collusion and nepotism.
The condition of monetary and economy, particularly in macro economy is going better.	The performance of the President was not satisfying people.
The threat of disintegration and problems related to democracy and human right can be reduced.	The President was passive, not responsive.
The improvement of the politic and security stability.	The Indonesian security worsened.
<i>We have actually achieved a lot all this time</i>	The government administration and development, and the leadership were disappointing.
Since the last three years we have done a lot, and the positive results are a lot, too.	Government has failed to reform, to solve the crisis and also to improve the social prosperity.

(Source: Editorial of KOMPAS 2003-2004, and textual speeches of Megawati 2003-2004)

The table clearly shows us that there is contradicted assessment to the performance of the government in crisis resolution. In one side, Megawati said the government was quite successful in crisis resolution, but in another side, media emphasized their reportage on the weaknesses and the failures of Megawati and her cabinet in crisis resolution, Indonesian image restoration and reformation.

Based on public relations perspective, the contradiction above is one indicator of the disharmonious relationship between the president and media. In the context of public relations, the harmonious relationship between institution and media is characterized by, at least, the capability of the institution to persuade media, to and not to publish something as the institution wants. It means that in the perspective of institution or organization, media will be effective if they want to emphasize on the positive side of the things, not on the negative side. It does not mean that media must manipulate the fact, ignore to publish something bad or wrong about an institution. The harmonious relationship between media and the organization must be represented by the willingness of the media to compose a bad thing of the organization in a positive way and consider the time of the reportage carefully.

In other way, the contradiction shows that there is different interest between the two parties. President must defense her image and reputation of her cabinet, whereas the media

have interest to be professional, do their social role function such as informing, educating and social controlling. President thinks it is important to create positive image on publics, particularly in the time around the general election will be taken place. To keep her good image on publics Megawati used the avoiding strategy to respond to the public criticism. Based on all statements made by her, in the end of her administration, avoiding strategy was implemented by Megawati in many kinds of form; (1) avoiding to admit that the government also contributed to the existence of the crisis and lengthened the duration of the crisis resolution; (2) shifting the blame to the Indonesian people; and (3) saying that the crisis in Indonesia was more difficult to be solved than the other crisis in other countries.

3.4. CONCLUSION

According to the strategies applied by the two presidents – HM Soeharto and BJ Habibie – and its contextual factors, it can be seen the structure is more dominant than the agency in crisis communication strategy choice. Both adaptive and defensive strategies are made on the basis of the structural context. In crisis, HM Soeharto preferred to establish the existed structure. However, BJ Habibie was more innovative and active in the certain cases. He made new actions, did not follow the existed structure but tried to create a new structure. Different from both presidents, Megawati, in the case of multidimensional crisis, used two strategies. In early time, she used accommodative or adaptive strategy. However, in the end of her presidency, she applied defensive strategy. At that time, publics and media frequently criticized her, regarding to her efforts to resolve the crisis. They saw that Megawati failed to solve crisis quickly. To encounter that assessment, Megawati tended to be defensive. She shifted the blame to the Indonesian people mentality, other institution and media people for the failure. What strategy did she choose for other cases, for instance in case of terrorism and corruption? What was the context for all the strategy choices? How did media people and publics see Megawati's effort in dealing with this issue? The answer is explained in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 4

CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES IN CASE OF TERRORISM AND CORRUPTION, COLLUSION, NEPOTISM

4.1. INTRODUCTION

During her presidency (2001-2004) the two biggest issues handled by Megawati were the increasing of the number of bombing and the corruption actions. The two issues worsened the crisis and the crisis resolution. These were also the crucial issues for Megawati related to her image establishment on internal or external publics. Actually those were not only faced by Megawati, but almost all the presidents of the Republic of Indonesia face it too. It means that the terrorism and the corruption are the ongoing issues and problems for every president in crisis resolution. The problems were also not exclusively belonged to the presidents or their administration but they also are belonged to the other related institutions, such the law enforcement institutions and other related governmental institutions. For the two cases mentioned, Indonesian National Police and Attorney Institution got involved in these issues. How Megawati, along with the other related institutions, responded to the issues was very sensitive and it influenced her image and reputation building on publics.

Below I analyzed the communication did by Megawati in responding to these issues. I would like to know how Megawati responded to terrorism and corruption. It is a part of the efforts to explore the crisis communication strategy of Megawati, especially the strategy to restore and to construct her image on Indonesian and international publics when her reputation was questioned by national and international publics through the Indonesian mass media.

4. 2. TERRORISM

4.2.1. Bomb Terror: Megawati's Reaction

In the reformation era, there were a number of bomb blasts occurred in several different areas in Indonesia. There are more than 80 cases of bombing in the period of 1998 – 2005 (Ekspose, July 2005). Not all bomb blasting was a part of terrorist actions or terrorism. As written before, relies on the Indonesian National Police's point of view, there were only a few of them can be said clearly as terrorism actions (Indonesian National Police, Annual Report 2004)⁴². The

⁴² There are many cases of bombing. Based on police investigation, beside as the action of terrorists, bombing might be caused by business, personal, and ethnic conflict (internal, local problems or conflicts), beside by the

several big bombings which were categorized as terrorism actions in Indonesia during Megawati's administration were Bali Bombing⁴³ (2002), J.W. Marriot Hotel, Jakarta (2003), Australian Embassy Building, Jakarta (2004). The table 31 is a list of bomb blasts occurred in 2000-2005. They were predicted as a part of global terrorism action.

Table 31
The Bomb Terrors in Indonesia
2000-2005

No	Date	Places	Detail
1	August 1 st 2000	Home of Philippines Ambassador, Jakarta	2 people died
2	September 13 th 2000	Building of Jakarta Stock Exchange, Jakarta	10 people died
3	December 24 th 2000	Several areas in Indonesia	16 people died
4	September 23 rd 2001	Atrium Senen Plaza, Jakarta	--
5	October 12 th 2001	The Restaurant of KFC, Makassar	--
6	November 6 th 2001	Australian School, Jakarta	--
7	January 1 st 2002	The Restaurant of Bulungan, Jakarta	1 person died
8	October 12 th 2002	Kuta, Bali	202 people died
9	December 5 th 2002	The Restaurant MCDonald, Makassar	3 people died
10	April 27 th 2003	Cengkareng Airport	--
11	August 5 th 2003	Hotel J.W. Marriot, Jakarta	11 people died
12	September 9 th 2004	Australian Embassy, Jakarta	5 people died
13	June 8 th 2005	Home of Abu Jibril, Pamulang Tangerang	--
14	October 1 st 2005	Kuta, Bali	22 people died

Source : Kompas, November 10th 2005

Terrorism has developed and become the hottest public issue since the World Trade Center Bombing in New York, September 11th 2001. Even though the bombing did not occur in Indonesia, its impact spread into this country. Since the President of US, George W Bush, claimed that the actor behind the bomb blast was Osama Bin Laden, USA decided to attack Afghanistan, the country where Osama hides. The attacking to Afghanistan by the US was labeled as against terrorism. It was interpreted in the different way by different countries and nations. This decision was interpreted by some people in Indonesia as an effort of US against Islam. It is a sensitive issue for Indonesian people since the majority of Indonesian is Moslem and Indonesia was also multi cultural country. It is very important and sensitive for Megawati

terrorism acts. For some cases, the police could not find the exactly motives of those bombing and for many cases, Indonesian National Police has not identified and arrested yet the actor (s) behind the action.

⁴³ Bali was bombed again in October 2005. Recorded, 22 people were dead and hundred's people get injured. It happened in the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the president of the Republic of Indonesia after Megawati.

and her cabinet because her response and reaction to the issues would be a triggered factor for the raising of broader issues, such as the relation among ethnics, religions, races and groups⁴⁴.

How the government reacts to these issues created the image of the president and her administration. On the case of WTC bombing and attacking of US to Afghanistan, Megawati showed her attitude and response by her statements on the Ascension Day of the Prophet Muhammad SAW, October 14th 2001. These are her statements.

“The spreading of the symptoms of violence, brutality and terrorism, as happening now, have driven us to think again what is wrong with our life. Are our patient and humanity on limit, so the goals must be attained by the violent way or even by terror, and finally killed the humanity itself?”

“Human civilization really has a record that war is assumed as the last appropriate answer to restore the justice. There is no one or nation wants to receive injustice. Moral, as taught by Nabi Muhammad Shallallahuallahi Wassalam is the direction that the oppression and the disgracing to the justice are wrong. This direction drives for the raising of social solidarity for the justice recovery. But the moral and civilization give the boundary: when and how far a war is appropriate to do, so war as a best method is not necessarily applied, even if it will cause of human indignity and disgrace the justice.”

“Everything has to lie down on the rules. No one or no group in this society or even in this nation is able to make their own measurement or rules, when they are permitted to use violence and even use it for attacking the other parts. Life institutions of modern world also have made the legitimated rules and regulations about war. Ignoring the rules, finally we just create a picture that violence and the other forms of terror.”

“It is difficult to imagine what will happen if everybody or group or nation is permitted to make everybody own rules or measurement to determine what is true or is not, and then decide to attack the other parts. It will be awful for this world if everybody is permitted to do it, even more if then he or she creates his own formula to make it right for everything they have done. In the same way, the solidarity that is made must be moving on the right way. Without vigilance, it finally drives the solidarity to the edge of injustice.”

“Moral has to be maintained in order to enlighten the rationality of the people, so they do not believe that “blood can be cleaned by blood.” As a civilized nation, we do not need to build the assumption that violence has to be responded by violence.”

“Where ever and when ever all kinds of violence, includes terrorism, have to be eliminated. No one in the world will accept it. Whoever the actor of violence or terror must receive punishment. It is a principle. The actor of violence and terror and any party who protects them must be taken to the trial and they have to obey the common and general law. The person or the group or even the government, could not be able and

⁴⁴ In Indonesian term, it is called as SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras dan antar Golongan). This issue was very sensitive for Indonesian public, so, there are several regulations in the several aspects of Indonesian life is supposed to avoid this issue.

permitted to chase and arrest the actors of violence and then without any clear reason they attack the other nation or countries. As I said before, there is a legal rule and measurement in the world that have to be obeyed. Without it, the purpose to fight against violence can slip to be the violence actions and new terror.”

Based on her speech, we can see that Megawati very definitely supported everybody or every country to fight against terrorism and terrorist. She did not deny that terrorism did not bring welfare to the people and the world. However, Megawati said that fighting terrorism or terrorist must be controlled by the rules, common rules, rules that were legitimated by all countries. She emphasized that a country, by the reason of against terrorism, used its own measurement to fight another country was similar to the terrorist itself.

Her speeches were clearly directed to the United States. Actually, the decision and response of US, caused by WTC bombing, created various reactions from several countries, including Indonesia. As a multi cultural country, Indonesia gave the big reaction. It was seen as the problem of the “Islam-Christian Relation”. This kind perception has impact on the developing of “Anti America issues or movements.” The relation among different religions in Indonesia, in a certain time, has been shaken by this event. Indonesia has been threatened by national disintegration. It is difficult for Megawati to leave her position. In one side, she must give clear position on the case of terrorism, but on other side, she also must respond to the issue of “Islam – Christian relation”. Based on this situation, Megawati made her speech to ensure the Indonesian publics that she and the Indonesian government has opposed the domination of the certain religion over the other religion. She also ensured to the international publics that she and the government supported to all efforts in fighting terrorist. Although she tried, it seemed so difficult to her to convince Indonesian people about terrorism. In fact, the acts of terrorism often manifested as religion symbols.⁴⁵

Megawati responses were asserted again when she gave the speech in the National Christmas Celebration, December 27, 2001.

“...The national life in the several countries pretends to be moving backward and threaten by terror, which is not so clear who the actors are and when it will happen. The same situation has been experienced by Indonesia. We really must do something, not only for purifying, but also correcting the mistakes and faults, something that we have done so far is restructuring our life to be better future.”

⁴⁵ Terrorism for the terrorist are often viewed as the fighting against Islam. Terrorists view their action as a part of holy war, fighting to protect their religions. The effort of US to fight terrorism by attacking Afghanistan was interpreted by terrorist was the effort of US attacked Islam. US was also viewed by the terrorists as a symbol of Christian.

“There have been so many victims and there will be more victims in the future if we do not do something to improve this situation.”

“We do not need to be pessimistic to face this situation. We have a rational capability, both to identify the problem –how difficult it is – and to give the resolution alternatives. What we need is the courage from the various ideology, class, and groups to formulate the best decision, how hard it is now.”

Through her speech, she wanted the publics to know about her attitude and responses about terrorism. She had tried to ensure all publics that the terrorism issue was an international issue, that the terrorism and its impacts might be experienced by all countries in the world, including Indonesia. Megawati rejected, through her statements, that the terrorism was not a part of the religious or holy action. She created this kind of statement not only for building positive image on the international publics about terrorism but also for muffling the Islam fundamentalist movements that tended to interpret the attack of US to Afghanistan as the effort of Christian to fight Islam. Megawati wanted to meet the two interests or take herself in a safety position. It is also indicated by the time and places she selected to convey the messages. It was in the religious occasions, Moslem and Christian Holidays.

In a few international occasions or in the meeting with the overseas leaders, she asked to the other countries for establishing and enforcing international cooperation to fight against terrorism. Her statements can be seen, as below:

“We love our country, so we expect to create the public security, orderliness, and peace. [...] Therefore, relating to the international terrorism threats which are dangerous for the establishment of world peace, Indonesia still keeps our commitment to fight against terrorism. [...] We believe that the cooperation between two countries, along with the international communities can eradicate terrorism.” (Megawati, February 13th 2002).

“...To establish peace, security and stability, we have very strong will to face all threats, including terrorism, along with ASEAN countries and the other countries.” (Megawati, April 25th 2002).

“In this time, His Excellency can trade on the Indonesian support in implementing the various initiatives of United Nations, including [...] common efforts to fight against international terrorism [...]” (Megawati, May 17th 2002).

“[...] and with looking at our several challenges, I command to the personnel of Indonesian National Police to [...] (4) keeps on guard and anticipates to the various form and methods of transnational crimes, including terrorism.” (Megawati, July 1st 2002).

“In 2002 the policies, programs and activities with regard to politics and security are mainly focused on the following agenda: [...] Third, restoring security and public order, including combating terrorism, both from the international perspective as a member of

UN, as well as from the national perspective with a view to protecting the public safety and maintaining national security..." (Megawati's speech, August 1st 2002)

"[...] aware of its bad impact, we commit to fight terrorism. But, in the fast changing world and the international relations were borderless, nothing to do, except building the international cooperation." (Megawati, January 20th 2003).

"Thinking of the huge causes, recently all nations in the world commit, that whatever the background, reasons and goals are, we realize that the terrorism can happen in any time, any where and done by any one." (Megawati, January 20th 2003)

"The old challenge which becomes the new source of public anxiety is terrorism and not traditional security threats [...]. The plan of regional action to solve the problems was made so long time as a part of and result of functional cooperation of ASEAN, but this cooperation is not equitable anymore in fighting terrorism, as happened in US and Bali. The two tragedies remind the world about the danger of the international terrorism [...]. Based on Indonesian perspective [...] it needs global coalition, that involves every nation, every societies, religion and culture to fight terrorism." (Megawati, August 8th 2003).

"We have to continue our cooperation for establishing the world structure which is more fair, prosperous and secure. Not only for handling the threats of regional and international instability, but also fighting against terrorism [...]" (Megawati, January 24th 2004).

"...Right now, we feel the importance of the cooperation enthusiasm. It has directed and will guide us to face the threats of terrorism [...]. The cooperation among nations, both regional and international, to fight terrorism becomes very important, as well as to eliminate the source of violence and terrorism." (Megawati, February 4th 2004).

"...I have unequivocally stated our position against terrorism. Yet, more important, on that occasion we also expressed that it would be more effective if we, the developed and developing countries, all co-operate in assessing, investigating, and eliminating the root causes that in truth are the sources of terrorism itself." (Megawati, June 21st 2004).

From her speeches, Megawati wanted to show to the publics that she and the government did not keep quiet but did quickly responsive reaction to the terrorism issues. She also ensured to the publics that she and the government were not passive and slow in reacting the issues. She rejected the critiques from people and Indonesian mass media that she and the government were always doubtful to take the position and actions. She just wanted to be careful in facing a very sensitive issue and situation.

The issues of terrorism became a deeper concern for Megawati and the Indonesian government since Bali bombing, one year later. It was the bombing, after the several bombing happened in the several areas of Indonesia. Some of the bombing were directed to the churches and mosques as the symbol of religions. And then, it is placed as the conflict among religion

communities. At that time, the government was assessed not capable to identify the actors of bombing and not seriously handle it. The credibility of Megawati and the government was not good in this area. Bali bombing was the big stimuli for Megawati in building her credibility on publics. The responses of Megawati were very sensitive reaction for her image building.

Bali bombing happened on October 12, 2002. It caused 200 people death and hundreds people were injured. The deeper concern to fight against terrorism can be indicated by the producing of Antiterrorism Regulation; that was *Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang/Perppu Antiterrorisme*, which was legalized to be *UU Antiterrorisme* (Antiterrorism Rules). The deep concern to the fighting of terrorism was shown formally by Megawati in her speech in the end of 2002, two months after the occurrence of the rules. She said as below:

“While we were still trying to establish political stability and security, in 2002 we were shocked by bomb blasting in Bali that killed many innocent people and tourists. Our security personnel were successful in identifying the actors, based on hard fact evident and accurate acknowledgement. We hope that the network of the terrorists can be identified deeper until we could find the main actors and all actors behind it. The Government has published two government regulations about terrorism and also submitted several draft of Rules for implementing this regulation.” (Megawati, December 31’2002)

“That is our commitment. Through this occasion, I want to reconfirm our decision to the all leaders and nations from my neighbor countries, that we are really very serious about it.” (Megawati, January 20th 2003).

“Through this event, we convey our message that how very much bitter the impact of terrorism, absolutely it did not discourage us to make the next steps to fight the threats of the human and their civilization. We are never doubtful to face it.” (Megawati, February 4th 2004).

In 2003 Megawati was continuing to give the statements, relating to the terrorism issues and especially to the Bali Bombing⁴⁶. It was done by Megawati persistently particularly to respond or react to the impact of Bali Bombing to the Indonesian image on international publics and her image on internal publics. The main messages were that Indonesia has committed to fight against terrorism and asked for establishing cooperation among nation. Megawati also

⁴⁶ In 2003 there were many bomb blasts in many areas. Few of those actions have relation to the national and international terrorism and some actions were driven by personal motifs or conflicts among religion communities. But all bomb blasting can be called as the terror by bomb, because those have made the spreading of fear on publics. After Bali Bombing, there were more than fifteen bomb blasts in Manado (Oct 12’02) , Makassar (Dec 5’02), Ambon (Dec 12’02), Ambon (Jan 14’03), Jakarta (February 3’03), Medan (March 31’03), Jakarta (April 24’03), Jakarta (April 27’03), Aceh (June 30’03), Jakarta (July 14’03), Aceh (July 25’03), Poso (August 7’03), Jakarta (September 5’03), Poso (September 12’03), Aceh (Dec 31’03). The bombing that occurred on JW Marriot Hotel, Jakarta (September 5’03), and Australian Embassy Building (2004), Bali Bombing Second (2005) were the bomb blasts which are indicated as a part of terrorism action.

persuaded Indonesian people that terrorism was not a part of holy activities, it did not have any connection and relation to the religious movement.

“Even though all the actors of terrorism said that the actions are relating to the Islam, however it is clear that Islam or Islam communities have no relation with their terrorism actions. Both the government officials and law enforcement personnel and also Islam community their selves can distinguish the two things above.” (Megawati, July 1st 2003).

On January 20th 2003, Megawati spoke on the international forum. She spoke about terrorism and the government position on this issue. Similar to her responses before, Megawati clearly stated that Indonesia needed the other countries’ commitment to cooperate in fighting terrorism. She stated also the very bad impact of the terrorism for Indonesia. Megawati asked for the understanding of the other countries that Indonesia was a victim of terrorism, not a country where must be punished as a place of the terrorists.

“Terrorism is the reality that is occurring now in our life, both in the level of national and international. Its impacts are not only the anxiety or panic, but also, more essential, the threat of humanity. The one of its characteristics that the terrorism does not distinguish the target and the victims who tended to be massive and innocent, make the terrorism is going to be a real crime for humanity. [...] However, in the same time we really understand that the terrorism has indeed destroyed our public orderliness, security and social equilibrium. Insecurity which has been experienced by people has driven to the raising of distrust among people, or groups in the society. [...] In Indonesia, we really experience it. The nationhood, we have built based on the pluralism, has been totally destroyed by the terrorism action. During our efforts to reform our nationhood and statehood, which required so many limited resources, terrorism and its impacts have a very bad influence, especially to the our development programs.” (Megawati, January 20th 2003)

In addition to the messages, Megawati also identified the root problems of terrorism. Referring to the root, she offered some suggestions of resolution. She said that the root of terrorism was the gap of prosperity among nation, that in turn it caused imbalance. The imbalance among nations increases the issues of injustice. And, injustice was predicted as the root of terrorism.

“We realize that in the long step our fight to terrorism will be successful only if we are able to eradicate the main source of the terrorism, namely the poverty, apathy, suspicion and injustice.” (Megawati, February 13th 2002).

“If it is true that the injustice or the social, political or economy discrepancy in our national and international institutions were becoming the root of terrorism actions, we have to be aware that to solve terrorism will be a very long time. Possibly, we, ourselves, will not be sure, when we are able to totally eradicate the terrorism.” (Megawati, January 20th 2003).

“Terrorism also has the root cause in injustice. This is our understanding from the very beginning, when the world was shocked by a series of those odious acts. Whatever the motives or reasons, we repudiate terrorism as a means or excuse to achieve an objective. We believe that no issue can be resolved by resorting to acts of terror. In addition to inflicting innocent victim losses, in our view, terror will only beget other acts of terror.” (Megawati, June 21st 2004)

Megawati also said that the travel warning or travel ban given by a few governments for Indonesia exactly was not consistent to the commitment to fight against terrorism. This suggestion or policies causes two things; (1) international publics are afraid or doubtful to visit Indonesia and (2) internal publics feel insecure because the travel warning can be interpreted that Indonesia was really not secure. The two things above cause the very bad impact for Indonesian tourism and positive impact for the terrorists. Terrorists will feel successful with their action, spreading fear.

Supporting to her statement that Indonesia was very committed to fight terrorism, Megawati asked and commanded to the Indonesian National Police to investigate the terrorism actions, find out the actors and execute them. It was said by her for many times, and in many occasions, especially in the international events. She always tried to ensure the other countries that Indonesia was indeed serious and concern with this kind of problem. For the internal publics, she repeatedly said that the terrorism was not a holy war, and it was also not a part of religious activities. By giving this statement, Megawati avoid the bad impact of her action to the political and social stability. She also tried to anticipate the existing of social disintegration.

In the later speeches, Megawati started to emphasize her messages on the hard efforts of the government and security apparatus in anticipating, preventing, investigating and executing the actors of terrorism, and also on the positive result of it. The success story of the government and Indonesian National Police was shown by her statement about who the actors of terrorism are. It was an indication that Indonesia was able to identify the actors.

“The Indonesian National Police, along with the security personnel, have worked so hard to ward off and eradicate the terrorism in this country, especially on the case of Bali Bombing that happened in the end of last year. Even though they have to face many difficulties, work so hard, be patient and diligent, their works begin to be successful. Honestly, I am proud of their hard working and capability. Beside being able to arrest some people who were suspected as the terrorism actors, they were successful finding the terrorism networking.” (Megawati, January 20th 2003)

“In the case of terrorism, now we have taken the corrective action quickly, by publishing the Antiterrorism Regulation, investigating and executing the suspected terrorism actors in the court. One thing that needs to be concerned is about the specific pattern of the

terrorism action in Indonesia. Almost all the actors, planners or executer are Indonesian people. The planner has been living in and under the protection of a certain country – or even as the citizen of other countries, where as the executers have been living in their home country.” (Megawati, July 1st 2003)

“Now, like or dislike, believe it or not, based on the whole process of investigation, we realize that our country was not only the target of the action but also the country where the several actors come from, as planners, executers and supporters. They are not many but their fanaticism of the extreme dogma, which not respect to publics’ property and their souls, and not distinguish the target [...] really causes domestic terrorism action, as a part of international terrorism. It is beginning to be the very dangerous threats.” (Megawati, July 1st 2003).

“We are never doubtful to face it. We chase after, arrest, investigate and execute the terrorism actors. Our law enforcement officials have been working so fast and our court, by strong hearts have given fair punishment to them. The part of them is still on going trial process, while the security and law enforcement personnel were still remaining to chase after the terrorism actors and their followers.” (Megawati, February 4th 2004).

“[...] even though shocked by the horrified reality, we have to thank to and proud of the Indonesian National Police personnel and all the intelligent communities. Together with the law enforcement and security apparatus, our police have been able to do their duty very well. They are able not only to find out the terrorist and the strategic planner, but also take them to the court. I hope this achievement will be maintained and improved, as we are helped by the security personnel from our neighbor countries.” (Megawati, July 3rd 2004).

“The courage and capability, and competency of the *Adhyaksa*, along with the Indonesian National Police personnel and security apparatus in bringing the actors of Bali and Jakarta bombing to the court were not a small achievement. In contrast, the concrete action to bring the actors and proceed them in the court have made this country and the government to be the first in the world which is consistent and strong to fight terrorism.” (Megawati, July 22nd 2004).

The statements about the success of Indonesian apparatus in eradicating terrorism were purposed to refuse the international assumption that Indonesia was not serious about terrorism⁴⁷. The international publics did not quite believe it because Indonesia did not take immediate movement to respond to their suggestions. It is indicated by several things, such as (1) avoiding the other government warning about the possibility of the occurrence of the

⁴⁷ The successful investigation of terrorism by the government, along with the Indonesian National Police and The Indonesian Armed Forces was indicated by their success in arresting and executing the terrorism actors, for instance, are Amrozy and Imam Samudra. In 2005 they will be executed, by punishment: death sentence. However, until the end of Megawati presidency and Dai Bachtiar as Head of Indonesian National Police leadership, the two of very important terrorist actors, Dr. Azahari and Nurdin M Top, could not be arrested yet. But, in November 9th 2005, Dr Azahari, claimed by the Indonesian National Police, was dead after the armed attack between terrorist and the Police in Malang, East Jawa. In this time, the Indonesian President was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and as the Head of Indonesian National Police is General (Pol) Sutanto.

terrorism actions in some areas in Indonesia; (2) prohibiting or liquidating the group of *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI) that was predicted that exists in Indonesia and suspected as a part of terrorism network in Asia. In Indonesia itself, the two suggestions above, for some parts of Indonesian people, have been interpreted as the international or overseas intervention to the Indonesian problem solving. The suggestions were also accepted by some people as the US efforts to discredit and fight Islam. Even more, they thought that all terrorism actions in Indonesia were engineered by US and its allied countries. For some Indonesian people, it was interpreted that Megawati and the government protected US and it was controlled by US.

“The report which contains – once more refers to the Center of Intelligent Agency in USA (CIA), the acknowledgement of the bombing action and even the plan of the murder of Megawati, were the two very serious plans and actions. But, let you see what the reaction of the Indonesian people? Publics did not shock or worried or nervous or alert. Very surprisingly, the society reaction tended to be distrustful to and they warned the US not to intervene and disturb this country. It existed also the negative reaction toward the Indonesian government from many parts of the society. They were questioning about the government who easily handed Al-Farouq over to the USA. It was also questioned by them how the government was very slow to give comments and reaction about it.” (Kompas, September 30th 2002).

For international publics, especially for US, it could be meant that Indonesian government protected the terrorism actors. Contrarily, based on Megawati’s perspective, the slowness of Indonesian government was representation of the carefulness and respectfulness to the Indonesia as a pluralistic nation, as spoken by her below:

“[...] we are really serious about it. The understanding to our social condition and social structure drives us to be careful to make step, in order to avoid the damaging of our social values of national life.” (Megawati, January 20th 2003).

The careful attitude, mentioned by Megawati, was also relied down on the later statements which are shown as the skeptical views of her about the other countries reactions toward the terrorism.

“[...] In Indonesia, we are of the belief that in reality only a small dose of honesty and courage is needed to uncover the sources that bring about terrorism. Simultaneously, we are also convinced that – without such an attitude—what we have been hearing as the policy of “the war against terrorism” would easily lose sight of direction. Should this situation be allowed to persist, it would not be improbable that the world would fall into deeper uncertainties, fear, and threats of unilateral acts.” (Megawati, June 21st 2004)

There is different perspective about the performance of the Government and Megawati in responding to the terrorism and the issues that was developing as the impacts of it. It can be seen as there is different interpretation between Megawati, internal publics and international publics about terrorism and how well the government and Megawati handled it. Table 32 is the summary of the description above.

Table 32
Megawati about Terrorism and Bomb Terror in Indonesia
(Based on her speeches 2001-2004)

No	Terrorism	Megawati's statements about terrorism	Date of the Statement
1	Impacts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raising of public anxiety, panic, and the developing of the threat of humanity • Destroyed our public orderliness, security and social equilibrium • Insecure, distrust among people • Destroyed the Indonesian Nationhood and the Statehood • Inhibited the national development programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • January 20, 2003
2	Root	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty, Apathy, Suspicion, Injustice • Social, political, economy gap/imbalance among nations • Injustice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • February 13, 2002 • January 20, 2003 • June 21, 2004
3	Responses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Published Antiterrorism Regulations • Asked for establishing cooperation among nations to fight terrorism • Fight against terrorism • Chased after, arrested, investigated and took the terrorists to the court, not only by Indonesia but also the other countries. • Explain to the people that terrorism is not a part of holy activities and not identical with Islam. • Very serious and concern to the terrorism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • January 20th 2003 • June 21st 2004 • July 1st 2003
4	Result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrested the suspected actors and successful finding the terrorism network • Able to identify the actors behind the terrorism • Successful to chase after, arrest, investigate and bring the terrorists to the court 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • January 20th 2003 • July 1st 2003 • February 4th 2004 • July 3rd 2004 • July 22nd 2004

Based on table 32, it can be said that Megawati and her cabinet saw that the root of terrorism was out from Indonesia, it was from outside. It meant that the external factors or international situation contributed much more on the high escalating of the terrorism actions. Terrorism that

occurred in Indonesia was only a part of international terrorisms, even though Megawati admitted that most of the actors of terrorism came from and lived in Indonesia. Referring to the root of terrorism, Megawati looked like want to say that there was no internal problem, came from Indonesia, as the source of the events. Therefore, when the bomb blast occurred again in Hotel of JW Marriot (2003) and Australian Embassy building (2004), it was identified as the action of terrorism, Megawati stated that the terror by bomb could be happened any where, any time and by any one.⁴⁸ Even, in USA where the military and police armed were very sophisticated, the terrorists could do the terror successfully. In another statement, Megawati also mentioned that how good performance of military and the police, if it was not supported by the efforts of all Indonesian people, terrors could not be prevented⁴⁹. By those statements, it was very clear that Megawati shifted the blame to the Indonesian people and the external factors. The weaknesses of the Indonesian National Police to anticipate the terror actions and the failure of them to establish the stability of national security were not the focus of Megawati in responding to the action. Therefore, to fight terrorism Megawati always persuaded the international publics to concern and establish the global cooperation, and persuaded the national publics to be willing to participate in the security efforts.

Megawati stated that the terrorism was caused by global and international problems, and it was contributed by the unwillingness of the Indonesian people to participate in maintaining and establishing the national security. It can be concluded that Megawati used **dissociate strategy** in constructing her image and her cabinet performance. Dissociate strategy used by Megawati consisted of two sub strategies, namely (1) placed the terrorism as a little part of the bigger world phenomena, so there were no countries could be free from the terrorism actions, including Indonesia, and (2) shifted the blame to the other parts, those are (1) the other countries, especially the developed countries that were inconsistent to fight terrorism and unfair and unjust in international policy making, and (2) the Indonesian people who did not get involved to make the security stability.

⁴⁸ The statement that terrorism can occur whenever and wherever was mentioned many times, not only by Megawati but also by other important people. This statement was usually mentioned after the occurring of bomb blasted.

⁴⁹ In the second Bali Bombing (2005), the Head of the Indonesian National Military (TNI/ Tentara Nasional Indonesia) said the same thing when he commented about it. He said that the bomb blasts that occurred in Bali because of no people participation in maintain the public security. The statement made many critiques. The one critique was whether there was public participation or not, it was military/police responsibility to establish the national security.

4.2.2. Megawati and Terrorism: Media Portrayal

4.2.2.1. WTC Bombing and Its Impacts

How did Indonesian mass media look at the terrorism and the government's responses? Terrorism and bomb terror for Indonesian mass media looks like a never ending story, the story which is continuing and ongoing. It means that terrorism and terror by bomb in Indonesia always becomes an attention of the Indonesian journalists. During Megawati's presidency, mass media had concerned to the terrorism issues since WTC bombing on September 11, 2001. Since that event affected to the Indonesian situation, for instance, the increasing of the Anti-America movements. These movements themselves influenced the many aspects of Indonesian life, especially in the government's efforts to eradicate the crisis.

Difficult situation in Indonesia as impact of WTC Bombing and the reaction of US to fight Afghanistan by the reason to fight terrorism was shown by mass media for several weeks after that time.

"It is not untrue story that the tragedy of September 11th 2001 gave big impacts for many parties and countries [...] For Indonesian economy situation, that event brought bad indications of the crisis resolution. [...] The increasing of Anti-America movements will cause the increasing of capital flight. In turn, the increasing of capital flight will make difficulties for Indonesian economy growth." (Kompas, October 1st 2001)

"Following the demonstration actions (*Anti America movements*-writer) which are highly increasing, the Foreign Department of United State permitted to the low line staffs to leave Indonesia. In addition, a few of American people are reported start leaving Indonesia to be back to their country. [...] Another facts are found that in Bali the rate of hotel occupancy decreased to 50-60% . [...] It was not only related to the declining of the amount of investment but also to the social and economical condition. [...] The initial symptoms (*as effects of the terror 11 September 2001*-writer) have been experienced by us since one week before today. People did demonstration to US US in Jakarta and other cities, threatened to do sweeping to western people and they also expressed their attitudes and comments to US ambassador in Jakarta. It was very crucial for us last week. Action-reaction of the terror 11 September 2001, for one week, is getting more crucial, controversial. Its impacts have been worried." (Kompas, Oct 1st 2001).

"Protests to USA as an action-reaction of the 11th September 2001 terror (*in Indonesia* – writer) interacted with the emotional environment and associated with the sensitive things. [...] it is almost every day we saw how sensitive our people and how high tendency to the people to judge by themselves. They tends to be anarchic... " (Kompas, Oct 8th 2001).

"The attack of US to Afghanistan strengthened its impacts on many countries, particularly on the Moslem countries. This impact was also experienced by Indonesia. It is mixing with several elements. The strongest factor is solidarity among the religion

communities. But it exists also, the factor of the developed country versus the poor, marginalized and powerless countries.” (Kompas, October 11th 2001).

“Now we are not only living in the crisis situation, but also staying in the uncertain situation. September 11th attack and the invasion of the military coalition led by USA to Afghanistan disturbed to the world peace. It causes many innocent people suffer, and the other part of them feel uncertain and live in the improbable life. We, in Indonesia, are a part of them. We, who are working hard to fight against crisis, are threatened by the second storm. [...] There is a very strong indicator that is the declining of value and volume of export...” (Kompas, October 13th 2001).

“For many countries, including Indonesia, the action-reaction of September 11th and the war which is chosen as its response, is driving for reactions: solidarity reaction, emotional reaction and the increasing of the number of demonstration. The reactions are also logical reactions, rational predictions and commitment to bring Indonesia out from the crisis. (Kompas, October 16th 2001).

“Unexpectedly, it looked like stroked by lightening, the actions of the September 11th terror to US actually gave impacts on us. Our risk of security was highly declining. Foreign and domestic capital were wiping out from Indonesia. The recession was getting stronger in US and other industrial countries. We get a *hit* again. This time, the export volume stuck. It was canceled and postpone [...] Not only our government or parties, this group or that group which will suffer of its impacts but also all of us, if the condition is getting more awful and misdirect.” (Kompas, November 13th 2001).

For Indonesia, WTC Bombing and the reaction of the US toward Afghanistan did not only affect to the Indonesian economy, as to the other countries, but it also affected on the relationship among different religion communities. Almost all of the movements contained the nuance of religious relationship which affected on the developing of religion prejudgments, distrust and even conflict among different religion communities. The following issues were about Islam-Christian, not only America-Afghanistan issues. It developed and influenced the political, economy and social condition in Indonesia. Based on mass media, the Indonesian situation which had been fighting to come out from crisis was becoming worse. The impact of this issue made the efforts of the government to resolve the crisis was getting harder and more difficult.

Beside the above situation, mass media also concerned to the responses of the government to the issues. There were several opinions, assessments of the mass media to the government performance in the case of WTC Bombing and US attack to Afghanistan, and also in case of the International and Indonesian people’ responses to this issues. In general, media thought that the responses of the government were late and too slow. Indonesian people made movement faster than the Indonesian government. People reacted quicker and acted more

responsive. People always made one step ahead than the government. Based on the assessments, media also looked at the uncertain situation, particularly in the relationship among the different religion communities, developed because of the impact of the unresponsive government, including unresponsive president. Mass media also saw that the government's attitude and position in responding the issues of Anti-America was not so clear and resolute.

In the early of her presidency, Megawati made some state visiting trip to the several foreign countries, to fulfill the other state invitations. One of the invitations came from George W Bush, the President of USA. It was coincident that her visit to US was one week after WTC Bombing and after the US made a plan to fight Afghanistan. This visit caused various opinions and one of them was coming from mass media.

“The President's visit to US only one week after WTC Bombing September 11th was not appropriate. Let's imagine, if during her visit to US, President George W Bush make a decision to attack Afghanistan or other countries by the reason of terrorism fighting, the position of Megawati will be difficult, isn't it? What position and comments will Megawati make if she receives many questions from mass media, congress' member, and other people of that country? Without any coincidence of fighting command, the president's visit is not in a right time. [...] what we can say? Please be smart to place our position, to make and answer the questions.” (Kompas, September 19th 2001).

Opinion about the time chosen by Megawati to visit US was not appropriate. It was an indication of the distrust of mass media to the president's capability to react the issues of WTC Bombing and the plan of the US to attack Afghanistan. The distrust might be based on the difficult situation in Indonesia which was faced by Megawati, where there were two different interests or point of views in relation to the issues. In that time, Megawati did not give the definite responses or reaction toward the two interests. It is shown by the following media statements :

“In this kind of situation we need a clear government policy. We wait for the government's determination that enables us to walk. The unclear government's policy has made this society acted by their own initiatives. Even, when there were many different points of view, attitudes and behaviors among people on this society, still the government did not give any definite policy. The government reacted to the issues too slowly. Always like this. Since reform era, there was no significant change. We did not see the changes in the sense of urgency, and as if we walked as usual, business as usual.” (Kompas, Oct 1st, 2001)

“It was the government's fault that the action-reaction occurred and we received its impacts. But, it is necessary to say that the government response was late. Response has been already taken by the certain group of society. The government was placed on the reacting position, not as an actor or leader who determines the action. [...] honestly it

was not as our expectation. The policy was not so clear, and was not socialized yet. Coordination was also not clear. People said it was just a form of meeting, discussion, looking for opinion. There was not yet coordination and active, comprehensive, coordinated response, and get things done, was really done.” (Kompas, October 27th 2001).

The disbelief of the mass media to the President was also caused by the indefinite response and position of Indonesia made by the President, along with the government and Indonesian publics before visiting to the USA. Media saw that Megawati and the government did not make dialogues and communication with all parts of the Indonesian society. They also assessed that the President and the government did not want to and doubted to take initiative, coordination, and consolidation and to give the direction. Therefore, they asked the government many times through their editorial, as written below:

“We ask again to the government, it is very urgent to intensify the dialogues and communication with the various group of the society in order to establish solidarity and the same attitudes for facing the complicated and sensitive problems.” (Kompas, Oct 8th 2001).

“To face the highly increasing of global crisis, Megawati and Hamzah Haz have to intensify the consultation to the people representatives. Not only to the people representatives in politics but also to the exponent and the leaders of mass organization, particularly of the religion organization. [...] the government and all national components meet to each other and to dialogue and consult, in order to attain the same understanding about the main problems of our nation.[...] which is logical is consolidate the mutual understanding, the mutual trust and consolidate the togetherness to handle the difficult problem.” (Kompas, Oct 11th 2001).

However in other editorial, Kompas wrote that Megawati’s visit to the US was actually assessed as giving positive image for Indonesia on international publics. It was shown as below:

“In US, the President of the Republic of Indonesia was counted in the positive way. That is the strongest impression of her visit in US and United Nation Organization. [...] Based on the media reportage, we tend to think that it is quite wise for Megawati to place herself before the nation and the president of United State who is being shocked, angry, worried and burned out by the enthusiasm to revenge and attack the terrorism.” (Kompas, September, 22nd 2001).

The worrying about the incapability of the President in handling a meeting with the President of US was wiped out. Media saw Megawati was capable for managing the conversation. The statements that hoped by mass media to be conveyed in that meeting were done by her successfully. It was about the suggestion of her to all leaders, including to the US’s President, to be careful to set the target of the struggle of terrorism fighting. The inaccurate and invalid

target and goals made the fighting for the terrorism can be interpreted as fighting for religion and a certain group society. The statement was her comment also to George W Bush who planned to attack Afghanistan due to the reason to fight terrorism. The statement was also directed to the Indonesian society that she supported their opinion and position which against US and its unions. However, beside the positive assessment, media still asked to the President of the Republic of Indonesia to explain more explicitly the Indonesian position in facing the impacts of the terror to the US to the Indonesian people in facing the impacts of the terror to the US. It is important to confirm the position because in the same time Indonesian government still has to bring this nation out from crisis. Media hoped for the government was able to do the two interests together, responding to the terrorism in the right way and reforming Indonesia, in the frame of crisis resolution. To reform Indonesia, Megawati has to concern to make the stability in politic, social and security.

4.2.2.2. Bali Bombing: the Second Biggest Terrorism Action

Media said that Bali Bombing is the second biggest terrorism action, after WTC Bombing in USA. The bomb blasting occurred in Legian Beach, Bali, Oct 12th 2002 in which 202 people died and more than 300 people were injured. Most of the victims were foreign tourists. This event was 'a big punch' for Indonesian government who has been working hard to resolve the crisis and ensuring the international publics that Indonesia was safe for foreigners to visit. It was one of the many bomb blasts occurred in Indonesia. It was the biggest one among the several bomb blasts which strengthened the image that Indonesia failed in establishing national security, and that the Indonesian National Police and government did not seriously investigate the actors. Two days after the bomb blast, Kompas wrote its editorial which depicted how hard the impact of it for Indonesian's image on international publics.

"Ironical mock was displayed through the terrorism action. Bali that was identical with the harmonious society and peaceful environment and social climate was destroyed by the biggest bomb blasts, as Indonesian people have ever known. We can imagine, how our face and profile as Indonesian citizen and nation on international stage. We are embarrassed, mocked, judged and asked for responsibility. [...] Is it true how dull our heart so we do not care of the Indonesian image on the world stage. Not only good reputation, trust and honor, but also its impacts on the political, economy and security trust." (Kompas, October 14th 2002).

"Not only human victims, but also reputation, and the victims of ongoing social and economy crisis. We are Indonesian people, even if we can't to be smart, become the victims of instability and ongoing conflict which are going to be worse. [...] Security was

a part of the ongoing instability. It was related to the bad economy which couldn't offer appropriate field works, the bad law enforcement, weak discipline, and weaknesses in all institutions in transition era. [...] The anxiety was growing fast when we saw, witnessed and experienced terrorism action in Bali that the developed countries came to Indonesia not for helping but as if 'killing' us slowly." (Kompas, October 23rd 2002).

"With the several bombing happened in Indonesia, this country is imaged as the very nice target of the international terrorism. There are so many factors playing behind it. According to Western media's analysis it might be true that one of them is the chronic accumulative effect of misgovernment of the Indonesian government." (Kompas, August 16th 2003).

"Indonesia is often suspected, as written by West Media, as one of the terrorists' nets. Contrarily, Indonesia is rarely mentioned as the victim of the international terrorism." (Kompas, September 19th 2003).

The same critics were also given by media to the performance of the government in dealing with the terrorism. Not only the media, but also international publics that criticized Indonesian government did not give any immediate response for the act of terrorism. Travel warning and travel ban published by other countries, even by our neighbor countries, were indication that they did not trust to the seriousness of the Indonesian government about terrorism fighting. It was indicated also that they did not trust to the capability of Indonesia to build the stability of security. Media understood its response, as they wrote on their editorial below:

"We understand. It is because we, Indonesia, have been told about the existence of terrorism networking in Indonesia and the threats of terrorism actions, but we were interpreted by the other countries that we did not take the preventive action which was effective and believable." (Kompas, October 23rd 2002).

Harian Kompas agreed with this interpretation. It was mentioned through its editorial as below:

"What is our argument to respond the opinion and assessment? We answer, the Indonesian government did not take the effective actions, not only for responding and preventing the threats of Indonesian security, including the terror, but also for the other things, such as the government administration management, law enforcement, and economic policy and program implementation. The effectiveness of the government for the things was weak." (Kompas, October 23rd 2002).

"The Republic of Indonesia seemed did not make progress in the last one year. Even, on the aspect of security we have to say that the condition is getting worse. If it is not, why the terrorists are so much brave to explode the bomb in Bali, at the hotel of JW Marriot and in other places?" (Kompas, August 16th 2003).

It means that the media saw the government was so late to make actions when the situation needs emergent responses. As usual, the government was too slow, and their reaction and responses were not so clear, and confusing. But, on the other aspect, media also saw that the international perception and reaction about terrorism in Indonesia was not fair. It reconfirmed the statement and attitude of Megawati about the reaction of the several countries which discredited Indonesia in case of terrorism.

“The pressure for us to investigate and execute the terrorism actions becomes the pressure to the Indonesian life, through the pressure to the Indonesian sources of economy etc. We said that the opinion and attitude like that are not right, unfair, unjust, and do not help us to solve the problem, but in contrast, it lengthen our crisis.” (Kompas, October 23rd 2002).

“Indonesia was really disappointed and offended to the US policy which compel the Indonesian citizens who are visiting to USA to report/ check in. [...] whatever the reasons, this policy is interpreted as a form of discrimination, harassment, arrogant and exaggerated behavior, and it discredit to Indonesia. [...] furthermore, Indonesia is difficult to understand and can't accept the partial policy.” (Kompas, January 20th 2003).

Not only in the aspect of the international reaction, media also supported many of Megawati statements about terrorism. It was indicated by the willingness of the media to report the statements of Megawati and it was followed by some positive assessments and agreement. Almost all the official statements of Megawati were quoted by media in its editorial, especially after Bali Bombing 2002.

“*Alhamdulillah* the President Megawati Soekarnoputri and her staffs were not passive. They performed emergent meeting and gave press release. They condemned the terror action, would investigate and arrest the actors. They conveyed condolence to the victims and their families and countries. They said welcome and thanks to the medical and humanity aids from other countries. It is the right time to the government and its staffs to arrest the actors, identify the networking, and execute them in the court. (Kompas, October 14th 2002).

“The disappointment toward the US policy can be seen from the persuasion of the President Megawati Soekarnoputri to the Indonesian people not to visit USA if it is not very urgent and important. As reported by mass media, the President was apprehensive about the policy that Indonesian people must report if they visit to USA. Indonesian reaction of it can also be seen from the statement of the Foreign Minister that questioned the impact of the policy to the collective efforts against terrorism.” (Kompas, January 20th 2003).

“President Megawati Soekarnoputri, when she gave her address on the Indonesian National Police Anniversary, asked to the other closed countries who gave protection to the intellectual actors of terrorism action in Indonesia to investigate, execute and gave

them punishment as regulated by their own law. [...] It strengthened to the importance of regional cooperation to fight against terrorism. “ (Kompas, July 2nd 2003).

“We agree that the terrorism which recently becomes a world phenomenon can’t be faced only by an half of our heart. We need a totally firm action. Therefore, we have to face it together. In time of Megawati giving her speech in ASEAN Anniversary, she strengthened her commitment that the threats of international terrorism can only be broken down by global coalition which needs all nations, societies, religion, and cultures cooperation.” (Kompas, August 9th 2003).

“Our leaders need to do the public defense in the global level, to claim that Indonesia is in the position of victims of the terrorists attack. [...] This step is very important to be created in order to ensure the international public that Indonesia was not only looked as the place where is intruded by international terrorism movements. [...] President Megawati has a strategic and prestigious chance in the front of UNO meeting to explain the Indonesian struggle to fight terrorism. [...] The visit of the President and the vice President to the foreign countries was very important and strategic to show our profiles as a big nation...” (Kompas, September 24th 2003).

“Explicitly, Megawati pressured to the developed countries to evocate the root of terrorism by changing the unfair policy about the conflict of the Middle East. [...] By her perspective, that policy is not only unfair but also sides with Israel. [...] Injustice which is supported the feeling of alienation brings opportunity for the development of the climate of violence. This condition is an original cause of the problems, that are remaining to grow and develop and one of them brings and drives the act of tragic terrorism. [...] It is normal if Megawati reminds us, the root of terrorism has to be wiped out before growing to be terrorism.” (Kompas, September 26th 2003).

“The President Megawati reconfirmed, the organizing of KTT ASEAN (Konperensi Tingkat Tinggi Association of South East Asian Nations/ Highly Conference of ASEAN) in Bali can be indicated as an Indonesian courage to face the threat of terrorism. Physically and symbolically, it also shows the strong heart of ASEAN leaders to fight the threat of terrorism as crimes of humanity.” (Kompas, October 10th 2003).

In general media said the same opinion as the government did. What the President said about terrorism, such as (1) its impact on the Indonesian situation and the image of Indonesia on the International publics, (2) root of the international terrorism and how to eliminate it, (3) response to the perception and reaction of the international publics to the terrorism, are not so far from what the media thought. In general, media always support the President and the government in fighting terrorism, including when the President had to react the other countries’ responses, including the US’s. As it was mentioned by the media, the position of Indonesia, as taken by the President and the government, was right and accurate. Only, there were few things seen by media was not quite correct; (1) the government was too slow in decision making and unsure in taking the action; (2) the government’s actions and statements

were unclear so they caused multi-interpretation and different perception among the different publics. It might because of the President and the government which were still trapped by the introvert behavior as the impact of crisis situation. Therefore, media also gave some advices and suggestion to the Presidents and the government, which can also be seen as the things that the government had not done yet or had done it partially. The advices are (1) intensifying dialog and communication with all parts of the Indonesian society, (2) thinking and doing things which can achieve the two interests equally. The first was the national interest, to reform Indonesia and bring this nation out from the crisis; and the second was the international interests, to fight terrorism along with the other nations in the world. There was a tendency that the government focused more on the certain interest but forgot to give attention to the other interests.

How the media saw the terrorism can be seen briefly on the Table 33. This table shows us the comparison of the media's views on the two cases of terrorism action, the one is terrorism act that occurred outside of Indonesia and the other is terrorism action that occurred in Indonesia. The two cases were a part of the acts of the international terrorism. We can also see that the media have different opinion and perspective in viewing and interpreting the government and the international responses to the different cases of terrorism.

Table 33
Megawati and Terrorism: Media Perspective
(Based on Kompas Editorial 2001-2004)

	WTC Bombing (2001)	Bali Bombing (2002)
The Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bad economic condition • Bad indication for crisis resolution • Threats of disintegration • Bad national security, especially for foreign visitors • Second crisis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bad image and reputation on international world • Unstable national security • Ongoing horizontal conflict
The root	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economical gap between the developed countries and developing/under develop countries • Injustice on the international policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low sense of urgency • Misgovernment • Unfair policy, injustice
Responses of the government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Too slow and always late • Unresponsive • Unclear statements, doubtful reaction, indefinite policy • No coordination, poor in communication 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do not take preventive and effective action • Give the right responses, by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ strengthening the international cooperation ◦ ensuring publics that Indonesia was a victim of terrorism ◦ showing the profile of the countries to the other countries. ◦ showing our strong heart to fight terrorism
International reaction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exaggerated, emotional, but it was understandable and acceptable. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Too arrogant • Not fair, unjust, discriminated, discredited

Based on table 33 we see that media tended to give positive assessment to the performance of the government much more on the second issues of terrorism than on the first issue. At the first case, Indonesia was really on the position as the country which was influenced by WTC Bombing, particularly by the attack of the US to Afghanistan. It means that Indonesia was an outsider of the case and it did not get involve directly in that event. The root of the event came from the external factors. In this situation, media saw the government was weak and not capable handling the impact of it on the national situation.

However in the second case, Indonesia was the target and experienced the event and its impacts. Media focused more on the positive action of the government in responding to the terrorism. Media took themselves in the same place as those of the government. Media feel as a part of Indonesian people who are protected and defended by the President and the

government. Most of the government action, in relating to the terrorism, was positive responses, based on the media perspective.

Generally, in the case of terrorism, President Megawati and the Indonesian government had the similar perception with those of the Indonesian media/ journalists. They together condemned the terrorism and the actors. They also concerned to the victims and the bad impacts of terrorism to the Indonesian social, political and economy situation and Indonesian's image on international publics. They were serious to investigate, identify, execute and punish the actors of terrorism. They together committed to fight against terrorism, so they had the same thought about the importance of global coalition, international and regional cooperation and consistent response to fight terrorism. The President and media also had the same perception about the international reactions which were too arrogant, discriminated, unjust, imbalanced, exaggerated and sometimes emotional.

In the perspective of public relations, the relationship between the president or the government and the media as explained before was in harmony. It means that they have similar opinion in viewing terrorism. Additionally their statements show that they supported to each other about this issue. With this kind of relationship, the crisis resolution should be easier to be solved and the image of Megawati can be remained in a good manner.

4.3. CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM

Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (CCN), in Indonesia is called as KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme). CCN or KKN is a very popular concept for Indonesian people. It is a kind of ever lasting Indonesian problem. It belongs to all presidents. It is still running until now. CCN is also mentioned by many people as the main source of the Indonesian crisis, and the main inhibit factor to crisis resolution. Megawati is the one who gave that statement. Eradicating the CCN was the program priority of all Indonesian Presidents and their cabinets. But, ironically, Indonesia is labeled as the most corrupted country in the world. Even, in the latest years, Indonesia was mentioned as the second biggest countries⁵⁰ in the world in the number of corruption actions. In international level, that Indonesia was a corrupt country was not so

⁵⁰ Based on the Survey of Transparency International, Indonesia has index of corruption 2.2, one level above the Myanmar. It means that in 2005, this institution placed Indonesia as the second biggest countries in the number of corruption actions in ASEAN (Association of the South East Asian Nations) or the sixth level in the world, together with three other countries, namely Azerbaijan, Kamerun, and Ethiopia. (Media Indonesia, October 19th 2005). The index was better, one level upper than the index in 2003 (IPC 1.9) and in 2004 (IPC 2.0). In that time, Indonesia placed on the group of worst level of the corrupt countries in the world. In general, since 1995 Indonesia remained in the low index on corruption perception (Kompas, November 8th 2005).

surprised. Even for Indonesian people, as if the label really belonged to their countries, for ever. It is even worse that many Indonesian people think and believe that the corruption has become a part of the Indonesian culture.

The effort to eradicate the corruption practices in Indonesia had been started by the first Indonesian President, Ir. Soekarno in his administration (1945-1965), it was continued by HM Soeharto, BJ Habibie, KH Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri and the current President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Many regulations and institutions or commission that had main tasks to eliminate the corruption actions were published and found by each presidents. Table 34 indicates that the corruption is still an ongoing problem for Indonesia. It was very difficult for each president and government to stop the practices, even though every president of the Republic of Indonesia always said that they committed to eradicate the corruption. Crisis was thought as the accumulative impacts of the corruption that has been done by the people. It was also the result of the incapability or unseriousness of the president and the government to eliminate it in the past. Table 34 also shows that almost all Presidents of the Republic of Indonesia took deep concern to combat terrorism, not only manifested by establishing teams or commission but also by publishing laws and regulations. It was also followed by some actions/efforts to investigate the actors of corruption and bring them to the court. However, some people still saw that their efforts were just stopped on the symbolic or rhetoric level. Some big investigations of the corruption, which involved very important people, usually ran so slow, even were stopped without any reasons.

Table 34
The Indonesian Presidents and Corruption Eradication Team

President	Time	Commission/Team	Law/Regulations
Ir. Soekarno	1945-1965	No team or commission established	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rules of Leader of Military No PRT/PM/06/1957 • The rule of Corruption Eradication the Central Leader of War No PRT/Peperpu/013/1958 • Law No 24/Prp/1960
HM Soeharto	1966-1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The team of eradicating corruption (Tim Pemberantasan Korupsi) – 1967 • Fourth Commission (Komisi Empat) – 1970 • The operational team for orderliness authority and corruption Eradication (Tim Operasi Ketertiban kewibawaan dan Pemberantasan Korupsi) -- 1977. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • P. Decree No 228 in 1967 • P. Decree No 12 in 1970 • Law No 3 1971 • P. Instruction No 9 in 1977 • Law No 11 in 1980
BJ Habibie	1998-1999	No team or commission established	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decree No XI /MPR/ 1998 • Presidential Instruction No 30/1998 • Law No 28/1999 • Law No 31/1999
KH Abdurrahman Wahid	1999-2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The investigate commission for the wealth of the state official (Komisi Pengawasan Kekayaan Pejabat Negara/ KPKPN) – 1999 • The joint team for corruption eradication (Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan Korupsi/TGPK) – 2000 • Ombudsman Team – 2000 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidential Decree (Keppres) No 81/1999 • P. Decree (Keppres) No 242/M/2000 • Government Regulation No 68/1999 • P. Decree (Keppres No 4/2000)
Megawati Soekarnoputri	2001-2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The commission for the eradication of corruption actions (Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi/KPK) – 2002 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law No 20/2002 • Law No 30/2002 • P. Decree (Keppres)
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	2005-2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The team for the eradication of corruption actions (Tim Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi/ Tipikor) – 2005 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidential Instruction No 5/2004 • Presd. Decree (Keppres) No 11/2005

Source: Compilation of Media Indonesia, July 25th 2005 and Kompas November 8th 2005

Since every president has her or his own commitments and strategies, it is important to analyze how and what commitment of Megawati to handle this never ending problem. Even more, all the prior presidents, before Megawati, were assessed by publics, national and international, that they were not successful to do this. It is not impossible Megawati was also criticized in the same way. It becomes more necessary to explore how Megawati built the trust of the people about her commitment to eradicate the corruption, still in the frame of crisis resolution and reformation, and how Megawati reacted to the critiques about her capability to eliminate corruption.

4.3.1. Strategy of Megawati

Megawati understood very well about the importance of corruption eradication for Indonesian publics. As people knew, the one of HM Soeharto's failures to defense his position as the President was his failure to ensure international and national publics that he was very serious and capable to eliminate the corruption, collusion and nepotism (CCN) (Kompas, October 30th 2001) . Even, his era of the presidency was called as the era of CCN (KKN- ind) in which the CNN was growing very fast and uncontrolled. Megawati learned from Soeharto's experience. She did want to fail to handle this problem. Therefore, in the first speech as the President of the Republic of Indonesia, in the front of People's Consultative Assembly on August 16th 2001, she stated clearly about her commitment about corruption. She said that CCN was a big problem for Indonesia. It was the source of the crisis and the difficult crisis resolution. And, CCN was a part of the New Order institution, which saw the CCN as the common behavior.

"The difficulty to eradicate corruption, collusion and nepotism, directly or not, had affected on crisis since 1997. Different from in the feudalistic social institutions which accepted CCN and it was not a big mistake, in the democratic institutions it will be a very difficult problem. [...] In this case, please permit me to tell that personally I have made a meeting with my closed families and asked them to be really promised not to open the possibility to do the CCN. They have really promised, and I hope they will be strong toward the temptation which comes from their environment. I believe that we will make great effort to prevent and solve CCN if all of us in this building also promise not to do it. I have also asked all the cabinet members to report their possession and submit it immediately to the investigation commission for the state official wealth (Komisi Pemeriksaan Kekayaan Pejabat Negara)." (Megawati's speech, August 16th 2001).

The commitment was very important to be delivered in her first annual state speech. Megawati wanted to persuade Indonesian people and ensure that Indonesia will change, particularly for

the CCN issues. She tried to build people trust that she and her cabinet under her leadership will be different and she wanted to make Indonesia to be a good government and good governance, free from CCN actions. The commitment was built from the commitment of her family not to act the CCN. She asked also the cabinet members not to act the CCN by reporting their possession to the authorized commission. Not only it, Megawati also started the commitment by determined the CCN eradication as one of the six main programs of her cabinet.

The statement in her speech was really interesting for almost all Indonesian people. It invited many comments, but most of them are positive and supported to her commitment. People made a good wish from her governance and the government. Megawati, in the first step, was capable to build good step for her long presidency. People assessed positively and hoped in the optimistic way. The statement was successful to make people looking at the new government and the new president by the positive and prospective thinking. Media was not the only one that mentioned her commitment to fight against CCN. In every occasion that was related to the good governance by good government, the commitment of the President to eradicate, even her persuasion to make war to the CCN was always reminded as the fundamental reason. Fighting against the CCN was a must for the government and it became a political demand from Indonesian people who wanted to reach success, as she mentioned on her speech below:

“The general condition of our national life for this case, especially in the commitment to fight against the CCN has driven a political demand for us to behave clearly and persistently in the case of law enforcement.” (Megawati, September 3rd 2001).

In front of the Indonesian general attorneys, she asked them to get attention and concern to the issue. Megawati saw that the quality of the law enforcement personnel was very determinative for eradicating the CCN by executing and giving fair punishment for the CCN actors, whoever they are. There were many CCN cases couldn't be brought to the court because there were so many 'games behind the stage' between the actors and the attorneys. It was an indicator of the bad quality of our law enforcement personnel and a bad indication for the realization of Megawati's commitment.

“Right now I am pleased to ask you (*the general attorneys-writer*) to get attention to the issue. One of the government's program written in Indonesian Development Plan is to perform law enforcement consistently, to build safety and security in the social life and to eradicate the CCN.” (Megawati, September 3rd 2001).

During 2002, Megawati seldom mentioned about corruption in her speeches. But, as explained before, mass media tended to repeat her statement about her commitment to fight against the CCN which was delivered in August 2001.

In the annual speech, August 1st 2003, Megawati mentioned again about CCN. She said that CCN in Indonesia is the one of the several sources for economy crisis in 1997. It means that Megawati tried to tell that CCN keeps going on and growing fast in the later time of her presidency.

“The important thing to be learned from the crisis in 1997 is how much dangerous the impact of the crisis into the life of nationhood and statehood. In the certain level, the high increasing of foreign and national debt and also the fall down of Indonesian banking system so far have connection with the CCN practices which have been growing so fast and spreading into the whole nation, especially in the time before the economy crisis. It is irony that when we tried hard to bring the actor(s) of the CCN in the executives institutions and privates to the court, now the CCN is also done collectively by a few politician, especially by people who have position as the local legislative institutions.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2003).

The statements mean that CCN was done not only by the executives but also by the legislatures, not only in the center but also in the local government. It also means that the CCN in Indonesia has been spreading in broader area. The corruption that was done by the legislative might be caused by the influence of the CCN to the cadre of political parties, that in turn they might be the members of the legislative institutions, as she stated on her speech below:

“The indicators of the weaknesses of the cadre education system are that the cadres of political parties have been influenced by the CCN that was actually a bad phenomenon which had driven us to smooth the reformation movement five years ago. [...] by heavyhearted I tell you that recently the phenomenon of CCN -- that in the past was suspected as the ‘disease’ for the executives persons – has infected to the legislatures, both in the province, regency, and municipality. [...] Many people said that those bad symptoms were raised because of two things, namely because of the large authority that was given to the local parliament, particularly the authority to accept or refuse responsibility report from governor, regent and high civil servants; and there is no supervising and controlling system for them, both by political parties who send them and the people who vote them in the general election. [...] In the short words, the great power of the members of the parliament was not equally followed by the proper responsibility or accountability mechanism. (Megawati’s speech, May 20th 2003).

Megawati gave the statement in the context of local autonomy that was given for local governments to manage all aspects of their life by themselves. No controlling and supervising mechanism made the legislative ‘play’ their decisions with the strategy of money politics. The main message of her speech is her admission that the CCN actions have widespread to all areas

and all governmental institutions in Indonesia. One of the sources of the extendability of the CCN, based on Megawati, was the lack of supervising and controlling mechanism for the local government. The driven factors of the development of the CCN in Indonesia were also mentioned by Megawati in another her speech:

“In the past, we witnessed various forms of deviation as a result of centralistic national perspective, which in the absence of effective public control, always had a tendency towards authoritarian. In the last decades prior to reform era, such authoritarian tendency was coupled with different forms of corruption, collusion and nepotism. To certain extent, this tendency continues to persist in the new order of post reform we are building nowadays. (Megawati’s speech, December 7th 2003)

“The other national problems have still been handled by the law enforcement apparatus, particularly in the problem of CCN. We do not lack of regulations and rules to eradicate the CCN and the other crimes. We do not also lack of institutions and personnel who must deal with the prevention and elimination of corruption. [...] However I need to explain that the final decision of the serial of the law processes is handled by the court and the law institutions that totally far from the government intervention.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2004)

Megawati in her speeches above claimed that CCN nowadays was a heritage of the new order administrative. It was coupled with the authoritarian and the centralistic national perspective. She also placed the unprofessional of the law enforcement institution as another sources of the ongoing CCN practices in Indonesia. Not only placed the failure of the CCN eradication on the institutions, but Megawati also saw that the role of the individual mentality gave contribution to the development of the CCN practices. People, personally, who were not strong to defense themselves from the temptation would drive the practices of CCN. It was stated by Megawati as below:

“In every time you will face any big temptation, even very big temptation to misuse your authority, including do the corruption or other CNN actions. The initiative to misuse authority like that can be influenced by yourselves, but it can be by persuasion or even pressure of the other parts. Whether you will be tempted or not, it depends on you personally, your moral which was cultivated by your parents, and your religiousness and also the personal integrity values you get from your ethnic.” (Megawati’s speech, August 5th 2004).

Referring to the statements I could say that Megawati really needed to identify the source or factors which contributed to the development of the CCN and the difficulties to eradicate it because there was a tendency that many people looked at Megawati’s performance in the CNN eradication was bad. Megawati herself admitted that she and the government felt the difficulty

to eliminate corruption and failed to attain her commitment. Not only once or twice, Megawati admitted her failure so many times in many occasions, even in her last annual state speech in 2004.

“[...] I understand that despite of all those efforts, the results have not yet met our expectation.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002).

“It is normal to be reflected how the corruption has developed so far and law violation keeps going on if there is no punishment.” (Megawati’s speech, October 5th 2002).

“During five years we have done several efforts to prevent, tackle, execute and recover the CCN [...] we have committed to improve in eliminating the crimes, even though based on our experiences, we can see that it is not an easy task. I know that many of us did not satisfy yet in tackling CCN. [...] The eradication of CCN actually does not connect with the technical law, but also with the aspects of social, economy and culture.” (Megawati, August 1st 2003)

“...corruption, collusion and nepotism was the one factor which triggered Indonesia felt down on the very serious economy crisis. It is very difficult to eliminate by the government nowadays.” (Megawati’s speech, November 13th 2003).

“We worry that the CCN which so far was predicted occurred in the central executive institutions, actually have disseminated to the local governments and also to the legislative institutions both in the center and local which being a core of autonomy program and have big financial budget.” (Megawati’s speech, May 5th 2004)

“The other national problem that still resolved is the law enforcement, especially in eradicating corruption. [...] But, it is the fact that our performance to eliminate and eradicate corruption has been successful yet. [...] As what happened in the law processes, I believe that no one which has been satisfied with the execution of the law violations.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2004).

The lack of success in corruption eradication was admitted definitely by Megawati even though the government’s development programs were emphasized on the CCN eradication. We should not be pessimistic when we realized that the CCN eradication, was not only to be the President’s commitment, that was followed by publishing any regulation to support government commitment, but it was set up as one of priority development programs in every year.

“The six main development programs of the cabinet of Gotong Royong are [...] (4) implementing law enforcement consistently, establishing the security stability in society, eradicate and eliminate CCN.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2001).

“In 2002 the policies, programs and activities with regard to politics and security are focused mainly on the following agenda: First...[...] Second, promotion of law enforcement with priority given to synchronizing activities in law enforcement, finalizing

major cases and preventing the practice of collusion, corruption and nepotism.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002).

“...six programs of the cabinet Gotong Royong [...] 4) Law enforcement, public safety and security and eradication of corruption. (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2003).

“The six main development programs of the cabinet of Gotong Royong are [...] (4) performing law enforcement consistently, establishing the security stability in society and continuing the effort to eradicate CCN.” (Megawati’s speech, August 16th 2004).

“In relating to the law enforcement, the government continues to do its utmost to fulfill the assembly’s mandate. To acquire a more solid legal foundation in combating corruption, in addition to Law No 20/2001 on the Amendment to Law No 31/1999 on Combating the Crime of Corruption, the government has legislated Law No 15/2002 on the crime of Money laundering.” (Megawati’s speech, August 1st 2002).

According to the description above, I would say that in the early of her presidency, Megawati by enthusiasm spoke about her commitment to fight against corruption, collusion and nepotism which has been growing fast, since the time of the HM Soeharto’s administration until the time of her administration. In that time, Indonesian people have positive wishes and hopes to the President’s commitment. However Megawati said for many times that it was not easy to fulfill her commitment to eradicate the CCN. She admitted that the government was not successful. It does not mean that Megawati admitted that the failure of the fulfillment of her commitment is because of the failure of her cabinet and the Indonesian government. As described above, she identified several factors that cause of the failure of the elimination and eradication of CCN in Indonesia. Almost all factors are external factors which were difficult to be controlled by her.

It shows that Megawati tended to use **dissociate strategy** when she must face and handle the critiques about her and the government’s failure in the case of corruption, collusion and nepotism. Table 35 below is a description of Megawati responses to the CCN in Indonesia.

Table 35
Megawati and the CCN of Indonesia
(2001-2004)

	Statements	Explanations
Commitment	Fight against CCN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To be the one priority of development programs of the cabinet.
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishing the institution/commission that dealing with the eradication of CCN
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publishing any regulation about CNN
Root of CCN and difficulty in eradicating	External factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The impact of feudalistic/authoritarian leadership of the New Order
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bad cadres of the political parties
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No controlling mechanism for local legislative
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unprofessional the law enforcement personnel/institution
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bad mentality of the Indonesian people
Evaluation by herself	Failed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not successful
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficult resolution
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People were not satisfied

Sources: Megawati textual speeches (2001-2004)

Table 35 above shows that Megawati used the dissociation strategy in responding the CCN issues and practices. She admitted the failure of her and her cabinet to resolve the CCN problems, but she did not want to take the blame. She took the blame on the external factors, not on herself or her cabinet.

If we compare it to the statements about terrorism, the commitment to fight against the practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism was less mentioned by Megawati. During four years of the Presidency, Megawati did not talk many times about the corruption in her formal speeches, especially in 2002. At this time, Megawati talked more about terrorism.

4.3.2. Megawati, Media and corruption

4.3.2.1. Indonesian Corruption

Performance of the government deals with the practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism always invited high attention and concern from publics, including mass media. And, it was connected to the commitments of the Presidents to combat and eliminate the practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism. The statements of the President about corruption, collusion and nepotism tended to be published and supported by media. However in another parts, the media criticized the government in their effort to eradicate the corruption.

Before the description of media about Megawati in dealing with corruption, firstly I need to describe how the media saw corruption occurring in Indonesia. It is necessary to analyze the media's position in the case of corruption, in order to look at its position in the relation between the President and the government, and Indonesian journalists. As viewed by Megawati, media see corruption as a serious problem for Indonesia, especially for the government in the context of crisis resolution. Through its editorial, media have tried to make a picture of this country's corruption, collusion and nepotism.

"We should be ashamed that Indonesia is placed on the lowest level in the list of corrupted countries in the world. But, it was more tragic, corruption has inhibited to make progress, corruption is a source of injustice and arbitrarily practices." (Kompas, July 26th 2001).

"Along with the efforts to promote peace and national unity, in early of the new government administration we must also proclaim to eradicate the practices of CCN. Without it, the new government will lose the good momentum to eradicate the corruption. And the result is the corruption will keep going, we will not make any progress. It is not efficient and we will not have any credibility." (Kompas, July 26th 2001).

"The prevention of CCN by the government is not just becoming public consumption. Indeed it is irony. During the era of reformation, we worked so very hard. Everything had tried to be reformed. How in that era, corruption was not subsided but it widespread to anywhere?" (Kompas, August 8th 2001).

"The CCN symptoms, including money politic, were spreading to everywhere in Indonesia. [...] about the raising of the few local Kings who decentralized CCN. The looseness of central control had driven the local officials to be more lose to practice CCN." (Kompas, October 25th 2001)

"We know that CCN is like a disease for this nation. The New Order had collapsed. It was because of the huge uncontrolled practices of CCN. Since long time ago, we criticized CCN practices because it was a parasite which destroyed Indonesian life. [...] However, the number of CCN practices was not reduced but increased. [...] Corruptions that are occurred in this country, is not only done by executives officials. In the transition era, the officials of legislatures were 'wilder' to practice CCN. [...] It is also done by the officials in judicative. (Kompas, October 30th 2001)

"Business industry has to take the responsibility of this current situation. Their behavior to start their business by doing mark-up and their contribution to the growth of the practices CCN causes the business kingdom they built was like "sandy kingdom. [...] We together know that the practices of CCN did not subside but contrarily, it developed. Even, it is more frankly because done in the situation which is open and transparent." (Kompas, May 14th 2002).

“The practices of CCN itself were continuing in the larger scale and it used by methods which are ignoring the risks. (Kompas, August 4th 2003).

“It is so sadden, we see the condition right now. The practices of CCN are displayed openly and frankly. [...] We often hear how the members of legislative institution to be arrogant to each other, to show off their possessions. [...] whereas we know their condition before they became the members of the legislative institutions.” (Kompas, November 11th 2003).

“We have to say that there is no progress in the judicative institution. The reason is there are cases which not yet finished and executed, but also more people in this institution get involve in the practice of corruption. It happened not only in the first general courts but also in the highest general courts.” (Kompas, January 1st 2003).

“[...] And which is most apprehensive is the CCN is not wiped out and reduced, in contrast, it is enhancing to everywhere. The political actions and law to this social diseases and crime do not give good result. They are not effective.” (Kompas, December 5th 2003).

“The practices of CCN have already internalized in our nation and that has actually strapped us into the crisis.” (Kompas, March 1st 2004)

Those editorials showed that the media looked at the practices of the corruption, collusion and nepotism have internalized so deeply and thoroughly into the people and spread into the whole Indonesian areas, not only in the executive, legislative and judicative institution, but also in the central, or local areas. Media also saw that corruption, collusion and nepotism were the source or the root of the broader of Indonesian problems, such as the crisis and the difficult crisis resolution and difficult reformation. In addition, the CCN practices in Indonesia varies in methods, and more transparent. Media also quoted the Indonesian rank in CCN based on the Survey of International Transparency to enforce or highlight the label that Indonesia was indeed a very bad country in the world in the aspect of CCN. The picture of Indonesia, especially in relation to the CCN, described by mass media was not so different from the picture described by the President. It means that the President admitted about the bad condition of Indonesia in case of corruption.

The impact of ongoing CCN practices was mentioned also by journalists. Crisis was one of the effects of practices of CCN. CCN was mentioned as a cause of crisis developed to be serial, highly escalated and hard. It also caused the crisis to be people's responsibility. The innocent people had bigger responsibility than it was for the persons who made mistakes, law violation and social crimes (Kompas, November 3rd 2001). Corruption is the inhibit factor for progress making, a source of injustice and also as arbitrarily practices (Kompas, July 26th 2001)

and CCN is not only making Indonesian economy 'fall down' but also enhancing the cruel injustice, disappearing investors, and placing the national honor and trust on the lowest level of another nations (Kompas, August 18th 2001), CCN is the one of the main sources of injustice and social gap (Kompas, August 4th 2003), CCN causes people to be responsible for highly economical cost, but high level of business community might use "peaceful negotiation" by bribing.(Kompas, October 4th 2003), CCN is a serious social disease and crime, which destroy our past, present and future life (Kompas, February 16th 2004).

Based on media, it can be said that how the government deals with corruption can be looked as how the government deals with crisis. The part of crisis is corruption. It means that the strategy to eradicate the crisis is similar to the strategy to make crisis out from Indonesia. Thus, it is important to take the government's effort to eradicate corruption in the area of crisis resolution strategy. Media, as what they usually have done, watched and criticized the president and Indonesian government's efforts in doing this. So many colorful comments were made by the media.

4.3.2.2. Megawati and the Corruption: Media Portrayal

Positive assessment and hope firstly published by media to the President commitment to eradicate CCN only few days after Megawati delivered it in her first state annual speech, August 16th 2001. Media and publics focused their comments more on the statement of the President who asked to her family not to do CCN. Kompas wrote in the editorial as below:

"That priority was described by the President. Strengthen the unity and oneness of this nation and state, preventing disintegration. [...] We appreciated with the attitude of the President who was aware of the signals, hopes and people demands. Please get up the government and clean governance, which are free from CCN. Not started by the others but by their environment." (Kompas, August 10, 2001).

"The statement of the president that she prohibited her family not to do CCN invited public's applause, appreciation and support. [...] This commitment was so hard. Don't discourage if almost all do not easy to believe it. It was not only because the same statements were also delivered by the prior presidents in the past, but also the issues of CCN were being internalized, rooted and it was a part of feudalism structure which gave a big chance for the practice of CCN, gave power as privilege [...] There was a big opportunity, smart temptation [...] Rationalization was easy to be made. The Indonesian business communities have been trapped into the corrupted business practices. [...] It is a big task. We appreciate with good willing and commitment of the President, which, like or dislike, is followed by the commitment of the vice president, ministers and the other government officials. [...] The president has made a good step..." (Kompas, August 18th 2001).

“However, once again, the improvement is not enough by giving statements. It has to be followed by a real action which can be seen and felt by any one that we really want to develop this country. The other thing we need is communication building. The government has to be more active to communicate with the strategic components, in this case is with the business communities.” (Kompas, October 24th 2001).

“The government of Megawati Soekarnoputri [...] will correct and improve the policy and bad practice in the past.⁵¹ And now, we can see the positive changes are going on. The Indonesian government wants to make correction and make policy better than those in the past.” (Kompas, October 25th 2001).

“According to the President, CCN was robbery. The actors of CCN were thieves, whatever their position and degree. Therefore the CCN actors have to be proceeded by law to take their responsibility toward what they have been done. The President asked to the leaders and the members of the youth organization for cutting off the series of the robberies. The practices of CCN, which have been done for so long time ago, even become our culture were identified as the one of economy crisis factors. [...] the statement was accepted well by several parties. At least, it was just the first time a president used the term openly and defined a corruptor so clearly.” (Kompas, October 30th 2001).

“President Megawati Soekarnoputri repeated her statement that they must decide priority. Those were economy recovery, political life normalization by using the reformation paradigm and restore the security and safety. Eradication of the corruption was the one of the priorities of the government. The priorities determination by the government was absolutely right decision. [...] especially for the priority to eradicate CCN. [...] We also appreciated for the President’s honesty, concern and modesty. Those were valuable social capital and needed to implement the government’s priorities.” (Kompas, November 3rd 2001).

“It is correct for the President Megawati Soekarnoputri to ask to the business communities to change their behavior quickly. The business communities’ attitude which just oriented to get benefit as much as they can has driven us to be trapped into the crisis. [...] Their behavior [...] have made the practices of CCN growing.” (Kompas, May 14th 2002).

“President Megawati Soekarnoputri in her report emphasized on the problem and challenged the CCN eradication. She said that it was not easy to eliminate those social disease and crime. [...] Megawati’s statement was correct. Eradicating and preventing CCN were really not easy, not an easy task. It was right also the statement of People Representative Assembly that eradicating CCN was not easy. It needed sacrifice, diligence and consistency. Sacrificing began from the government leaders, in the private and public sector, and in the state, public or private institutions.” (Kompas, August 4th 2003).

⁵¹ The practices mentioned above are about corruption and collusion that usually were decentralized to the local areas, not only in the center. It is usually connected to the implementation of local autonomy.

In the other part of Kompas editorials, negative assessments were also made. It is usually delivered in the form of criticism and advises which always linked together.

“Corruption as a cause of the crisis became responsibility, more for the people. [...] it was the reason why executing and preventing the practices of CCN was never enough and not satisfied the truth and justice. It made the concept of eradication of gap, violation and social crime was not so really urgent for the political elites and government. (Kompas, November 3rd 2001).

“Live modestly, that was the words that we often heard recently. Started by President Megawati Soekarnoputri [...] which persuaded the higher governmental officials to begin living modestly and efficiently. [...] And then what was the result? Live modestly never comes true. [...] The question was why it happened? It was because the expectation of living modestly was just lip service.” (Kompas, December 28th 2001).

“Not many people believed when in her closing year speech, Megawati declared to eradicate CCN. During 2001 it was recorded the President at least said the similar statement four times [...] The skeptical attitude was based on the fact that the practices of CCN was not decreased but increased.” (Kompas, January 1st 2002).

“We understood the reason of the Megawati’s dissatisfaction to the performance of Supreme Court in the case of the eradication of CCN. It was many times the cases of CCN were brought to the court but finally the actors were released. [...] It can’t be freed from the influence of unserious government to eradicate CCN. The government itself often did not strong enough to promote the law, strengthened the internal discipline, to show that they really want to eliminate CCN. [...] And then did the President take action to the case⁵²? Actually not! Even though she had not directly said, the President felt better not to change or ask the Head of General Attorney to be non-active, only by the reason that the new person could not guaranteed that everything would to be better.” (Kompas, November 29th 2002).

“The President has authority to control the performance of General Attorney because it is the task of the executives. Surprisingly, the President did not concern to get involved in the case of the Head of General Attorney’ accusation about the concealing his riches.” (Kompas, January 13th 2003).

“The persuasion of the President to work hard and live modestly, at least raising the question, is the persuasion serious, is the persuasion credible. So far, willingness and enthusiasm of the government were not so clear. Surprisingly, we saw and felt the opposite situation. (Kompas, January 14th 2003).

“We do not need to deny that there are still any weaknesses. The government which does not have leadership, CCN behavior increases and the attitude of few people who are interested more in their right than their duty increases too.” (Kompas, February 28th 2003).

⁵² It is about the case of the Head of Indonesian General Attorney who suspected have concealed his richness.

“Beside the economical condition, people focus their criticism on the law enforcement, prevention and CCN investigation. [...] People disappointment and critiques were directed not only to the government administration and the developments which were done by Ministers, but also to their leadership. (Kompas, May 5th 2003)

“Law and regulation made them (*business communities – writer*) under the government. For working fluently, even for living properly, business communities must be “nice” to the government and not only fulfill the duty to pay the tax. It made them to be pressured to bribe and blackmailed.” (Kompas, October 4th 2003).

“Megawati admitted honestly that the recruitment system for the candidates of legislatures members in the general election 1999 was not objective. It contained the practice of nepotism. [...] Her statement was very honest.” (Kompas, November 20th 2003).

“Actually the new government or the reformation government, which changes the President three times, has not made any improvement for people yet. [...] more disappointed when the government, political elites and also various governmental institutions have not been successful yet to perform good governance and administration, which is free from corruption. The situation and condition seem very massy.” (Kompas, December 5th 2003)

“The goals to eradicate CCN always be declared. Politically we have listed CCN eradication on the decree. However, CCN was not reduced. Even, increasing not only in number, but also it was more transparent, especially after we were not able to behave distinctly, to give hard punishment to them who did CCN.” (Kompas, February 16th 2004).

“Information about the practices of CCN was the more transparent and open. It was because of the democracy and the existence of mass media. It seemed they kept shouting, looking for attention. Imagine what will happen if they are ignored by the government officials and authorized institutions. It will cause disappointment, frustration, discouragement and hopelessness.” (Kompas, July 2nd 2004).

“In her annual speech August 16th 2004, President Megawati admitted that the efforts to eradicate CCN were still so far from the expectation. President said that actually the government has done optimally to eradicate CCN but the law processes were out from her authority. We intentionally emphasized on the corruption eradication because recently we saw the heavy risk we got as the impact of the government incapability to take firm action to the practices of CCN.” (Kompas, August 20th 2004).

The media stated that the efforts of the government to eliminate and eradicate CCN were not absolutely successful. It is indicated by many statements of the media that the practices of CCN in Indonesia, during reformation era, especially in the era of Megawati Soekarnoputri's administration are highly increasing in number and volume. It is also mentioned by media that the failure in corruption eradication was because of the weaknesses of the government. Media

concluded the main weaknesses of the government are: (1) the political elites and government had no strong and consistent commitment to eradicate the corruption; and (2) the government was not serious to eradicate CCN. However, media highlighted the acknowledgement of the president about her failure to eliminate corruption and that her failure was contributed by the unprofessional of the law enforcement personnel, such as the officials of general attorney and Supreme Court. Media agreed that corruption eradication was not an easy task. It was because of the weaknesses of the governmental institutions, as explained before, beside, CCN had already internalized into the Indonesian people to be culture.

In general, I can say that the media looked at the performance of the President and government to eradicate CCN was not quite good. Media tended to assess that Megawati and the Indonesian government failed to eradicate CCN. Their commitment had not been followed by the equal and real action. There was no consistency between the statement and action.

If comparing the statements of the president with the media, they have similar opinion about CCN eradication done by the government. The President admitted her failure, and media also looked at the performance of the President and her cabinet in the similar way. But, there are a few differences between the Indonesian media and the President when they looked at the similar thing, Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, as listed in Table 36.

Table 36
Megawati and Media:
The Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (CCN)

Dimension	Megawati	Mass Media
Assessment in CCN eradication	Not successful	Failed
Commitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very committed • To be the one of six government's priorities program 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not serious • Not consistent • Just lip services
Source of the failure	External factors, not part of the government's weaknesses	Internal and external (the government itself and the other institutions)
Frequency of talking about	Not many times	Many times, often

The low assessment, based on media's point of view, about government and president's performance in handling CNN become an indicator that there is no conducive and supportive relationship between media and the president. It shows that there is no good cooperation between them to solve the crisis.

4.4. CONCLUSION

In the case of terrorism, Megawati tended to be accommodative in early of time. But, when the time came up and there were many critics and negative assessment from publics and media, she tended to be defensive. She shifted the blame to the Indonesian people who did not participate in the national security tasks, and to the other countries which did not commit to encounter the terrorism actions. In the case of corruption collusion and nepotism issues, Megawati also applied the defensive strategy to respond to the public's criticism. She admitted her failure in corruption actions eradication but she rejected to admit that the failure is caused by ineffective efforts of the government. Megawati tended to shift the blame to the other parts by giving statements as follow (1) people mentality was corrupt, (2) corruption became the culture of the "New Orde" and it inherited to be the Indonesian culture, (3) other institutions such as Indonesian general attorney, Indonesian national police, and also local legislative institution were not serious to fight corruption. Those three things were thought as the sources of the failure, as Megawati mentioned. More intensive publics and media spoke about her failure in the case of terrorism and corruption, more defensive Megawati was.

Why did it happen? What factors could drive Megawati to select the defensive strategy for the two cases, even in all cases? These questions are answered and explained in the last chapter.

CHAPTER 5

CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AND THE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS : A CONCLUSION

5.1. THE STRATEGY IS DEFENSIVE

Referring to the finding, it can be concluded that almost all the presidents of the Republic of Indonesia tended to use a defensive strategy to defense or restore or reconstruct their image. In the different cases and situations, they always apply self defensive strategy.

Table 38 shows the strategy used by the presidents. HM Soeharto, in the first time stated that the crisis was a biggest national problem. He used defending strategy, which is divided into four specific defense strategies, namely: (1) denial, (2) counterattack, (3) differentiation/ scapegoating, (4) opinion-knowledge dissociation. Even though he used four different specific strategies, all are categorized as a dissociate strategy. It is used for achieving main intention, is the strategy to deny the mistake, or make distance from a wrongdoing. As explained before, HM Soeharto faced the situation in which his image was in danger because of people's perception that he failed to reform the nation, he was not capable to eradicate people from poverty, and also was not able to minimize the corruption, collusion and nepotism actions. The final excess of those was the people's demand for resignation of HM Soeharto. In this situation, HM Soeharto claimed that people's assessments were not absolutely true. The statements were not reasonable, and only constructed by a few small group of people. Even more, he fenced the people who gave the statements by using words: "I am ready to against them. They must face with me." He used not only denial strategy, but also counterattack, differentiation and opinion-knowledge dissociation strategy. It can be understood why those strategies were used by Soeharto, especially in a case where he was in the edge of his existence after held the power for 32 years.

Different from Soeharto, BJ Habibie, in the case of crisis, admitted the failure of the crisis recovery was contributed by incapability of the government and governmental institutions. He also made apology for it and said sorry for this to the Indonesian people. He also promised on his statements to improve the Indonesian political, economy and social situation. It can be said that he used adapting strategy by admitting his failure to reform Indonesia and eradicate crisis. And he made clear actions for improving it. It is very understandable he used this strategy. Habibie was in time of image building. He needs to

improve his reputation after the last government administration which had very bad image on publics in dealing with the crisis and reformation. On the other hand, he also used self defense strategy by giving the statements that the weaknesses of the governments could be separated by the weaknesses of the New Order administration. It means that Habibie took the blame not only on his current administration but also on the other administration. Habibie did not want to take all responsibility for the failure in crisis and crisis resolution.

Similar to Habibie's strategies, Megawati also combined two big strategies in dealing with the crisis or critical cases. She used not only defending strategy but also adapting strategy. She tended to use adapting strategy in facing crisis in her early administration. She admitted that the crisis happened because of many factors, internal and external factors. The bigger one was the weaknesses of the Indonesian governmental institutions both in the past and present. These factors gave contribution to the crisis and prolonged crisis resolution. It is more than the factors from international situation or publics. This acknowledgment can be meant that she herself as a part of the government and people, took the responsibilities, although only a few, for the crisis. In that time her statements can be categorized as adapting strategy, more specifically it was an evasion strategy, admitted that a part of the crisis was contributed by her weaknesses of the government. In contrast, in the end of her administration, when she faced the people assessment to the failure of her cabinet to overcome the crisis as people expectation, she used defending strategy by blaming other people as a source of the failure of crisis handling. She emphasized on the people mentality which is more unsupportive for crisis resolution. In addition to that prolonged crisis, Megawati also made distance from the wrong doing by giving statements that crisis in Indonesia was more difficult to be solved than it was in other countries. She said the difficulties of the government to solve the crisis were contributed by two things; (1) Indonesian people mentality; and (2) the situation of the crisis itself. It means that the crisis occurrence and prolonged crisis resolution were results of the problems on those factors. In the other part, she always reported the progresses and the positive result of her efforts in recovering the Indonesia's situation after the crisis. She said that the prolonged crisis was not caused by the mistakes of the government. It indicates that Megawati used defending strategy, by shifting the blame on the other part or people. She shifted the blame to the publics and the crisis itself. It was called as differentiation strategy, more specifically called as counterattack strategy or scapegoat strategy.

Particularly in the case of terrorism, especially in the early step of the development of the US's attack to Afghanistan issue, Megawati was carefully listening to the Indonesian people

who criticized that Indonesian government did not take quick responses. Facing that kind of criticism, Megawati took hard efforts to accommodate the people wants and demands and tended to make similar steps what the people did. She used accommodating strategy. On the other hand, when the terrorism actions were experienced by Indonesian itself (in case of Bali Bombing) people gave not conducive response for the government. They criticized that the government (c.q. Indonesian national police) had failed to maintain and establish Indonesian security from terrorist attacks. In the early of this time, Megawati used defending strategy by giving statement that terrorism could happen every where and every time. It was difficult to be predicted when and where terrorist would take actions, even more, the security technology system for terrorism in Indonesia still stayed behind. For instance, USA that has very sophisticated and modern military technology could not be free from terrorism acts. But in the same time, she also used accommodative strategy, she asked Indonesian people to fight for terrorism through her statements and actions. The target of audiences was more for international publics than national publics. The statements showed the willingness of her to hear Indonesian public's voices, to be empathic for them, and together with them to do actions to solve the problem. It was an indication of accommodative strategy in responding to the crucial issues. She claimed frequently that Indonesia and the Indonesian government has been successful to handle the terrorism acts, not only by producing anti terror regulation, but also by identifying, investigating, bringing them into the court and executing them. She claimed also that Indonesia was more successful and consistent than US or other countries which are concern on the terrorism combating.

In another case, namely corruption, collusion and nepotism (CCN – KKN-Ind), Megawati assessed that Indonesia failed in CCN eradication even though it could not be said that the government's efforts were meaningless. She always said that the government along with her had worked very hard for it. Since people saw that the government failed to eradicate CCN, Megawati shifted the blame to the other parts. She said that too many Indonesian people saw CCN as something not illegal and they accepted it as a part of Indonesian values and norms. It was the biggest of the sources of the crisis and difficult crisis resolution. She also blamed the law enforcement institutions, such as the Indonesian General Attorney as other sources of the failure. Shifting the blame to other parties is the one strategy of dissociation or self defense. It also means that Megawati did not definitely mention that she, as a part of the government, made the mistakes and did the wrongdoing about the increasing of the number of the CCN acts and the failure of its eradication. Megawati also used opinion knowledge

dissociation strategy since she said that CCN was the problem of all the presidents. The failure to eliminate CCN did not belong only to Megawati. Megawati took the failure on the broader context and problem. She made apology for it but she asked for the people to think it as only a part of the broader context.

All strategies used by the presidents are shown briefly on table 37 below.

Table 37
Crisis Communication Strategies

Personal	Organizational	Tactics	HM Soeharto	BJ Habibie	Megawati		
					Case 1/Crisis	Case 2/Terrorism	Case 3/CCN
Defending	Dissociation	Denial	√				
		Counterattack	√				
		Differentiation	Scapegoating		Shift the blame to the other party		Scapegoating / shifting the blame
		Apology					Said sorry for the failure.
		Legal	Opinion-knowledge dissociation		Opinion-knowledge dissociation	Opinion-knowledge dissociation	Opinion-knowledge dissociation
Adapting	Apology	Evasion			Take a few of responsibilities		
		Reducing offensiveness of the act					
		Corrective action			Give the statements about the progress of crisis recovery.	Give the statements about the government's effort in handling the terrorism acts and issues.	
		Mortification		Take the responsibility and makes apology			

5.2. THE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

5.2.1. The Structured Public Relations

In the context of crisis, how effective of crisis management strategy of the organization can be product of how the organization thinks and position public relations – as a part of organization and representation of the publics. To resolve the crisis, it needs to build and maintain good and supportive relationship between the government and the publics. The relationship between the government and the publics can be indicated by the role and functions, the relationship model, mechanism and procedures of the Public Relations practices.

As mentioned in the earlier chapter, the Indonesian Government Public Relations (GPR) was constructed by the former leaders in an ideal way. It means that the government positioned PR function as a communication facilitator to establish an equal relationship between the government and its publics. As stated by the founding fathers of Indonesian GPR, Government Public Relations must be open for communication sharing with publics, for information exchange. The relationship between the government and the publics must be equal, means there is always high participation of the publics in the process of policy making. Empirically, Indonesian GPR was positioned by the government in a reverse way. GPR was more closed system. GPR staffs were asked to hold technical role and function and to operate one way communication model. They were just a tool to convey the government statements and voices. Procedures and mechanism for presidential communication was so formal, directed and controlled by the power holder.

This kind of Public Relations structure and communication system has been applied since HM Soeharto administration until Megawati's presidency. It means that in the era of Megawati's administration, the structure of the Public Relations and the presidential communication rules and procedures tended to be closed, mechanistic and centralistic. There was not an equal relationship between the Presidents and Publics Relations. This kind of relationship is not conducive for crisis resolution. It was worsened by the negative image of the presidents. Bad image, as mentioned earlier, can be an indicator of bad relationship between the governments and publics. All conditions can be thought as one of many contexts for crisis communication strategy chosen by the President.

5.2.2. The Distrustful Relationship between President and Media

The quality of the relationship between the president and the press can be seen by observing the way of the press to construct the news about the president and the way of the president to

respond to the news or reportage about the president. How did Kompas and Media Indonesia, the national newspapers, look at the President's response strategy. In fact, these news papers' reportage for each case was different. There were three cases to be analyzed. The assessment discrepancy that exists between news reportage and president about the government/president's performance in dealing with the crisis can be indication of the relationship between media and government/ president. Table 38 below describes it.

Table 38
President and the Press

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3
President looks at the their own performance	Successful	Successful	Not successful
Media/Kompas look at the president's performance	Failed	Successful	Failed

In case one, the president and media have different assessment of the government's performance in dealing with the crisis. They have contradictory statements. In case of crisis handling and crisis recovery, media assessed that the government was not successful to recover the Indonesian situation after crisis. On the other hand, the government felt good with their performance. In case two and case three, there were similar assessments. Government admitted that they failed in handling the case and media said the similar statements. In the other thing, only in the case of terrorism media saw that the government was successful. The success is indicated by the degree of satisfaction of people about the government's action in facing and managing the issues of crisis. Satisfaction means that the government's efforts meet the people's expectation. In contrast, in two other cases, Kompas said in a 'negative' manner about government's performance. What does it mean?

It is difficult to say there was no good relationship between Kompas and the President even though in the two cases. This media focused its reportage more on the weaknesses and the failure of the government. "Negative views" from media was getting increased in the end of the time of Megawati administration. In contrast, in the similar time, Megawati also looked at the press as "her enemy". She said that critiques from media were not longer objective, but tended to "kill" the government reputation. On other side, negative views from media can be looked as manifestation of the media responsibility for Kompas to control and criticize the government. Media thought that Megawati did not have willingness to be criticized. In this

case, this kind of relationship in which there was no similar, even more, opposite thought on viewing the same object, and tended to look down on each other was not supportive and conducive. It was strengthened by Megawati's responses in which tended to defend herself against media which gave a bad judgment for her. In this kind of situation when she thought that her reputation and existence would have been destroyed by media, defending strategy was used by Megawati. Crisis was worsened by the communication problem, and vice versa. Government failed to build and maintain the relationship with the media. Government failed to build mutual trust and understanding between them. And it was absolutely as a representation of bad relationship, especially in the end of Megawati's presidency. This kind of relationship might lead someone or an organization to respond to the crisis by self defending strategy. It is different from the situation, in which an organization or a person has good relationship with media. In this situation, media supposed to assist the organization or the person to solve the problem and focused their news report more on the positive or progress manner in crisis resolution.

Good relationship between government and media, as indicated by the above criteria, was experienced by BJ Habibie and Gus Dur in the early of his presidency. BJ Habibie, the one who decided to revoke the publish permit for press, built an equal relationship between him and the media. Freedom of the press took place in his era. People called it as "honeymoon era" for both the media and the government. As explained before, at that time BJ Habibie used adapting strategy in dealing with the crisis. As we know, Habibie held the highest power of the Republic of Indonesia only less than one year. He was still in time of image building as the new president. It means that the factors could be the background of adapting strategy selection. The factors are (1) there was good supporting from media; (2) it happened in early time of his presidency; and (3) the crisis that it was contributed also by the government weaknesses and failure. The last statement indicated that there was perception of self-involvement to the crisis. Theoretically, if the organization thought that they also contributed to the existed crisis, it tended to use adapting strategy than defending strategy. It was done by Habibie.

On the other hand, HM Soeharto, the President during New Orde administration used self defense strategy. He used all tactics which are grouped in defending strategy. Why did he use this kind of strategy? Was there no good supporting from media for him in dealing with the crisis? In 1998, Soeharto was in the edge of his power. People demanded him to resign because of his failure to reform the country and nation. Not only Indonesia in crisis, but also he was in crisis. As explained on prior chapters, HM Soeharto did not want to admit that crisis existed

due to his or government's failure. He did not admit his failure. There was no mistake of him and the government. It means that there was no self involvement in the existed crisis. Based on the theory, the situation in which an organization or a person feels that they do not get involved on the existed crisis, it or he tended to use the defending strategy.

5.2.3. Crisis Situation: the International Involvement

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the selection of strategy depends on the situation of crisis. This situation is characterized by; (1) crisis attribution both external and personal control, (2) organizational performance, and, (3) severity of crisis damage. The situation of crisis may vary, depends on the variety of the elements of the crisis. According to Coombs (1998), the strategy selected by the Presidents of the Republic of Indonesia could be affected by the crisis situation. As described earlier, crisis in Indonesia in time of HM Suharto was admitted as something that could be denied. The crisis happened because of the external problem and Indonesia just received the impact of it. It means that the crisis, based on HM Suharto, the second President of the Republic of Indonesia, was because of the external sources. The control of the Indonesian government for the crisis was limited. In the case of organizational performance, HM Suharto thought his administration and government's performance was good. He had positive self assessments about his performance. There was not any problem with the government even when the crisis came. It means that Suharto viewed that he had a good and positive organizational performance. In the other elements, Suharto also looked at the crisis as something not hard and did not bring big damage to Indonesia. He believed that Indonesia's economy situation was quite strong to face the crisis.

BJ Habibie, the third President of the Republic of Indonesia, looked at the crisis differently. He said that the crisis in Indonesia happened because of the weaknesses of Indonesian governments and the people's mentality which made them not capable to face and manage crisis faster and in the right way. It means that Habibie tended to look at the crisis was because of the internal sources or internal problems in the government and governmental institutions. Habibie in crisis time also saw that Indonesian government did not have positive performance. In many parts, Habibie saw his past administration (New Orde Administration) failed to perform their functions. At last, he looked at the crisis was a serious problem that brought very negative impact for Indonesian life. Crisis was something very hard and dangerous so it must be handled carefully and quickly. Habibie faced the different situation. The usage of this strategy can be connected to the different perception of the situation of crisis.

He thought that the government must be responsible for crisis resolution. These factors could be related to the strategy of accommodation he applied.

In the same case, Megawati admitted that Indonesia was really in crisis. Although she claimed that crisis was caused by the internal and external problems, in early of her administration she admitted that the crisis was caused more by the weaknesses and incapability of the governmental institutions to handle the crisis. She emphasized to the personal factor as locus of crisis. Therefore, improving the personal weaknesses is the best solution for crisis recovery. It means she admitted that the government's performance was not quite good. Megawati also realized the damage of the crisis was so big. And in that time, she used accommodative strategy. However in the end of her presidency she changed her strategy. She thought that the prolonged crisis was not because of her personal/ organizational fallacy. She took the blame on the external control. She also said that the organization's performance in dealing with the crisis was very positive, and there was not any problem with it. The severity of the crisis damage was not so big any longer. She also thought that Indonesia was in a good condition. It is clear in crisis, she applied defensive strategy.

The explanation about the situation of crisis interpreted by each president can be related to the strategy of crisis response. The different perception about situation of each crisis leads to the different strategy. By using Coombs' formula, it can be understandable the three of the presidents used different crisis response strategy. Table 39 can be used to explain briefly about the situation of the crisis and crisis response strategy used by Suharto, Habibie and Megawati.

Table 39
Elements of Crisis Situation

Elements of Crisis Situation	Suharto	Habibie	Megawati	
			Early	End
Crisis attribution	External	Personal	Personal	External
Organizational performance	Positive	Negative	Negative	Positive
Severity of crisis damage	Low	High	High	Low
Strategy of crisis response	Defensive	Accommodative	Accommodative	Defensive

Of course, these above crisis situations are perceptual. It is created and interpreted by individual, in this case is the presidents. It is the subjective assessment. So, the strategy is

selected on the basis of his/her perception. If compared to the Coombs statement, it looks quite similar that the accommodative strategy is used in the situation as follow: (1) when the crisis source can be controlled by an organization, (2) the organization has negative performance in dealing with the crisis in the past, and (3) the severity of crisis damage is high. In contrast, in the situation where crisis locus is outside of the organization, performance of the organization is positive and the degree of damage caused by the crisis is low, the strategy of defense is applied.

Even though Coombs statement seems right to look at the situation of crisis as the factor influence to select the strategy, there are other factors that might interact with the strategy. As described above, the strategy of the crisis response was selected not only on the basis of the crisis situation, but also the other factors, such as the perception of the crisis responsibility and the degree of threat of image damage. If the crisis responsibility of crisis is weak, the defensive strategy is more useful. In contrast, if the crisis responsibility of crisis is strong the strategy should be accommodative. They also mentioned the threat of image damage. The bigger organizational responsibility, the bigger the threat to image damage is. The high threat of image damage leads an organization or a person to choose accommodative strategy in crisis response. Let see how the presidents percept the organizational responsibility for the crisis. HM Soeharto clearly said that crisis happened because of the external factors. Those statements can be thought as the rejection of him and his cabinet to take crisis responsibility. Crisis responsibility of Soeharto was weak. The threat of image damage was also low. In fact, HM Soeharto used defensive strategy. In contras, BJ Habibie looked at that the crisis has the result of the weaknesses of the government. It means that Habibie took the responsibility for the crisis and thought that the image damage because of crisis was high. He used accommodative strategy. On the other hand, in the early time, Megawati admitted that crisis was because of the internal problems but in the end of her administration, she said in different way. She said that the source of the crisis was not in the government but in the public mentality. It means that in early of her administration, Megawati took the responsibility, but in the end time she did not. In early time she thought that the image damage because of crisis was high but in the end time of crisis, the threat of image damage decreased. The strategy of crisis response was changed, from accommodative to defensive strategy.

In the other research Coombs and Holliday (2001:321-340) mentioned the threat of image damage will be greater for the organization with the unfavorable relationship history than for the organization with favorable relationship history. In this research, Coombs and Holliday

said that relationship history is one part of performance history. An organization with positive relationship with its publics will be easier to maintain its organizational image in crisis. In context of this research, relationship history can be breakdown into two, those are the relationship between the government or president and journalists, and the general publics. As mentioned, in time of Megawati administration, and generally in other presidents' administration, there was a point of time of favorable relationship between them. It is called "a honeymoon era". Generally it happened in early time of their administration. Megawati and Gus Dur have similar relationship history with the media or journalists. In early time, they have a favorable relationship, but in the end of time, the relationship worsened. Media told contrast story about crisis recovery. On the other hand, Habibie had favorable relationship with media. The freedom of the press developed in time of his administration. Open communication and interaction established in that time. Media also told in favorable way about Habibie's performance. On the basis of media portrayal, it can be seen the relationship between the president and its general publics. When people positively saw the President's performance, it can be meant that they had favorable relationship. In crisis, HM Soeharto and its publics stayed in unfavorable relationship and Habibie was seen by its publics in a good way. Megawati experienced two different situations of the relationship. These things can be understood as the factors that lead to the strategy of crisis response. Positive relationship probably reduced the degree of threat of image damage. An organization or a person with favorable relationship will be more secure in crisis than those with unfavorable relationship. In this condition, the strategy of defensive will be more useful. Refusing that she was doing wrong can be accepted easier by publics for the organization with favorable relationship. However, it is not to be done. Soeharto, with unfavorable relationship, tended to use defensive strategy. As a result of the crisis was going worse. Gus Dur and Megawati, in the end of their administration, used defensive strategy even though they did not have favorable relationship with their publics. Megawati in the end of her administration rejected the publics' statement of her unsuccessful efforts to recover the crisis. Even more, she shifted the blame to the people. Theoretically it is absolutely not effective for her and the crisis resolution. And, in fact, it was. Both of them failed to maintain positive image on publics.


Let us see the cases of terrorism and corruption that had to be responded by Megawati. As aforementioned description, in case of terrorism, Megawati applied accommodative and defensive strategy in the same time. In the first time of bombing in WTC, USA (2001), when people criticized that she did not have crisis sense in context of terrorism, she denied by saying

that the slowness of her response was symbols of carefulness of actions. The selected strategy can be understood by the situational factors such as the crisis was thought as external causes, and the severity of crisis damage for Indonesia was low. Because of the external causes, she thought that she should not to take the responsibility too high. It means that she and the government's responsibility for this event were low. It also means that the threat of image damage for the President and her cabinet was low. However in time of Bali bombing (2002) and other terrors by bomb happened in the following time, Megawati changed her strategy. She used defensive strategy. These are the factors can be the basis of the strategy. The situation in that time was very crucial. The severity of crisis damage was very hard. The threat of image damage on international and national public was very high. Even more, the image of this nation was in danger. Unfortunately, Megawati said that crisis was unavoidable. Terrorism acts could happen every time and everywhere. She thought that the source of the crisis was from external, although she admitted that the military and police institutions' performance were not quite good also. In contrast, when the terror by bomb was still ongoing and increasing in frequency and intensity, and when it was followed by negative responses from the other countries and international world, when media saw the failure of the government in anticipating bombing, Megawati changed her strategy. She thought that her image was in danger if she and the government could do nothing. She tended to be more responsive for listening to public's voices, actively created statements about government action and position in relation to the international world, adaptive to the dynamic public discourse. It was an indicator of corrective action strategy and mortification. The two tactics are categorized in the accommodative strategy. The factors mentioned by Coombs were not enough to be used. There were any other factors such as media and international public pressures which also give contribution to the person or organization in strategy selection. On the case of terrorism, the media and publics' negative assessment are seen clearly as the important factors which have connection with the defensive strategy.

It can be learned from the case of Megawati that in creating strategy to respond to the terrorism issue and bombing acts. Megawati used two different strategies in the different situation and time. According to the Ihlen's research, the strategy can be changed if the initial response or strategy could not be accepted and it is criticized by media and publics. The change of the strategy done by Megawati in terrorism issues can be understood as well as the aforementioned phenomenon. In the case of terrorism, I formulate that the factors, such as media 'negative' tension, high degree of threat to image/reputation damage and high degree of

potential damage of crisis lead to the change of strategy. Based on several researches about corporate strategy in responding crisis, commonly the person or organization used defense strategy rather than adapting or accommodating strategy in the initial phase of crisis development, as described on following model 9.

Model 9
Factors lead the change of crisis response strategy



In 2004, fourth year of her presidency, Megawati seemed to be highly confident in responding to the terrorism issues. She had directly confronted to the other developed countries, asked for their real action toward the terrorism. Even, she challenged those countries to be consequent in dealing with the international terrorism, by giving statement that Indonesia was the most consequent for that matter. That action took positive attention of the media and people. The result of it, they supported Megawati in taking clear action and statement. In that situation, there was a supported relationship among Megawati, people and media.

How about the case of corruption eradication by Megawati? As explained before, media assessed that she and her cabinet failed in eradicating corruption. Government did it by an half of heart, not serious and not followed by a real action. However, Megawati had the same self assessment. She thought that she and her cabinet failed in corruption eradicating. Although, both of them have the same assessment, actually, they had different strategy in giving the statement. Megawati admitted that failure but she did not admit that the failure was contributed by their ineffective efforts. She blamed the other parties as the source of this failure, such as the Indonesian people mentality, feudalistic behavior, improper policy and practices that had been brought and generated by New Orde. Megawati used defense strategy in this case, by applying

scapegoating and opinion-knowledge strategy. In other way Kompas saw that government gave big contribution in that failure, beside the other contributions. It means that there was a difference between government and Kompas in looking at the failure.

Even though, Kompas and Megawati had the same opinion about the government performance in handling the corruption issues, it did not mean that there was a mutual understanding or supporting relationship between them, as well as in the case of terrorism. Kompas frequently connected the failures or weaknesses of the government to their failure of corruption eradication. Corruption thought by media, and also by Megawati herself, as the main root of crisis and any problem in Indonesia, remained as the root problem and unsolved matter for the government. Kompas mentioned this things so many times, even though, in contrast, Megawati did not mention it as many as Kompas did. Even, Kompas did not fully trust Megawati about her statement to eradicate corruption and all of causes in the early of her presidency. Kompas viewed that statement was only purposed to construct her good image, get attention and sympathy of the Indonesian people. Distrust of Kompas to the Megawati's commitment for eliminating corruption can be understood as the criteria of the absence of supporting relationship from media to the government. The rejection of Megawati that she was doing ineffectively as media said is also the criteria of the distrustful relationship between them. On this situation of the relationship, the crisis was still going on and tended to be ever lasting problem.

Let us see how the crisis situation influences an action. Corruption was an ongoing and unsolved problem for Indonesian government and people. Almost all president of the Republic of Indonesia faced this kind of problem. For certain people or groups, corruption was thought as a part of Indonesian culture and as a normal behavior for Indonesian society. For them, it is the main reason of the failure of almost all governments to eradicate corruption acts. However, Megawati did not think this problem as the crucial or critical problem that could threaten her image. In the early period of her presidency, she looked at this issue as one of all important programs of her cabinet, and even though Indonesia was given international label as the worst country in corruption acts in the world.

Compare to the terrorism issues, the commitment of Megawati in the case of corruption was relatively weaker. Even though media and local people gave hard pressure to her to take real and quick action, it was not given by international publics. Terrorism got attention much more than corruption. There were international publics involved in terrorism. The reason was the terrorism and its impacts could be experienced by all nations. This is an

international issue and problem, also international threats. Different from terrorism, corruption in Indonesia is a local and internal problem. Thus, in this case, international publics' pressures were absence. Corruption was less important and it was not urgent for her and not to be priority. She also thought that her image would not be destroyed by her failure to eradicate corruption. She felt save even though media criticized her in the negative way because the relationship performance history in this case was also negative. Megawati also rejected to take responsibility for this failure. Those were some reasons and factors which became the background of her strategy.

It means that there are other factors contributing to the selection of crisis response strategy. Table 40 shows all contributed factors might contribute to the selection and effectiveness of crisis response strategies, both in terrorism and corruption issues.

Table 40
Crisis situation in case of terrorism
and corruption

Elements of Crisis	Terrorism		Corruption
	Early	End	
Crisis Situation			
1. Crisis attribution	External	Personal	External
2. Organizational performance	Negative	Positive	Positive
3. The severity of crisis damage	Low	High	Low
The threat to Image/ reputation damage	Low	High	Low
Organization or person's responsibility	Low	High	Low
Media and local public pressure	High	High	High
International public pressure	Low	High	Low
Relationship history/performance	Negative	Positive	Negative
Strategy	Defensive	Accommodative	Defensive

If it is analyzed by statement of Coombs, (1) crisis situation, such as crisis attribution, organizational performance, and the degree of severity of crisis image; (2) the threat of image damage; (3) organizational or person's crisis responsibility; and (4) the relationship history or performance are the determinant factors for an organization or a person in selecting the strategy. It is because the strategy of defense or accommodation/ adaptation can be applied in various situations of crisis. However, there is another factors can be related to the strategy selection. Table 40 shows that there are three additional factors, these are (1) media and local public pressure, and (2) international public pressure/ international public involvement, and (3)

the relationship with media and publics. In three cases, only in terrorism issues, international publics are involved. And, in the end stage of terrorism, the relationship between government and press and publics was positive. It means that accommodation strategy is selected on the situation when international publics' pressures exist and the relationship with publics is positive and supportive.

On this context, I can draw a conclusion that the action of the organization or organizational members can be based on their thinking or perception about the crisis situation. Strategy of crisis response or image restoration is selected and applied on the basis of their interpretation of what they see or hear about the crisis. It means that crisis situation becomes to be very perceptual than factual. However it becomes to be very real data for the organizational or personal decision making processes. An action is created relies on what can people think, not on the real fact. It is an important reason to explain the factor that may lead the failure or ineffectiveness of the certain strategy of crisis response.

In conclusion I want to put all factors mentioned above as the external factors, outside of the organization or within the environment. It means that there is interaction between an organization and its environment. The action taken by an organization is determined by the organization itself and its environment, vice versa. In crisis, any strategy is selected on the basis of the organizational structure and the environment's pressure and the strategy selected by the organization affects the crisis situation, the organizational structure and the social political structure in the larger system.

5.2.4. The Government: Rules and Resources

In an organizational context, structuration theory can be adopted to analyze how action and structure interacts to accomplish their decision making goals. According to the Poole in his theory 'adaptive structuration theory', rules are understood as "propositions that indicate how something ought to be done or what is good or bad." These rules contain members' collective practical wisdom on how best to reach to the group goals. The resources that individual bring to the task are "materials, possessions or attributes that can be used to influence or control the actions of the group or its members." (Griffin 2003:249). Personal relationship is thought as one of resources for the decision making process. So does the expertise, capability, knowledge, communication skill and the other attributes of the members of the organization. Rules and resources interact one to another to shape action, and vice versa. The other key concept of structuration theory is interaction. Poole said in his theory that interaction between structure

and action means “the decision (as the organizational action –writer) not only is affected by the structure of the group, but at the same time it also has an effect upon those same rules and resources.” Rules and resources are not medium but also the outcome of interaction.

According to the structuration theory, it can be predicted that the strategy of the president and the government in responding crisis is affected by organizational rules and the materials, knowledge, skill, and capability of the President, as the member of the government, and in contrast, those rules and resources are affected by the strategy of the president in responding to the crisis. There is interaction and interplay between an action and a structure. It is called as duality of structure. Rules can be understood as norms, regulation, law, common practices which is ought to be done or determine what is good or bad for the government. In context of strategy of crisis responses, rules can be manifested as the commonly public relations practices and regulations. Resources mean President’s characters which might have connection with the crisis response actions. It can be the skill of communication, capability to build relationship with her important publics such as media and the publics both national and international. These resources interact with rules and it shapes and is shaped by the strategy of crisis responses.

5.2.4.1. Tight Rules and the Mindlessness

Structurally, the unit that is responsible for handling Public Relations functions did not exist in the State Secretariat⁵³. These departments functionally hold the organizationally administrative tasks for the president and her cabinet. A few of these tasks is preparing data which is needed by the President for composing the text of the speech, performing the other of the state information services and also documentation and information services. It means that these tasks are one of many Public Relations functions. Operationally, it is implemented operationally, such as: (1) managing the president or cabinet’s media relations activities, such a press conference, writing press release; (2) documenting and keeping archives about President’s communication and activities (3) distributing information about President’s agenda and activities to the important publics. These activities can be called as presidential communication management tasks.

It was explained in the first chapter about presidential communication management that there are differences between one president and the others. In general, there is no the pattern

⁵³ State secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia is divided into five departments: (1) State secretariat, (2) cabinet secretariat, (3) President Secretariat, (4) Vice President Secretariat, and (5) President Military Secretariat.

or written rules which regulate the presidential communication management. It means that almost all presidents relied their communication to the publics on the individually practices. It caused the rules of presidential communication management was never to be recognized by all presidents. There was no settled communication system that became a guide for the president, and also for all presidents. Each president's communication practices relied more on their own traits, characteristics, capability, knowledge, needs and interests, and also the situation that had to be faced. It means that the communication pattern of the president relied more on the resources. It could be that there is interaction between rules and resources. It will be medium and also output for the strategy which is done by the presidents to construct their image during the time of crisis.

Even though there were no common rules of presidential communication, in general the tendency of communication pattern can be looked from the communication practices of the Presidents. Beside HM Soeharto who had quite settled communication system, the next presidents, including KH Abdurrahman Wahid, generally applied a certain pattern of presidential communication. As described in the earlier chapter, HM Soeharto's communication system could be categorized as closed, formal, linier, and centralized. It followed his political leadership which was more authoritative than democratic. It was thought that it had connection to his military background and the Javanese culture which has brought him the values of feudalism. On the other hand, BJ Habibie's communication style was more open, not too formal, decentralized and concerned more on dialogue than one way communication. It was thought that it was the result of had a relation to his western education background, so that it influenced much more on his attitude toward freedom of the press and political leadership. As described on the first chapter, I have linked these factors to the strategy which was selected by them in the time of crisis. I wrote in earlier chapter that it might be the factors which interacted with the strategy in crisis responses.

How about Megawati? I have described that she applied two kind of opposite crisis strategies, defending and accommodating strategy for three cases she had to face. Is there any connection between the strategy selected by her and the communication system or pattern, and also her personal characteristics, as well as the two aforementioned presidents?

In the following paragraphs, it will be described the communication rules and practices of Megawati and her political leadership style, and the personal characters of her which have connection with her selected strategy in constructing her image during crisis. As described before, there was no settled presidential communication system in her institution. The early

time of her presidency, it seemed she welcomed the press. Not so much different from Gus Dur, the President before her, the relation between the press and her was so closed and friendly. Megawati was in early time in image building after she had been elected to be the President of the Republic of Indonesia for the period of 2001-2004. The friendliness of Megawati-Press can be understood as the efforts of her to build her image as a reformist and democratic person the two prior presidents, Habibie and Gus Dur. These two things were very important to get public's sympathy and support. It was truly effective in the first nine months of her administration. As described in chapter one and four, the image of Megawati on publics was better than those of the earlier presidents. The honeymoon era for Megawati and the Indonesian press was too short. When media assessed her performance in the first year of her administration in a negative manner, she began to react to the statements of media negatively. She judged that media were less balanced in reportage. Media focused more on the weaknesses or failures, but not on the progress or positive improvement of her performance.

In the part of personal communication capability, Megawati had been known as a person who was not quite talkative in publics' space. She was absolutely contradictive with Gus Dur. People called her as "Mrs Silent", and in contrast, Gus Dur was called as person who was "talking too much". Some people said that Megawati's silence is the communication style which she chose, which were emphasized on the principle of carefulness, high self control, and good communication management. However for the other people, it was the weaknesses of Megawati, especially if she was compared to the other presidents⁵⁴. It was more seen as the weakness of her personal characters than her communication strategy in the president election. Some people saw that the character was not conducive for her reputation and image building. In fact, some people saw that it made her seems not credible. Her communication performance during her period of presidency made her lost of public sympathy because people associated the communication skill with the intellectual capacity. Refusing public debate as a part of political campaign by Megawati and also rejecting "door stop interview" were thought by some people as the strategy of her and her political party to hide her intellectual incapability, more over when she had to argue with the other president candidates. Refusing public debate in presidential campaign was based on her reasons, they were: (1) it was not appropriate for Indonesian culture, and (2) it was not written on the general election regulation. These reasons reaped criticism. Even though she did not have official spokespersons, for some important

⁵⁴ That Megawati was not too much talking was being to be the one of biggest criticism and very constraint for her in the competition in the general election 2004. However, for some people, this kind image her political and intellectual capability was not appropriate for participating in political field.

public issues, Megawati used her Ministers or her state secretary, including her husband, to convey the statement to the publics. It was employed also for her written textual speeches. Related ministers or expert staffs were responsible for preparing her speeches, both in informal or formal meeting. It means that one of the public relations functions was held by these people. The presidential secretariat which was set up as the public relations department for the President did not get involve directly in composing the President speeches.⁵⁵ More than this, a few people saw that some of Megawati's policies, decisions and statements were not genuinely her own thought and wisdom but they were just product of her inner circle staffs' voices⁵⁶. Megawati, for some people, was assessed as the puppet and her inner circle staffs were the mastermind, powered people behind the scenes. In general, she was much more silent than giving statements.

Some people also thought that her experience as a political party leader did not support her to be a president. Practical politic experience as a leader of political party could not be an indicator that she was capable to be the President. Some people saw she only capable to be a leader for her own party but not for the country. The assessment was coming because she almost never gave verbal statement to respond to the Indonesian public issues which needed her comment, response and reaction. People did not understand and know her intellectual capability. People also felt difficult to know her thought, vision and mission about certain issue, partially national issues. People though that as the president, she should be responsive, active and competent to deal with the national problem, not only with the internal political party problem. It can be accepted when in the following time, she was also assessed as the president who had low level in intellectual, especially when she was compared to other president candidates.

⁵⁵ It was also associated with the education background and her experience in the field of political practices. Megawati did not finish her study in university. She held high school graduation certificate for getting involved in presidential election. She was also imaged as a housewife than carrier woman, as well as she herself constructed her own image. She liked mentioning herself by the word "your mother". It means that she looked at her image as a woman who is a mother, both constructed by herself and some people, was positive for gaining many more voters.

⁵⁶ Not too different from Gus Dur, some people saw many decisions and policies of Megawati were very influenced by the closed people around her. They were called "whisperer", people who always give the opinion, information and even suggestion for every events and issues to the presidents. This people always tried hard to persuade her for giving reaction about the issues as they expected. In case of Gus Dur, people thought that because of his handicap, he delegated information seeking to his expert staffs or people who "seated" around him. And, unfortunately, they sometimes tended to be manipulative, giving bias information which are contaminated by their own interests and goals. Gus Dur would have been limited by his physical handicap and Megawati by education background and gender.

Some people looked at Megawati as the “Soekarno⁵⁷’s daughter” not as Megawati itself. Megawati was just the shadow of his father. Additionally, it was used by her and her political party in their campaign. Being a Soekarno’s daughter was the “anchor” of their presidential campaign. It was really constructed and deliberated political communication of her. By her own intention, she always enforced and established that kind of image. It was believed as a benefit for her and the political party to win the election. Believe it or not, it was one of many reasons why people voted her.

That Megawati is a woman was also a part of the people perception of her incredibility. By Islam perspective, woman is inhibited to be a leader, so a certain group rejected her to be the president⁵⁸. There are several groups which hold those values. Not only Islam perspective, some people who still hold paternalism see a woman should not be chosen as a public leader. Few ethnics in Indonesia that were paternalistic posit a woman as the second level human, lower than a man. In these ethnics, the presidential campaign of Megawati, by using the message anchor “woman empowerment” was not effective, even more it was rejected.

Other controversial perception about her personal attributes which kept going on during her presidency and during the time close to the general election 2004. She, on one hand, was not disturbed by these controversies, but on other hand, she finally defended herself to encounter these controversies. Sumarno (2002) wrote eight of Megawati’s personal attributes which were very controversial and debatable, these are: (1) too silent, introvert and passive; (2) enigmatic, mysterious, difficult to be understood; (3) conservative, could not accept easily new political values which were very dynamic; (4) affirming to be the cult for her loyal follower; (5) low level in intellectual capacity; (6) capable only for the leader of her group; (7) unstable attitude in selecting the members of her political party; (8) less initiative and ideas. The controversy means that all characters above were debated and had double opposite meaning in the different publics. Her followers created meaning in the more positive side than out of her

⁵⁷ Soekarno was the first President of the Republic of Indonesia. For many people, Soekarno was the charismatic President. Therefore Megawati as his daughter was seen as the same as him. The character of Indonesian voters was irrational and traditional so they tended not to concern on the rational and intellectual capability of the candidates of the Presidents when they voted.

⁵⁸ About the issue, it was a very hot debate in time of president’s campaign era. Debate met various perspectives who looked at that issue in the different or even contradictive view. Group who brings the values of gender equality looked the issue positively. It was a good time for an Indonesian woman to be a public leader. For other group, a woman as Megawati profiled, was associated to the person who has strength more on the domestic role than public role. So, she was not appropriate to be the President. Indonesia that was in very hard crisis needs a leader who was very strong, capable and competent. And, for this group, Megawati was rejected as a President.

followers. These eight points were the resources which can influence the decision making and her action. In fact, Megawati had failed to be a winner in the second step of presidential election 2004.

Table 41 describes the personal characteristics of Megawati which were very constraint for the presidential election. Almost all attributes triggered controversy and debate.

Table 41
Personal Attributes of Megawati

Positive/ Pro	Negative/Contra
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High skill of communication management/ communication strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low skill of political communication
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was time for woman to be the public leader • Warrior woman, “Srikandi”, “Ratu Adil”, “Mother of Nation”⁵⁹. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A woman could not be a public leader • A woman can be meant: weak, passive, not responsive, emotional, silent, not expressive, introvert
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The daughter of Soekarno • Capable to create loyal and fanatic followers • To be a cult for her followers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Just the shadow” of her father • Using the name of Soekarno was only the strategy to increase and improve Megawati’s image in the political field.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All people have right to be the President • Political knowledge and intellectual capacity did not have to be received as a formal education. Informal and daily life experience is a very fruitful education. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low level in practical politic experience and education • Low level in intellectual capacity

Although it was highly controversial, she was still silent, not talking too much about the national political public issues. She did not give much attention for this controversy. She was still as the person who was always silent, passive and not responsive. She was really an introvert person as mentioned by her little daughter and many other people. However for her loyal followers, it was an indication of her power, and it is the reason she was thought very competent and deserved to be the President.

Referring to the structuration theory that is adopted by Poole for the context of organization, these resources and rules (or structure) will interact with the action. It means that an action can be shaped by the structure and the structure can be shaped by the action. In a

⁵⁹ Srikandi is the warrior woman, a character in the story of Indonesian leather puppet show (“wayang”). She is very strong, likes to help people from suffering, popular and influenced. Ratu Adil is an Indonesian concept for symbolizing the struggle movement of the people in order to promote justice. It is adapting the original concept of social movement called “messiah movement”. Concept of “Mother of Nation” also symbol of the people who has a great willingness to protect and save the powerless people, children of nation. The three concepts were

case of crisis, the strategy selected by Megawati was the action as a product of the decision making process. This action, according to Poole's conception, was produced when Megawati used her present rules and resources in her interaction with publics, and when the action was replicated and done repeatedly, Megawati did reproduction of the rules and resources. It can be said that the strategy of crisis response by Megawati was produced by the usage of common presidential communication management practices and her personal resources in interaction with her colleagues and publics.

Based on the description about the presidential communication management of the Megawati's administration, we can look that some PR functions and roles are a part of Presidential Secretariat Unit's tasks and responsibilities. It is supported by the statements of the Head of Bureau of Press and Media, the Presidential Secretary of the Republic of Indonesia and President Decree about task and function of Cabinet Secretary which that the roles and function of this bureau was emphasized only on the technical things of information dissemination. Their staffs do not participate in determining the content of institutional or organizational statement or information will be conveyed to the publics. They are not official or presidential spokespersons who create and disseminate message by their own words. As mentioned before, in the era of Megawati's administration, there were not formal presidential spokespersons⁶⁰ even though people criticized her that she could not be a qualified spokesperson and public relations for herself. As also has mentioned in earlier chapters, Megawati, by her personal communication style, tended to create one single communicator, one way traffic communication model and block feedback message from its publics. It can be related to the role and functions of her staffs in her institution in which focus more on technical tasks than on managerial tasks. The opposite and contradictive assessments between her and publics about her personal and institutional performance can be an indicator of the existence of unequal relationship between her and its public, including the media persons.

Table 42 identifies more clearly and briefly the rule and resources which are broken down into some technical things: (1) role and functions of PR; (2) PR/communication model between organization and its publics; (3) personality/personal attribute.

⁶⁰ Comparing to Gus Dur's era, he inaugurated several president's spokesperson, even though he was used to give some statements by himself.

Table 42
Rules and resources used to respond to crisis

Rules/ Organizational Characters	Resources/ Personal characters
Technical Roles/Communication Technician: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preparing and handling press conference • Composing and distributing press release • Printing and publishing organizational information • Documenting activities and archiving 	Demographic attributes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Graduated from High School • Housewife • Woman • The daughter of Ir Soekarno, the first of the President of RI Personality attribute: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introvert • Enigmatic • Weak/ not stable • Conservative • Passive/ not responsive
Press agency/Public information model: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing information about president activities • Preparing news stories that reporters will use • Convincing reporter to publicize the presidential information • Getting good name or reputation of the president into the media • Keeping bad publicity out of the media • Getting maximum publicity 	Working experience: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The leader of political party • The members of the Parliament • Vice President • President
Organizational communication model: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One way communication • Centralized communication 	Communication style <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal/planned/structured/mediated communication • One way communication • Reserved person

When crisis came, the action or strategy chosen by Megawati can be linked with those attributes. It means that the rules and resources were used for the action she did, in dealing with the publics and crisis itself. What personally action by Megawati could not be free from the rules and resources. In the same time, what Megawati's action shaped or made stable the rules and resources.

For instance, the introvert attitude or behavior leads her to be reserved person. She chose to be silent to respond to the certain public issues. This attitude also led her not to speak spontaneously or communicate face to face or dialogue with publics easily and she preferred to speak in formal and structured events, read the text which had been prepared by her expert

staffs and limited the time to others who asked her statements. It was always used by her even though many people asked her to speak up and be responsive toward the publics' curious. It means that so many people wanted her to change and improve her communication competence, she remained her communication style. She always reproduced and strengthened the structure. She preferred to make something not change or stable to do something made differently. She was conservative, not comfortable with something new or different from usual. She made the model of the organizational communication match to her style, one way and centralized. However in the same time, her conservativeness was more firmed when organizational communication practices kept running as well⁶¹.

Megawati who was a leader of one of the big political parties brought influences in her leadership style as the President. People saw that Megawati was a "Queen" for her loyal and traditional followers. As a queen, her power will be stronger if she lives as an ascetic, to shut up in a long time. The more she spends time for meditation, the more power she gets. The more she shuts up and draws herself from social interaction, the more powerful she is. Based on this analogy, Megawati who was cult for her followers did the same way, even when she was a President. She thought that there was no something to be changed. She spoke up only in the internal event of her political party even though some people criticized her that she was now a President, a leader for all Indonesian people, not only for her followers in her party. Her leadership style as the leader of political party was still used when she was a president. The same action was done to respond to the different event and situation. It means that there was a reproduction process, strengthen the existed structure. Structure will be more stable. The more stable the structure, the more powerful it leads people action. Megawati could not freely change the structure because she did not change the action. She could not change the action easily because she was leaded by the existed stable structure.

In the context of public relations function, an organizational communication system will be formed as a close system than an open system. PR staffs or practitioners tend to be functionary than functional. Functionary means people who just do what they asked to do. They work and do the activities on the basis of command. For the person like Megawati, who is conservative, passive, reserved and introvert, a close system will be more comfortable. She and then posits her PR staffs emphasized more on the task dealing with the communication

⁶¹ Roles and functions of the president secretary were not changed so significantly in the era of Megawati. Comparing to those of Gus Dur administration, there was not something so different in the organizational structure of the state secretary, but only in spokespersons. As mentioned before, Gus Dur has official and formal spokespersons.

technical thing. In this position, Megawati felt safe and secure. She felt dominant and powerful, and so there was no channel and opportunity to transmit critics to her. The unit which is closed system fit for the characters of Megawati. The comfort feeling made her did not want to change something. There was no opposite tension which pressured her, so she kept her attitude and behavior and felt nothing wrong with it. PR in a closed system means that they do not need too many interactions with the environment because they think that they can survive by themselves. They can fix, revitalize and survive by using themselves as a basis of their own rules and resources. PR in a close system sees resources could not take from its environment and it is not depended on that. The relationship with the publics tends to be asymmetrical and using one way communication model. PR staffs as representative and functionary of the organization was dominant in information sharing. Including in the relation to the journalist, PR staffs are the source of information, so there is information exchange equally. The journalists work for PR function. An organization deliberately hires journalists to handle press function. In many cases, it is usual PR staffs who handle journalist functions: constructing, producing and distributing institutional information. Everything is done by them and for them.


Megawati did the same way. She thought that everything would be right and running well by her own efforts. She did not necessary to take environment's resources to make her and her cabinet survived. She just relied on the expert staffs, the ministers in her cabinet for responding to the public and crucial issues and than everything well done. For the external communication, she hired few journalists to compose and distribute information about her and her cabinet. For the internal communication, the president secretariat handled the PR functions in information sharing and distribution.

Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded that the government institution preferred a closed system to an open system. It was followed by the other character that the relationship between the organization and its publics, including media people, tended to be unequal or not symmetrical. An organization handled the power in information constructing, producing and distribution and its publics have less opportunity and channel to transmit their voices. As a result of this condition, the organizational action might not be the product of the interaction between an organization and its public. In a case of crisis, the president's action to respond to it was not the product of the equal interaction with the publics. President as an individual was more dominant and determinant for what should be done. She formed the rule and the resources more stable and firmed. She used both when she interacted with the publics in making action. The close bureaucracy system and her personal character that tends to be

introvert and mindless leads her to create one way communication and unequal relationship with the publics, including with media and journalists.

As described before, the relationship between Megawati and the press was not in harmony. It was not only because the media could not get much more important public information from her but also there was no trust between them. This kind of relationship was not different from the relationship that was constructed with the publics. The assessment of publics toward the Megawati's performance almost in all years of her administration and in almost all fields, especially in dealing with the crisis, indicated that there was no positive support from publics to her. In general, Megawati respond to it by using defensive strategy with few different tactics. According to the explanation, it can be said that there might be links among the rules and resources, the relations between president and the media and publics and the action she made for responding to it. Model 10 describes the links among all mentioned factors.

Model 10
The linking of factors/ elements



According to the structuration theory, an action can be shaped by the structure and in the same time the action shapes the structure. There is a process of production which makes change and reproduction which makes stability. It means that there is duality or interplay between an action and a structure. The self defense strategy of Megawati was used because of the rules and

resources guided or led her, in the same time, the strategy of her created new rules and resources or strengthen the existed structure. Actually she could not blame the press or publics when, by her perception, the press assessed her performance did not as she wished. On the basis of adapting structuration theory by Poole, people, the organization's members, frequently complaint for the uncomfortable rules of the organization as if it is formed without their participation. Poole said that every rules and resources of the organization, good or bad, are formed by its members. They are frequently not conscious of their contribution for that uncomfortable rules and resources. It means that an action can be taken consciously or unconsciously and both shape the structure.

Megawati who many times complained to the press, other institutions or the other parties in some cases for uncomfortable situation and tended to blame those parties for the wrong doing, as Poole said, she might be unaware that her action contributed also to the situation. When she blamed the general attorney in case of her failure to eliminate corruption, actually she herself formed the professionalism of the Indonesian attorneys. In other case, when she shifted the blame to the international world in the case of terrorism, she actually contributed to the international responses. When she shifted the blame to to other parties, such as Indonesian people mentality, in case of crisis, actually she was the person who was responsible for the mentality building. The wrongdoing in the structure, consciously or not, was contributed by individual action. So, there is interplay between the structure and the agency, there is production and reproduction of the structure.

5.2.4.2. Unsupportive Political Situation

Explanation about crisis situation in the earlier paragraph shows that it is so difficult to draw a conclusion on the basis of the empirical data about the strategy applied by Megawati in responding the crisis. Three different cases were responded by the similar strategy, those were dissociation/defensive strategy, even though in the end of crisis stage of terrorism case, Megawati changed her strategy to be accommodative strategy. For these cases, it can be concluded that whatever crisis situation, Megawati applied dissociation strategy or self defense strategy. Crisis situation was not determinant factor for crisis strategy selection.

When the crisis situation can be called as a system's environment, and when it is analyzed by using an open system theory, it can be said that the organizational action is determined by the situation of the environment. In many public relations cases, an action to respond to the crisis can not be separated from the environment situation. It means that there


are double interactions between an organization as an open system and crisis situation as the situation which tight on the environment. According to the empirical data above, this explanation about the open system cannot be applied to explain what Megawati's strategies. It seems more quite relevant to be said that the selected strategy was more influenced by the organizational rules and the individual resources of the organization.

It is quite different from the case of terrorism in which in the end stage of the case, Megawati used accommodative strategy. The action was taken by Megawati not because the crisis situation which pressured her. Need to note that the terrorism issue was a little bit different from the two other cases. The terrorism happened in Indonesia became the international issues because it involved the other countries, even, the international world, where as the two other cases, such corruption and crisis, were the national problems. The pressure of the international world, including the international mass media can be the other important factor, besides the structural factor. When the international world is also "playing the games", more and less it pressures the international social or political situation. There will be more high tension for the national situation, especially for the Indonesian government. It means also that in case of terrorism, Megawati did not face directly to the national publics or Indonesian people, but the other nations and people. For Megawati, it was more influent for image building. So, she wanted to be more democratic looking on her publics by using accommodative or adaptive strategy. In the terrorism case, the Indonesia's social and political situation was created more by the international situation than national situation. However, in other cases, political situation was more influenced by the Indonesian problem itself. On those cases, political situation was not conducive for Megawati to resolve the crisis. The people's pessimism and distrust toward the capability of Megawati to resolve any crisis made political situation worse and in turn it made the crisis also worse. There was no positive contribution from the political situation. It means that the crisis situation interacts also with the political situation. In case of Megawati's administration, it was so clear that the political situation was coloring the crisis and the strategy of the crisis response. Compared to the political situations of the three cases, the terrorism gave more bad impact on the political situation that in turn gave higher tension for Megawati to build good image on international publics' view.

Model 11 describes all factors which are reciprocally interacting, which can explain the reasoning factors for selecting of the crisis response strategy. Strategy applied by the president, as a repeated action, in turn creates a structure. Self defensive strategy applied by Megawati becomes an organizational and social structure when it is applied repeatedly. This strategy will

be a norm, value, even rule of this society in responding to the forthcoming crisis. In turn the structure constrains and helps the next presidents, leaders or people in society to select the crisis communication strategy. It means, the next presidents will use the same strategy that is the defensive strategy. The defensive strategy finally becomes one of social structures.

Model 11
Contextual Factors in Crisis Communication Strategy Choice



5.3. CONCLUSION

It is too simple to explore the background factors in the process of selection of the crisis response strategy lay down only on the system theory although it is acceptable to conclude that action is constrained by structure. Research shows that many actions made by the President to respond to the crisis are determined by the previous structure. In the three crisis cases, the actor just to be a part of the system and follows the old structure. It means that the structure helps and enables an organization or a person to feel more comfortable and secure in decision making and creating action, even in crisis situation. Behaving or doing action on the present

“track” is seen as the easy way to avoid unnecessary risks. It means that there is a reinforcement or establishment or reproduction of the rules and resources. Learning from Megawati in dealing with the crisis, she chose defensive strategy on the basis of the “old” structure that had been made by the previous Indonesian presidents. The defensive strategy that applied by the past leaders to be the structure for the current and next leaders. The structure is more dominant than the agency. In these cases, the agent is not capable to make some new actions and to create new structure. Moreover, she just shifted the blames to the old structure and thought the “old” structure as a kind of heritage which is not avoidable and changeable. It means that the structure reproduction is more applicable, even though in the crisis situation.

However, by applying the structuration theory, it is important to note that the structure is created by the repetitive individual actions. It means that the actor is not just a part of the system, but they are agents who are able to produce a structure in a system. Agent has ability to use the rules and resources to make new action, and in turn to produce the new structure. Megawati might forget that with her modality as power, dominance and legitimacy, she could do some actions to replace or to change the old one. In crisis, in which the situation is more unpredictable, uncertain and urgent, and so many factors are getting more involved, doing change or ‘walking not on the existed track’ is very important. The decision maker should not do just by laying down on the rule because the rule itself sometimes to be questioned and reconstructed. Therefore crisis sometimes followed by a communication crisis in which people hold their own perception and interpretation in decision making processes. A fact is something blurred. Data are getting more multi interpretative. In crisis, the information which is very dynamic, changeable, unpredictable, uncertain, equivocal, ambiguous, and sometimes controversial. The statements given by an organization or a person in the point of time of crisis sometimes is incoherent and inconsistent with the existed structure. Quick response is very important to take. “Take action quickly, don’t waste time too much and too long” is a key statement in crisis. If an organization is in crisis, many ‘new’ actions must be taken. Since the best strategy to respond to the crisis is contextual, an organization or a person sometimes uses ‘try and error strategy’. By being creative and rational, people are able to be adaptive and accommodative with the unpredictable situation. If the strategy is done consistently and as a routine it can be a new structure that helps people to recover the crisis effectively in the future. It is a process of structuration.

Furthermore, not only an organizational structure can interplay with the action but also the larger structures or the structures in environment. In organizational context, structure

focuses on the organizational rules and resources, as said by Poole and the organization's members are active and capable to create and recreate the structure of the organization. But, how do about rules and resources in the community and other organizational publics? They have their own structure which might be different from the organization's structure. It is difficult to understand that an agency and a structure of the organization can't be affected by the other structures. I want to say that the member of the organization has a free will. They are capable to adapt and adjust both the rules and resources of their organization and the other external structures. Both of them are interconnected by communication.

On context of the research I have found that all the presidents of the Republic of Indonesia tend to apply defensive strategy in any situations of crisis. Apologizing was done in the context of defense her or his reputation. Usually they put apology in the larger context where the mistakes do not only belong to them as the actor but also the other actors in the other systems or supra system. However, high pressures from the external or international publics seem so highly influence the president to apply accommodative strategy. It can be connected with the image damage on international publics that might happen in the future. As we know, Indonesia is thought as the nation which is very dependent on the developed countries, such as USA. In many areas, USA still hold high power to affect Indonesian's political economy policies, even though this country has tried to claim that there is no overseas intervention. It means that the structure in the larger systems or organizational environment also constrain for the action. Theoretically, on the basis of the system theory and structuration theory, it is hard for the system to be separated from the external environment. There is always 'take and give' between the system and environment, and also 'interplaying' between the structure and the agency. Structure here covers the external structure and agency, - two elements which are not a part of the organization's structure and agents. It is important to note that the greater tension from external publics, the greater tension to an organization applies the accommodative strategy.

Beside the pressure for the environment, the pressure from media has a high impact on the decision of the organization to respond to the crisis. As described earlier, in crisis, communication will be a fundamental element to bind an organization and its environment, and also the structure and the agency. High quality of communication is determinant for an organization to overcome the crisis. Media as one of its elements can't be separated from communication. Mass media have a very important role to create good or bad news for crisis resolution. Media also determines what public's thinking and action toward the organization

and vice versa in crisis. Good relationship between an organization and media will more useful for crisis recovering. Good relationship leads the media to give positive tension or pressure by creating crisis reportage in balance and objective way, focusing the interest of organization and public in equal position. Good relationship is indicated by a willingness of an organization to be open for information sharing and exchange, keeping honesty to publics and trusting media in crisis communication.

In conclusion, there are several conditions when the accommodative strategy is applied, namely: (1) an organization has a good relationship with the media, (2) there is a high pressure from international publics, and (3) there is a high threat of image damage. And, by using the accommodative strategy, good relationship between an organization and media will be established and the 'interventional pressure from international public' will reduce. And it leads the decreasing of threat of image damage of the crisis. And, in turn, it can drive the organization or people to use the accommodative strategy in responding to the crisis. It happens continuously and keeps sustainable. These repetitive actions will produce the structure. Accommodative strategy will be a new structure that leads people's behavior.

There is always interaction and interplay between an action and a structure, between a structure and an agency, a system and an environment. By using the system theory, the selected strategy to respond to crisis can't be separated from the environment, such as other publics, situations of the crisis, and the relationship between organization and the environment. By using structuration theory, the strategy always produces and reproduced by the interaction and communication among people in an organization by utilizing rules and resources, and between the action itself and the organizational structure.

Finally, the strategy of crisis response is always connected with the several factors. However these factors can not be the determinativeness. It is the main difference of this study, especially if it is compared to the study of the crisis communication in the area of profitable or commercial institution. In the context of politic or political institution, it is more difficult to predict or to set the factors leads to the strategy of crisis response than those in the other context or other areas. In political area, 'something' behind the individual's action is more playful than those, for instances, in the economic area. There are so many hidden agenda, both in the level of organization and individual. It is not rare there is no definite boundary between organizational and the personal interest. By using structuration theory, it is easier to analyze the hidden meaning of the personal action and the rules and resources, the structure and agency in order to set the factors which play in crisis communication strategy. So, it is more difficult to

make conclusion, what factors will lead to the organization to take what crisis communication strategy, what factors as causes and as result. They both are interacting.

5.4. RECOMMENDATION

5.4.1. Practical Implication

Based on the result of this research, I want to say that it is useful for the president or the government to be “public relations practitioner” for themselves especially in crisis. It means that they need to improve their organizational and personal reputation first and next they need to increase their communication competence, both strategically and technically, personally and publicly. An ability to assess a crisis situation correctly is the important part of the communication competence. It needs ability and willingness to analyze the content of media, statistical data and public voices or public opinion. Building good relationship with the publics, especially with international publics and media persons, is the most important thing to be done. In order to create good relationship, the presidents must be mindful, talkative, and positive personality. It is necessary to make them to be positively responsive to the crisis. The strategy of accommodative communication in crisis is better to apply. This strategy will lead those people or organization to attain good reputation and good image. Learning by everything is good to make improvement of our next action and to maintain something which is correct. Adopting what the past government done is not always bad. If it is an effective strategy and it is still effective for the current situation, why we don't do it? In crisis, there are some structures must be remained, made more stable. We just do reproduction of the structure. On the other hand, why do we have to follow the existed track or rules if we are able to find and do new strategies or new rules which are more effective? By creating new strategy, new action, government is able to produce new structure. For this purpose, we need people who are powerful, dominate, legitimate and having communication competence. The kind of people is capable to use rules and resources to create or produce new structures through their action and interaction. We need people who are active listening public's voices and courageous to act something new for fulfilling public's interest.

Additionally, learning the other structures, outside of the organizational structure is also important. However, an organization can't be free from the influences the external situation, therefore we need to make productive balancing between remaining the internal state and adapting the change of environment. It is including the presidents, in a certain situation, they need to remain their character and personal attributes and in a different situation they need to

change their own personal attribute to adapt, adopt and take the influences from outside. It is the most important in the crisis situation that they need to combine the two ways. By this way, the president may find the best strategy to respond to the crisis by applying the accommodative strategy. And in turn, she or he is able to transform an action to be a social practice or social structure.

5.4.2. Academic Implication

This research found a new insight of Public Relations field. In general, researchers used more objective theories than subjective or interpretive theories. The structural functionalism tended to be applied to analyze the organization and its behavior. In context of crisis responses strategy, success or failure of the crisis recovery is seen more as a product of the organization. Leader or the member of organization is seen as a part of the structure not as a single entity or personal. In this research, I give a new addition of PR knowledge, that the failure or success of the crisis recovery is also a product of the individuals with all their personal attributes and characters and how they have free willingness to use the rules and resources to create strategy and action. The system or rules and resources of the organization may be conducive and support for applying certain strategy to respond to the crisis, but in the end, it does not guarantee for the effectiveness of the crisis recovery. It may because of the personal attributes and characters that do not support that strategy. In turn, crisis is not going to the end. However, it can happen conversely. In the basis of this finding, we need to look at the personal attributes and characters to analyze the effectiveness of crisis strategy. It may be right to say that there is no need strategy or, even, an organizational manual guide for responding to the crisis. It can be a creation of the individual and personal creativity. It could be spontaneous and unique. The member of the organization can be a smart and rational individual so she or he can think and respond to the crisis in the right way. Especially in a crisis, where an organization can be in a critical position, even in the chaotic situation, everything can change unpredictably. It needs a member of organization who is mindful, open for entering to something new and easily adapts the dynamic of the environment, including the dynamic of the relationship with the publics and media.

In the aspect of the research methodology, it is useful to use quantitative content analysis of textual speech to ensure that there is causal relationship between the factors and which factors may be more determinable for the effectiveness of the crisis response strategy. By doing it, we can identify which strategy will be the most effective to maintain and create good

image in the crisis situation. Observation research or full participation research where the researcher can observe directly to the action of the research subject in responding to the crisis is also necessary. It means that a multi level research and multi research methods are necessary.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

THE LIST OF WRITTEN SPEECHES OF

- HM SOEHARTO (1997/1998)
- BJ HABIBIE (1999)
- MEGAWATI (2001-2004)

No	Date	Place	Occasion
HM Soeharto			
1	August 16th, 1997	Jakarta	Board of Indonesian Parliament's Annual Meeting
2	March 1 st 1998	Jakarta	Board of People Representative's Meeting
3	May 1 st 1998	Jakarta	Board of Indonesian Parliament's meeting
BJ Habibie			
1	August 16 th 1999	Jakarta	Board of Indonesian Parliament's Annual Meeting
2	October 17 th 1999	Jakarta	Board of People Representative's Meeting
Megawati Soekarnoputri			
1	August 16 th 2001	Jakarta	Board of People Representative's Meeting
2	August 30 th 2001	Jakarta	Seminar "National Development Strategy"
3	September 3 rd 2001	Jakarta	Indonesian Leader Attorney's Meeting
4	October 5 th 2001	Jakarta	Ceremony of Indonesian National Army' Anniversary
5	October 14 th 2001	Jakarta	Celebration of Isra Mi'raj of The Prophet Muhammad Day
6	October 29 th 2001	Jakarta	Coordination Meeting of National Development
7	November 16 th 2001	Jakarta	Dialogue Meeting between Local and Central Government
8	November 30 th 2001	Jakarta	Briefing of the Course for National Defense Institution
9	December 2 nd 2001	Jakarta	Celebration of Nuzulul Qor'an Day
10	December 5 th 2001	Jakarta	Primaniyarta Award
11	December 13 th 2001	Jakarta	Ceremony of Praspa Indonesian National Army and Police
12	December 22 nd 2001	Jakarta	Celebration of Mother Day
13	December 27 th 2001	Jakarta	Opening Ceremony of Conference of "Persatuan Perintis Kemerdekaan"
14	December 27 th 2001	Jakarta	National Christmas Celebration
15	December 29 th 2001	Jakarta	Celebration of Juang Kartika Day
16	February 8 th 2002	Banjarmasin	Celebration of National Press Day
17	February 11 th 2002	Jakarta	Coordination Meeting of State Apparatuses Empowerment

18	February 13 th 2002	Jakarta	State Banquet with the President of Kroasia
19	February 14 th 2002	Jakarta	Closing Meeting of the Leader of National Army
20	February 17 th 2002	Jakarta	Celebration of Chinese New Year
21	April 16 th 2002	Jakarta	Short Course of Institution of National Defense
22	April 17 th 2002	Jakarta	Opening Ceremony of Workshop of Small and Middle Business
23	April 19 th 2002	Jakarta	Reception of Anniversary of “Gerakan Pemuda Anshor”
24	April 19 th 2002	Palembang	Opening of Working Meeting of “Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia”
25	April 22 nd 2002	Jakarta	Opening Ceremony of International Conference of “Jaminan Akses Informasi Publik”
26	April 25 th 2002	Jakarta	State Banquet for Prime Minister of Republic of Laos
27	May 2 nd 2002	Jakarta	Celebration of National Education Day
28	May 6 th 2002	Jakarta	State Banquet for PM New Zealand
29	May 10 th 2002	Jakarta	Seminar “Pengembangan Peran Serta Masyarakat dalam Peningkatan Investasi”
30	May 17 th 2002	Jakarta	State Banquet for UNO General Secretary
31	May 20 th 2002	Denpasar	Ceremony of the Day of National Resurgence
32	May 24 th 2002	Jakarta	Celebration of Maulid Nabi
33	June 24 th 2002	Yogyakarta	The Opening Ceremony of the Sixth Asian Conference in Religion and Peace
34	Juli 1 st 2002	Jakarta	The Celebration of Bhayangkara Day
35	July 2 nd 2002	Jakarta	Asean Multilateral Intelligence Exchange
36	August 16 th 2002	Jakarta	Annual State Report for Board of Parliament
37	October 3 rd 2002	Jakarta	Isra Mi'raj Day
38	October 5 th 2002	Jakarta	Anniversary of Indonesian National Army
39	October 18 th 2002	Jakarta	National Meeting of PEPABRI
40	November 21 st 2002	Jakarta	Nuzulul Qor'an
41	November 25 th 2002	Jakarta	Regular Course for Institution of National Defense
42	December 13 th 2002	Jakarta	Nusantara Day
43	December 16 th 2002	Jakarta	Congress of KNPI
44	December 31 st 2002	Jakarta	State Address for year's end
45	January 30 th 2003	Jakarta	Cooperation among nation in terrorism combating conference

46	February 9 th 2003	Denpasar	Anniversary of Indonesian National Press
47	February 27 th 2003	Jakarta	--
48	May 2 nd 2003	Subang	National Education Day
49	May 20 th 2003	Jakarta	Annual Meeting of Political Party
50	June 9 th 2003	Jakarta	--
51	July 1 st 2003	Tangerang	Anniversary of Indonesian National Police
52	August 1 st 2003	Jakarta	Annual Speeches address The Indonesian Legislative
53	August 8 th 2003	Jakarta	Anniversary of ASEAN
54	August 8 th 2003	Bandung	Inauguration of STPDN Graduation
55	July 14 th 2003	Denpasar	Seminar "The Development of National Law"
56	October 2 nd 2003	Palangkaraya	Congress of Association of Indonesian Journalists
57	September 5 th 2003	Jakarta	Working Meeting of the Leaders of Local Government
58	November 12 th 2003	Jakarta	Literacy Day
59	November 13 th 2003	Jakarta	Briefing of Institution of National Defense
60	December 7 th 2003	Denpasar	United in Diversity Forum
61	December 23 rd 2003	Jakarta	Working Meeting of the Governor
62	January 12 th 2004	Jakarta	The Month of Safety and Health Working
63	January 24 th 2004	Jakarta	The State Banquet for PM of Bangladesh
64	February 4 th 2004	Denpasar	Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting
65	February 10 th 2004	Jakarta	National Press Day
66	February 11 th 2004	Jakarta	Refreshing of National Character Building
67	March 3 rd 2004	Makassar	Coordination Meeting of the empowerment of the State Apparatuses
68	March 3 rd 2004	Ambon	Working Meeting of the Association of Local Government
69	March 8 th 2004	Pakanbaru	Working Meeting of coordination Board of Landscape
70	May 1 st 2004	Jakarta	Maulid Nabi
71	May 5 th 2004	Jakarta	National Education Day
72	May 13 th 2004	Jakarta	Commemoration of May 13 1998
73	May 17 th 2004	Jakarta	Working Meeting of Religion Department Officers
74	May 18 th 2004	Jakarta	Government statement
75	May 24 th 2004	Jakarta	Celebration of National Resurgence day
76	May 27 th 2004	Jakarta	National Working Meeting of KNPI
77	May 31 st 2004	Jakarta	National Working Meeting of Local Government

78	June 5 th 2004	Tondano	The Week of Farmer Meeting
79	June 7 th 2004	Jakarta	The Dialogue for Micro Business Units
80	June 7 th 2004	Jakarta	Earth Day
81	June 17 th 2004	Jakarta	Technical Meeting for General Indonesia Attorney
82	June 17 th 2004	Jakarta	Jakarta Fair
83	June 21 st 2004	Denpasar	Annual Session of AALCo
84	June 30 th 2004	Jakarta	Annual Meeting of ASEAN Ministers
85	July 3 rd 2004	Semarang	Bhayangkara Day
86	July 22 nd 2004	Jakarta	Adhyaksa Day
87	Juli 31 st 2004	Surabaya	The Meeting of Apeksi
88	August 5 th 2004	Jatinangor	Inauguration of STPM graduation
89	August 16 th 2004	Jakarta	Annual State Speech of RUU APBN

APPENDIX 2
THE LIST OF KOMPAS' EDITORIAL
KEYWORDS: Crisis, Corruption, Megawati, Government
(2001-2004)

No	TITLE	Date of published
Year 2000		
1	Ya benar, Memerintah itu ternyata harus membuat keputusan	Wed, 16-02-00
2	Perlu diingatkan lagi memerintah itu melihat ke depan, antisipasi	Wed, 22-11-00
Year 2001		
1	Elite politik berutang kepada rakyat	Thurs, 26-07-01
2	Berlakunya otonomi membuka sejarah baru	Wed, 03-01-01
3	Sebarapa jauh dendam bagian dari motivasi...	Sat, 17-02-01
4	Jika tukang pos sampai unjuk rasa	Wed, 04-04-01
5	Kini semua menyetujui jalan institusional	Fri, 18-05-01
6	Akan memenuhi kewajiban sebaik-baiknya..	Thurs, 28-06-01
7	Elite Politik berutang kepada rakyat	Thurs, 27-07-01
8	AS dan Negara-negara lain memang menginginkan Indonesia yang stabil	Thurs, 27-07-01
9	Bom meledak dimana-mana	Fri, 03-08-01
10	Kita terkejut sampai sekelompok rakyat mengultimatum Presiden	Tues, 07-08-01
11	Kabinet baru terutama tim ekonominya dinilai cukup menjanjikan	Fri, 10-08-01
12	Mengapa pidato kenegaraan Presiden Megawati dinilai bagus	Sat , 18-08-01
13	Perbaikan penegakan hukum kita kendalanya pada manusia	Fri, 24-08-01
14	Dibandingkan masalah lainnya, kesepakatan IMF termasuk sederhana	Thurs, 30-08-01
15	RAPBN belum cukup kuat...	Sat , 08-09-01
16	Perbaikan Hidup rakyat jadi ukuran sukses..	Thurs , 25-10-01
17	Koruptor itu mencuri harta Negara...	Tues, 30-10-01
18	Belum banyak kabar baik yang bisa dilaporkan..	Sat , 03-11-01
19	Mengapa 100 hari Pemerintahan Megawati dibahas...	Tues , 20-11-01
20	Kepada Mantan Presiden Soeharto...	Sat, 22-12-01
21	Sejak 1974 hidup sederhana jadi jargon...	Fri , 28-12-01
Year 2002		
1	Lawatan Presiden tentu diikuti dengan berbagai harapan	Sat , 31-08-02
2	Apakah kita mulai memasuki era penegakan hukum...	Wed , 09-01-02
3	Ingat, persoalan yang harus kita selesaikan bukan banjur semata	Wed , 06-02-02
4	Keselamatan jiwa penting diperhatikan...	Thurs, 28-02-02

5	Perbaiki perilaku tidak terkecuali pengusaha BUMN	Tues, 14-05-02
6	Apa yang dilakukan untuk mengantisipasi krisis ...	Fri , 26-07-02
7	Seberapa jauh pengadilan semakin dapat kita andalkan	Fri , 06-09-02
8	Pemberantasan KKN bukan hanya tanggung jawab MA	Fri , 29-11-02

Year 2003

1	Perbaiki lembaga yudikatif tidak cukup hanya dengan mengeluh	Mon , 13-01-03
2	Agar dibuka peluang dan Kemauan untuk duduk bersama...	Tues , 14-01-03
3	Bagaimana menilai reformasi yang genap berusia 5 tahun	Tues , 20-05-03
4	Korupsi salah satu isu sentral Capres 2004	Mon , 04-08-03
5	Kita diibaratkan tambang emas di medan ranjau	Sat , 16-08-03

6	Kadin memerangi suap, mungkinkah?	Sat, 04-10-03
7	Tentang berita laksanakan tolak tanda tangani pakta anti suap	Thurs , 30-10-03
8	Partai Politik jangan salah lagi memilih caleg	Thurs , 20-11-03
9	Apa makna tampilnya Mbak Tutut sebagai Capres?	Fri, 05-12-03
10	Pertemuan Megawati-Hasjim Muzadi menarik Perhatian	Mon , 16-02-03

Year 2004

1	Pembubaran BPPN dan Indikator Akhir Masa Krisis	Mon , 01-03-04
2	Debat Presiden di panggung terbuka	Fri , 02-07-04
3	Karaha Bodas dan Pemberantasan KKN	Fri , 20-08-04

APPENDIX 3
THE LIST OF KOMPAS' EDITORIAL
KEYWORDS: Crisis, Terrorism, Megawati, Government
(2001-2004)

No	Title	Date of published
Tahun 2001		
1	Tepatkah kunjungan Presiden Megawati ke AS..?	Mon , 17-09-01
2	Di Amerika Presiden Megawati diperhitungkan	Sat , 22-09-01
3	Tidak apa-apa bermain api, asal kita sanggup membayar	Mon, 01-10-01
4	Kedatangan Presiden Megawati ditunggu oleh sejumlah pekerjaan mendesak	Mon , 01-10-01
5	Kembali diingatkan perlunya kita bersikap adil, bijak, terkendali	Mon ,08-10-01
6	Seraya memerintah, pemerintah harus terus konsultasi dengan rakyat	Thurs ,11-10-01
7	Parlemen dan komponen strategis harus ikut menentukan sikap bangsa	Sat, 13-10-01
8	Tantangan kita minggu ini masih sama seperti minggu kemarin	Tues ,16-10-01
9	Kereta tabrakan, banjir mengancam, perampokan sadis...	Sat, 27-10-01
10	Pembubuhan Teys harus diungkap...	Tues ,13-11-01
11	Mengapa kita tak berani mencanangkan tahun 2002 ...	Sat, 29-12-01
Tahun 2002		
12	Keselamatan jiwa penting diperhatikan di tengah kita membangun ekonomi	Thurs , 28-02-02
13	Isu terorisme jangan memecah belah	Mon, 23-09-02
14	Dalam kasus bom bali yang dipertaruhkan Indonesia	Mon, 14-10-02
15	Keselamatan jiwa penting diperhatikan...	Thurs , 28-02-02
16	Di Meksiko Presiden harus siap membela Indonesia	Wed , 23-10-02
17	RI dan Singapura tegaskan kerjasama melawan terorisme	Wed , 18-12-02
Tahun 2003		
18	Tentu saja Indonesia tersinggung atas ketentuan AS	Mon, 20-01-03
19	Hubungan Indonesia-Australia dan lainnya	Mon, 17-02-03
20	Perlu didukung ide jadikan ASEAN Zona Bebas terror	Wed, 02-07-03
21	Tanda-tanda menunjukkan Indonesia tahan guncangan	Mon, 11-08-03
22	Hukuman mati Amrozi bukanlah akhir cerita	Sat, 09-08-03
23	Kita diibaratkan tambang emas di medan ranjau	Sat, 16-08-03
24	Presiden dan Wapres bergantian melawat ke luar negeri	Wed, 24-09-03
25	Presiden desak para pemimpin dunia cabut akar terorisme	Fri, 26-09-03
26	Kunjungan Bush ke Bali dalam perspektif hubungan RI-AS	Wed, 22-10-03
27	Tragedi Bom Bali Diperingati sebagai tragedy kemanusiaan	Sat, 11-10-03
Tahun 2004		
28	Ledakan bom di KPU dan pemilihan ulang di Al-Zaytun	Tues , 27-07-04
29	Momentum ini jangan sampai gagal lagi	Wed, 22-09-04

APPENDIX 4
LIST OF MEDIA INDONESIA'S EDITORIAL
(1998-2001)

No	Title	Date
1998-2000		
1	Pengakuan yang Menyakitkan	September 22 nd 98
2	Akbar-Mega Sudahlah, Guru Bangsa	April 11 th 99
3	Diamnya Mega	July 15 th 99
4	Pers yang Jujur	November 20 th 2000
2001		
1	Reformasi Kedua	January 25 th
2	Politik Tanpa Etika	February 6 th
3	Matinya Nurani Pemimpin	February 15 th
4	Godaan Buat Tentara	March 8 th
5	Indonesia Tanpa Simbol	April 18 th
6	Monster Kekuasaan	April 20 th
7	Politik (adu) Massa	January 29 th
8	Demokrasi atau Anarkhisme	May 31 st
9	Belajar Mencari Jalan Damai	June 20 th
10	Diktator Baru Negeri ini	July 23 rd
11	Selamat Datang Presiden Baru	July 24 th
12	Mega dan Juru Bicara	August 1 st
13	Membaca nurani melalui Rupiah	August 2 nd
14	Kesadaran Baru tentang Utang	August 29 th
15	Mencari Mutiara yang Hilang	September 4 th
16	Kesabaran untuk Aceh	September 9 th
17	Nasionalisme melalui Rupiah	September 28 th
18	Politik Goyang	September 30 th
19	Pujian dan Serangan terhadap Megawati	October 18 th
20	Menertawakan DPR	October 25 th
21	Seratus Hari dalam Kesunyian	November 1 st
22	Negara Harus Kuat	December 14 th
23	Contoh dari Malino	December 21 st